








The copyright of this thesis rests with the University of Cape Town. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published 
without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used 












THE FERTILITY OF THEORIES 
 
Thesis submitted by Robert Segall for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, University of Cape Town 
March 2009 
 
This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for any award of 
any degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, 
this dissertation from the work, or works, of other people has been attributed, and 
has been cited and referenced. 
 









I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Bernhard Weiss. His extremely thoughtful, 
penetrating and constructive criticisms of earlier drafts have been both an 
essential part of writing this thesis and a great and enjoyable education for me. 
 













In addition to empirical adequacy and compatibility with other current theories, 
scientific theories are commonly judged on three criteria – simplicity, elegance, 
and fertility. Fertility has received comparatively little attention in the philosophical 
literature. 
 
A definition of a certain sort of fertility, called P-fertility, proposed by Ernan 
McMullin, is that it consists in the capacity of a theory to be successfully modified 
over time to explain new experimental data or theoretical insights. McMullin 
made the major claim that he has a novel and perhaps the sole argument for 
Scientific Realism. His argument involves two strands (i) theories must be 
considered diachronically and it is an historical fact that long standing successful 
scientific theories are P-fertile, and (ii) the correct explanation of this fact is that 
these theories reflect the realities of a mind-independent world. 
 
A rebuttal of McMullin’s position given in the literature is considered and rejected. 
His argument therefore requires further consideration. The plausible first strand 
of McMullin’s argument is accepted for the purposes of discussion, and thus the 
observation requires explanation, either along McMullin’s own lines or otherwise. 
 
The concept of diachronicity and the implications of accepting a diachronic view 
of scientific theories are considered. The identity of theory across time can be 
understood both from a Realist and an Anti-realist perspective via the concept of 
significant claims in the successive versions of the long standing successful 
theories. This defuses a possible objection to McMullin’s argument, namely that 
by assuming diachronicity he begs the question against the Anti-realist. 
Explanations of the conjunction of success and P-fertility are examined from the 
perspective of Scientific Realism and the major current Anti-realist stances – 












To justify the second strand of McMullin’s argument, a notion of the approximate 
truth or of the verisimilitude of theories is required. Inter alia it is argued that a 
distinction must be made between the approximate truth of a scientific theory and 
that of a simple assertion or a simple narrative. The concepts of the approximate 
truth of scientific theories and their verisimilitude are explored and some serious 
difficulties are identified. First, it is difficult to accommodate differences in respect 
as well as in degree in delineating the nature of an approximately true theory. 
Second, it is difficult to give a satisfactory account of the metric used to assess 
the verisimilitude of theories. It is argued that in any case no version of these 
concepts can adequately support the second strand of McMullin’s thesis. This is 
because, at best, approximate truth and verisimilitude can only support a 
pragmatic claim – the improved empirical adequacy of successive versions of the 
long standing theory. In contrast, McMullin’s thesis requires that successor 
versions generally are better theories. Third, there is an intractable theory 
dependent weighting problem posed by the open ended nature of scientific 
theories in contrast with the closed narratives describing idealized models. 
 
The role of the approximate truth of scientific theories is explored, within the 
frameworks of Realism and Anti-realism, with regard to the possible responses to 
the existence of two highly successful, well corroborated, but incompatible 
theories – general relativity and quantum mechanics. It is suggested that 
Scientific Realism itself, not only McMullin’s argument for Scientific Realism, 
requires the notion of approximate truth or verisimilitude of theories. 
 
Putnam’s Internal Realism is considered, and, if as I suggest, no adequate 
account of the concepts of the approximate truth or verisimilitude of scientific 
theories can be given, Internal Realism (which need not draw on these concepts 
because of its denial that there is a unique correct description of the world) is 
more plausible than the full blooded Scientific Realism advocated by McMullin, 
despite granting the claim of the historical observation of the conjunction 
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CHAPTER 1 THE FERTILITY OF THEORIES 
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by 
external objects, resembling them: How shall this question be determined? By 
experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, 
and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the 
perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with 
objects. The supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any 
foundation in reasoning. 
David Hume1 
 
What, in brief, does science tell us about the world? This question has been a 
crucial one for philosophers since the time of Hume, who was the first to defend 
a phenomenalist ontology which would deny an intelligible structure to nature, 
and therefore by implication refuse any sort of realist view of science 
Ernan Mc Mullin2 
1.1 Introduction 
The debate between Scientific Realism and Scientific Anti-realism is partly about 
the reality of the unobservable entities3 postulated by scientific theories. Aspects 
of the debate are also about the truth or approximate truth of scientific theories. 
On the one hand contemporary science has enjoyed remarkable success, both in 
making predictions and in giving rise to major technological advances. On the 
                                            
1 Hume, D. 1999 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding T.L. Beauchamp (Ed) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 12.12. 
2 McMullin E. 1970 ‘The History and Philosophy of Science: A Taxonomy’ Minnesota Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science R. Stuewer (Ed) Volume 5 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 
p. 45. 
3 It should not be thought that these are merely huge populations of a small number of esoteric 
fundamental building blocks like electrons or quarks. The vast majority of the Earth’s living 
creatures are bacteria or other microscopic organisms. Not merely by number, but also by mass, 
these creatures outweigh the sum of visible creatures. The clear ocean, for example, is a vast 
diverse rich soup of ‘unobservable’ living forms and there is a huge mass of thermophilic bacteria 
in the earth’s crust. Moreover, there are many other unobservables of a macroscopic kind like 
dinosaurs. In addition there are unobservables that have left no known trace, like the common 











other hand the current scientific world view, most notably in physics, threatens 
cherished notions of causality and contains serious internal contradictions. 
 
Van Fraassen4 with his Constructive Empiricism claims that one should at best 
suspend belief in the unobservable entities; their existence cannot be known. He 
accepts the reality of macroscopic entities. On the other hand, the evident theory 
dependence of observations, and the continuum between the observable and the 
unobservable5, suggests that the ontological issue must be considered together 
with the wider issue of the known6 ‘underdetermination of theory by experiment’. 
The question seems then to be as much whether the current theory, say, of the 
electrical conductivity of metals is true or approximately true, as whether one is 
entitled to believe that metals exist while electrons may not7. If the theory is 
approximately true then the belief in electrons seems well founded. This last 
claim depends upon finding an understanding of the difficult concept of the 
approximate truth of scientific theories which provides a justification for the claim. 
I make some further introductory remarks on the critical issue of the approximate 
truth of theories in section 1.2. 
 
Towards the end of a book-length, scholarly account of the Scientific Realism 
versus Scientific Anti-realism debate, Kukla8 summarizes the position: ‘It is not 
inconceivable to me that someone may yet devise a novel argument that gives 
an advantage to one side or the other. But I wouldn't hold my breath.’ 
                                            
4 van Fraassen, B. C. 1980 The Scientific Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press; van Fraassen 
does not deny that theoretical statements have truth values, he is an Anti-realist about theoretical 
entities and claims that the Scientific Realist claim of truth is extravagant: science he says 
properly aims only at empirical adequacy and should eschew ‘inflationary metaphysics’. 
5 Maxwell, G. 1962 ‘The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities’ in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell 
(Eds) Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 
Volume 3 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press pp. 3-27. 
6 Logically, a finite body of evidence allows of more than one theory. However, some 
philosophers argue that empirical equivalence does not entail underdetermination because non-
empirical qualities (simplicity, elegance, explanatory power) can enable legitimate discrimination 
between empirically adequate theories. 
7 Metals are often defined in terms of their electronic structure. The remark in the text implies that 
alternatively metals can be defined as exhibiting all or most of the following physical qualities: 
they are opaque, good thermal and electrical conductors; and lustrous when polished. 












One proposed vindication of Scientific Realism arises from an argument based 
on the alleged empirical observation that successful scientific theories generally 
are fertile theories. It is argued that this conjunction of success and fertility is 
itself a decisive criterion indicating that the ‘structures postulated in the theory 
correspond reasonably well to the structures of the real.’ 9 Thus Scientific 
Realism is justified. It is this notion that will be the major focus of the present 
inquiry. The chief proponent of this interesting position is Ernan McMullin10, and 
he has a particular definition of fertility that is central to the claim. I return to his 
definition in section 1.4. 
 
Apart from empirical adequacy, theory criteria in science include fit with existing 
accepted theory (which is often incorporated within empirical adequacy), 
simplicity, elegance, and fertility (or fruitfulness)11. Simplicity is complicated12, 
and is extensively discussed in the philosophical literature. It is in any case not 
                                            
9 McMullin, E. 1976 ‘The fertility of theory and the unit for appraisal in science’ in R.S. Cohen et al 
(Eds), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Dordrecht: D. Reidel p. 423. 
10 See for example, McMullin, E. 1968 ‘What Do Physical Models Tell Us?’ in Logic, Methodology 
and Philosophy of Science, R. van Rootselaar and J.F. Staal (Eds) Amsterdam: North-Holland 
pp. 385-396; McMullin E. 1970 ‘The History and Philosophy of Science: A Taxonomy’ Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science R. Stuewer (Ed) Volume 5 Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press pp. 12-67; McMullin, E. 1976 ‘The fertility of theory and the unit for appraisal in 
science’ in R.S. Cohen et al (Eds), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 
pp.395-431; and McMullin, E. 1984 ‘A Case for Scientific Realism’ in Scientific Realism J. Leplin 
(Ed) Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 8-40. 
11 See for example Chalmers, A. 1999 What is this thing called science? Brisbane: University of 
Queensland Press. How, for example, empirical adequacy is understood and weighted will vary 
depending on the weight given to the other virtues, so that these criteria are to some extent 
interdependent. 
12 Is y = px5 + qx2 simpler than y = xz? In the latter we have linear dependence but more 
variables. Also, a relationship that looks simple in one coordinate system (say polar coordinates) 
may not do so in another (say Cartesian coordinates). Nevertheless, simplicity is widely invoked 
by scientists and perhaps the seeming arbitrariness of simplicity indicates only that it is context 
dependent (Bird, A. 1998 Philosophy of Science London: McGill-Queen’s University Press p.158). 
In any case the hypothesis that the simpler theory has higher prior probability is false, if simplicity 
depends solely on parameter counting (Curd, M. and Cover, J.C. 1998 Philosophy of Science M. 
Curd and J.C. Cover (Eds) New York: W.W. Norton and Co p. 652). Hypotheses with fewer 
parameters logically entail hypotheses with more parameters; every planet travels in a circle 
entails every planet travels in an ellipse. Thus simpler theories are less probable than more 
complex ones. (For Popper this would of course be an advantage of simple theories, but this is an 
unusual stance.) Further, physicists are inclined to see quantum theory as simple, which seems 












obvious that it is commonly used as a criterion of theory choice in science, 
although physicists in particular do sometimes invoke it. As McMullin remarks13: 
‘As theories develop, as factors at first laid aside are taken into account, the 
tendency has historically been to greater, not less, complexity.’ 
 
Elegance is admired by scientists, particularly theoretical physicists14, and even 
more by mathematicians, but is commonly ignored by philosophers in their 
critique of science (as distinct from their appraisal of philosophical theories). I 
suspect this is on the grounds that it is even more improbable that the world is 
required to be elegant than that it is required to be simple (whatever either might 
mean)15. Fertility is discussed very little by philosophers, but is regarded as 
important by scientists16. 
 
The present inquiry tries to explore why fertility is regarded as important, and 
centrally, why it might indeed be important. In relation to this last, the major 
question, as already suggested, is whether fertility can be used to argue for 
Scientific Realism. 
                                            
13 McMullin, E. 1996 ‘Epistemic Virtue and Theory Appraisal’ in Realism in the Sciences I. 
Douven, and L. Horsten (Eds) Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 1-34 p. 24. 
14 Although Einstein, against the general run of theoretical physicists, is reputed to have said, ‘If 
you are out to describe the truth, leave elegance to the tailor’. The elegance may sometimes arise 
simply because mathematics is the best language physicists have, and they regard the corpus of 
mathematics as elegant. In biology, Crick’s supremely elegant solution to the problem of the 
genetic code (why do we produce only 20 amino acids rather than 64 from a code of four ‘letters’ 
three at a time) – ‘Codes Without Commas’ – was highly regarded for some time. Nature with its 
degenerate code turned out not to be as elegant as Crick’s proposal. 
15 What theoretical physicists mean by referring to a theory as elegant is various and complicated 
and relates to a highly specialized aesthetic notion born of deep working involvement with 
abstruse theories, and the need to make tractable theories via sophisticated idealizations. It also 
often involves some notion of the necessity of aspects of the theory. For example, Newton’s 
gravitational theory took the inverse square law because this accounted for Kepler’s 
observations; Einstein’s general relativity theory must use an inverse square law. If elegance as a 
criterion of truth were to be taken in its ordinary aesthetic sense it would imply the necessity of 
the observer – an idea repugnant to the Scientific Realist. 
16 This last statement must be treated with caution since the term fertility is used in different ways. 
Some of the appeal to scientists of fertility (that is effectiveness in predicting new phenomena or 
leading to new observations or new generalizations via extension to existing theory) has little to 











1.2 Approximate Truth and Verisimilitude 
I referred at the outset to the truth or approximate truth of theories, while 
McMullin uses phrases like correspondence to the structures of the real. The 
point is important because a central part of Scientific Realism for many 
philosophers of science17 is the notion of approximate truth, or an alternative, 
namely verisimilitude. McMullin does not accept the usual account that theories 
are ‘approximately true’ or that some have greater verisimilitude than others, 
because this immediately raises the question of how near to the truth. The 
question, he believes, is in principle unanswerable. He believes that Scientific 
Realism can be accepted without an account of the approximate truth of theories 
or their verisimilitude. His response18 to the Anti-realist who demands such an 
account is to enjoin her to resist ‘… the temptation to suppose that whatever 
cannot be said in a semantically definitive way is not worth saying.’ 
 
I do not believe the problem with the approximate truth of theories that concerns 
McMullin can be avoided. There seems to be no useful distinction between the 
claim that a theory is approximately true, or alternatively has great verisimilitude 
(i.e. in relation to the mind-independent world), and 
The basic claim made by scientific realism, once again, is that the long term 
success of a scientific theory gives reason to believe that something like 
[italics added] the entities and structure postulated by the theory actually 
exists19. 
Or 
the explanatory success of a theory gives a limited warrant for the success of 
the theory or (what amounts to the same thing) for the existence of 
                                            
17 See for example Popper, K.R. 1963 Conjectures and Refutations, New York: Harper and 
Rowe; Niiniluoto, I. 1999 Critical Scientific Realism Oxford: Oxford University Press; Psillos, S. 
1999 Scientific realism: how science tracks truth New York: Routledge. 
18 McMullin, E. 1984 ‘A Case for Scientific Realism’ in Scientific Realism J. Leplin (Ed) Berkeley: 
University of California Press p. 36. 











explanatory structures roughly like [italic added] those postulated by the 
theory20. 
Or the passage21 in an argument for Scientific Realism against Instrumentalism: 
When we ask about a particular theory, how likely it is that it is true 
(correlatively, how likely it is that something like [italics added] the explanatory 
entities it postulates actually exist), it is to these virtues that we are inclined to 
turn. 
The virtues referred in the last quote are the ‘superempirical’ values like fertility, 
and of course the crucial phrase in this and the first quote is ‘something like’, and 
in the second quote ‘roughly like’. In fact, McMullin does on a number of 
occasions refer directly to the approximate truth of theories22. 
 
McMullin argues against the pertinence of approximate truth by first pointing out, 
in response to van Fraassen’s assertion that Scientific Realists must claim that 
science aims at truth, that scientists do not believe their theories to be true23. 
This is accepted by van Fraassen, and indeed is rarely contested either by 
scientists or philosophers of science. McMullin goes on to say that the scientist 
claims her theories give some insight into the structures of the world but she 
could not say ‘how good that insight is’24. This seems to be the issue; scientists 
reject one theory in favour of another precisely on some judgment of the 
goodness of the insight. They make comparisons, as they must, between 
competing theories. McMullin might be right to question this, and to affirm that 
the scientists indeed do not know how good their insights are. However, the 
challenge then is to justify claims about the progressive nature of science and its 
                                            
20 McMullin, E. 1996 ‘Epistemic Virtue and Theory Appraisal’ in Realism in the Sciences I. 
Douven and L. Horsten (Eds) Leuven: Leuven University Press pp. 1-34, p. 29. 
21 McMullin, E. 1993 ‘Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science’ World Changes: Thomas 
Kuhn and the Nature of Science, P.G. Horwich (Ed), reprinted in Philosophy of Science M. Curd 
and J.A. Cover (Eds) New York W.W. Norton and Company pp. 119-138 p. 135. 
22 McMullin, E. 1985 ‘Galilean Idealization’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 16, 247-
273 p. 262; McMullin, E. 1987 ‘Explanatory Success and the Truth of Theory’ in N. Rescher (Ed) 
Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective Lanham: University Press of America p. 70; 
McMullin, E. 1996 ‘Epistemic Virtue and Theory Appraisal’ in Realism in the Sciences I. Douven 
and L. Horsten (Eds) Leuven: Leuven University Press pp. 1-34, p. 29. 
23 McMullin, E. 1984 op. cit. p. 35. 











realist pretensions, while implicitly denying that scientists can meaningfully make 
claims that one theory is nearer to the truth than another. 
 
It does not get us out of the dilemma of necessary comparison to contend25, 
‘The language of theoretical explanation is of a quite special sort. It is open-
ended and capable of ever further development.’ This statement is a useful 
pointer to McMullin’s view of scientific theory as metaphor and his insightful 
thesis about the fertility of theories. Nevertheless McMullin needs to be able to 
claim that the successive versions of the progressively modified successful 
theory are in general improvements with regard to proximity to describing the 
mind-independent world. 
 
In a later paper McMullin says26, 
first that a scientific realist is committed to attributing some sort of truth-value 
to successful theories, and second, that the measure of truthlikeness or 
likelihood to be attributed to the theory is precisely the degree of explanatory 
success the theory is taken to have shown. 
He amplifies this by giving an example, saying that the striking success of the 
plate tectonic model gives good reason for the geologist to believe it is true that 
the continents and ocean floors are carried on massive rocky plates in slow 
relative motion. And he adds, reasonably, that the theory is approximate because 
it is not definitive, while not wanting to acknowledge that current plate tectonic 
theory is approximately true. Now the Scientific Anti-realist philosopher and the 
Scientific Realist philosopher both accept (in their legitimate shared ignorance) 
what the leading geologists are currently saying about the basic ideas in plate 
tectonics. The reasonableness of current science is not in dispute; the problem is 
that it seems impossible to get away from the facts that (i) scientists do not 
believe their theories are true; (ii) they necessarily make judgments about the 
relative merits of theories; and (iii) science is a rational activity. If the comparative 
                                            
25 Ibid p. 36 
26 McMullin, E. 1987 ‘Explanatory Success and the Truth of Theory’ in N. Rescher (Ed) Scientific 











judgments made by Scientific Realists are not based on the truth or approximate 
truth or verisimilitude of the competing theories, it is difficult to see what they can 
mean. It is possible to take the metaphysical stance that there is a mind-
independent world, which we cannot know at all, but that is not the doctrine of 
Scientific Realism, as is discussed in the next section. 
 
There are of course different types of theory, some avowedly instrumental, such 
as idealizing masses as point masses, or talking about rigid bodies, or taking a 
fluid to be a continuum. The Scientific Realist does not take such theories to be 
true or approximately true of a mind-independent world in the sense that they 
closely describe that hypothesized world. Thus, approximately true when said of 
such theories, refers primarily to their empirical adequacy and explanatory 
power. However, theories describing the electron or the hydrogen bond are 
believed to be near to describing the nature of these entities. For such theories 
for the Scientific Realist (in the full blooded sense that McMullin is attempting to 
establish) it is a necessary claim that successive versions of the theories in a 
given domain progressively increasingly resemble the true nature of the mind-
independent world. This progress may not be monotonic27, but the claimed 
approach to the structure of the real requires a usable concept of the 
approximate truth or the verisimilitude of theories. 
 
As McMullin writes28: 
The guiding insight here is that if a theory displays just the sort of resources 
over time that one would expect if it were (approximately) true, this gives a 
prima facie case for supposing that it is in fact (approximately) true. 
 
                                            
27 With hindsight good reasons can sometimes be seen for the progress not to be monotonic. 
Drude’s classical theory explained Ohm’s Law, but subsequently Bloch’s quantum mechanical 
account showed that electrons would experience no resistance in propagating through a periodic 
lattice. The role of impurities, lattice defects and thermal fluctuations restored resistance within 
the quantum story. 
28 McMullin, E. 1996 ‘Epistemic Virtue and Theory Appraisal’ in Realism in the Sciences I. 











These issues, around approximate truth and verisimilitude, in what one might call 
causal theories like these last, and those like the fluid example, are taken up in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
1.3 Scientific Realism 
Ladyman29, in prefacing his account of Scientific Realism, lays out a common 
form of Realism which he characterizes as follows. 
If we incorporate both metaphysical and semantic realism about some subject 
matter S (which could be ethics, mathematics, aesthetics or theoretical 
science, among others) and add an epistemic requirement we get a strong 
form of realism about S: 
(i) the entities or kinds of entities talked about and/or described by a 
discourse about S exist; 
(ii) their existence is independent of our knowledge and minds. 
These are the metaphysical requirements.  
(iii) Statements about S are irreducible/ineliminable and are genuinely 
assertoric expressions; 
(iv) truth conditions for statements of S are objective and determine the truth 
or falsity of those statements depending on how things stand in the world. 
These semantic requirements are cashed out in terms of a correspondence 
theory of truth, as opposed to a pragmatic or a coherence theory of truth. 
(v) Truths about S are knowable and we do in fact know some of them, and 
hence the terms of S successfully refer to things in the world. 
This is the epistemic requirement. 
 
Ladyman adds that If we now take S to be science we have a Scientific Realist 
position. There is an alternative Scientific Realist position which is to accept all of 
                                            











the Ladyman account except for the commitment to a Correspondence Theory of 
truth30. 
1.4 McMullin’s P-fertility 
We can return now to the claim that fertility of theories can provide support for 
Scientific Realism and begin with an account of the supposed virtue of fertility. 
 
Scientists generally regard novel prediction as a highly significant indicator of the 
value of a proposed theory31. Whether this is justified is a matter of controversy 
among both scientists and philosophers of science, and I return to this question 
shortly. However, the first point is that it is common to equate novel prediction 
with fertility, that is, if a theory makes novel predictions32 it is a fertile theory. This 
is not the definition that McMullin uses in his argument that fertility is a ground for 
believing that the fertility of well established theories is evidence for Scientific 
Realism. Before moving on to McMullin’s definition of fertility it is useful to say 
something further about novel prediction, which is a related concept. 
 
From a logical point of view there is no reason to value more highly the 
explanation of facts, which emerged after the development of a theory, than 
those facts known at the time the theory was developed33. Nevertheless, as 
                                            
30 The possibility of a Scientific Realist position not incorporating a correspondence theory of truth 
is rejected by some writers. For example, Sankey (Sankey, H. 2004 ‘Scientific Realism: An 
Elaboration and a Defence’ Knowledge and the World: Challenges beyond the Science Wars M. 
Carrier, J. Roggenhofer, G. Küppers and P. Blanchard (Eds) Berlin: Springer Verlag p. 69) says, 
‘Correspondence theories which treat truth as a relation between language and reality are the 
only theories of truth compatible with realism.’ 
31 Not all historians of science agree with the more ambitious claim, which is commonly made by 
scientists themselves, that scientists value this most highly. Scerri and Worrall state that 
Mendeleeff’s contemporaries were more impressed with his ordering of the known elements than 
his correct predictions of the finding of new elements (Scerri, E.R. and Worrall, J. 2001 ‘Prediction 
and the Periodic Table’ Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 32A, 407-452). Of 
course this example, even if fully established, tells us little about the claimed generalization. 
32 A novel prediction in this context is an outcome of the theory under consideration that is 
subsequently confirmed, was not evident when the theory was formulated and clashes with 
current expectations. 
33 Matters are somewhat more complicated. If a scientist, unaware of some important fact that 
was known to others, developed a theory, and yet the theory explained that fact, this would be 
seen as impressive evidence for her theory. Moreover, it is not just the explanation of ‘new’ facts 











already mentioned, an explanation of ‘new’ facts is more highly valued by 
scientists. Inter alia it suggests that a theory is not ad hoc. I do not here mean ad 
hoc in the sense that the theory has been built to explain the known facts – all 
theories are rightly built like this. I mean that the development of the theory may 
have been fudged to fit all the known facts, whereas a theory built to explain 
some subset of these facts, which then predicts the remaining (predicted) facts, 
can not have been fudged to fit these unknown (predicted) facts. This brief 
account, sufficient for immediate purposes, derives from the extensive account 
given by Lipton34. Lipton illuminates the point by an analogy with deducing a 
missing word in a crossword puzzle using the clue alone or using the clue plus 
the letters provided by intersecting words. The result of the former method, if it 
then fits the given letters as well as the other constraints, has greater credibility 
compared with the latter method. It should be stressed that fudged as used here 
is not meant to suggest any impropriety; it simply means that the weight 
appropriate to various pieces of evidence may have been wrongly estimated35. 
 
Fertility, as McMullin uses it, is not to be equated with novel prediction. The 
important element as McMullin sees it is the ‘actual success the theory has had 
in opening up new areas, in meeting anomalies, and so forth’36 via the 
modifications made in the historical course of the development of the theory. This 
                                                                                                                                  
intention of the theory to explain. Again, from a logical point of view, the proposed theory gains no 
explanatory merit by virtue of the ignorance of the person propounding it.  
34 Lipton, P. 2004 Inference to the Best Explanation 2nd edition London: Routledge Chapter 10. 
35 On the other hand something questionable may take place. John Ziman, himself an able 
theoretical physicist, makes the following remark. ‘Obviously general agreement between theory 
and experiment is very satisfying, but one must always be conscious of the possibility that the 
theory may have been tailored to fit the known facts. Professional theoretical physicists are 
trained to look for adjustable parameters in other people’s theories that might have been used for 
this purpose.’ (Ziman, J.M. 1981 Puzzles, Problems and Enigmas Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 40) 
36 McMullin, E. 1976 ‘The fertility of theory and the unit for appraisal in science’ in R.S. Cohen et 
al (Eds), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, p. 400. This notion of fertility 
was advocated earlier by Frank, but as a criterion of theory acceptance, not as an argument for 
Scientific Realism. Frank writes: ‘The most important reason for the acceptance of a theory 
beyond the “scientific criterions” in the narrower sense (agreement with observation and simplicity 
of the mathematical pattern) is the fitness of a theory to be generalized, to be the basis of a new 
theory that does not logically follow from the original one, and to allow prediction of more 
observational facts.’ (Frank, P.G. 1961 ‘The Variety of Reasons for the Acceptance of Scientific 











McMullin calls proven fertility (P-fertility), which he contrasts with untested 
promise (U-fertility)37. P-fertility then is the success of the theory as traced 
historically since its inception. 
 
There is a difficulty here in deciding what constitutes the continuous life of a 
theory as it is modified to explain anomalies or to accommodate new or more 
accurate data; when does a theory change sufficiently to be deemed a new 
theory? (This issue is taken up in section 2.2.) Nevertheless, there seems 
sometimes to be comparatively clear continuity. The kinetic theory of gases with 
its point molecules and its elastic collisions can perhaps properly be seen as the 
same theory when allowance is made for particles of finite size (intermolecular 
repulsive forces) and intermolecular attractive forces. Conversely, special 
relativity is arguably a clear break from Newtonian mechanics. 
 
This difficult and essential question as to what constitutes the life of a theory on 
McMullin’s diachronic view of theory appraisal is taken up in Chapter 2.  
 
As I have just remarked, the notion of proven fertility is inextricably connected 
with the point that the theory must be considered as it develops over time. This is 
not inconsistent with the claims of Scientific Realism, since in general it is only for 
theories that have been explanatorily successful for a considerable period (albeit 
modified) that the claim is made that they are approximately true, and the 
unobservable entities they postulate are real. 
 
P-fertility consists not in outcomes entailed by the theory in its original form, and 
for which the theory was designed. P-fertility consists in the explanation of new or 
additional phenomena via modifications in the original theory. These successive 
modifications are suggested by the theory in its original and then in its 
                                            
37 The interest in U-fertility would be the practical value it would have (if one could estimate it) in 
deciding that a theory was worth pursuing because of its high developmental promise, that is, 
high U-fertility. Nolan likens it to the value of a lottery ticket (Nolan, D. 1999 ‘Is Fertility Virtuous in 











successive forms, and require creative input. As I have said, P-fertility is not, on 
McMullin’s stance, novel prediction. It is widely accepted that a theory that 
explains data not known at its inception, and especially, remote from the data 
used in developing the theory, is particularly convincing. Sometimes these new 
facts will have been entailed by the theory in its original form; these entailed facts 
will constitute novel prediction. However, these facts do not bear on the issue of 
fertility as McMullin uses the notion in his P-fertility; they are simply strong 
confirmation of the theory. A classic case is Fresnel’s theory, which entailed the 
bright spot at the centre of the shadow, a phenomenon that was not known at the 
time the theory was proposed. This is not P-fertility. It is of course novel 
prediction38. 
 
A theory with a track record of successful successive modifications, arising 
naturally from the successive forms of the theory, is precisely a P-fertile theory. 
The theory viewed from the perspective of fertility is a changing entity, 
progressively requiring creative input from scientists. As a result, this concept of 
fertility lies outside the scope of a strict logical analysis of the merits of a theory 
since it is in part a historical question. Whether a theory has proved to be fertile 
will be, for example, partly a result of the intensity of interest in the theory 
manifested by the scientific community. This in turn will depend on factors like 
the perceived importance of the theory, and this, in its turn, may sometimes 
depend on factors that have nothing to do with scientific questions but may turn 
on the exigencies of societal needs. Thus a ‘potentially’ P-fertile theory in some 
obscure esoteric area of science may remain undeveloped and have little P-
fertility. Further, the P-fertility of a theory will depend upon the talent of the 
scientists engaged with the theory during its lifetime and on other contingent 
factors. 
 
                                            
38 The phenomenon was calculated by Poisson to be entailed by Fresnel’s theory; some 
historians claim that Poisson believed at the time that this improbable result (in fact swiftly 











McMullin likens a good theory to a metaphor. It is suggestive in the same way 
and also hints at the unattainability of a final definitive theory. He has in mind not 
so much a striking phrase such as ‘her mother is a tiger’, but rather an extended 
metaphor like Plato's metaphor of the shadows on the wall of the cave. I am not 
referring here to the brevity of the metaphor but rather to its depth. Short 
metaphors like ‘society is a sea’, ‘marriage is a zero sum game’, ‘The Lord is my 
Shepherd’ or ‘poverty is a crime’ have far reaching resonance and 
suggestiveness39. 
 
McMullin sees a model as always accompanying the theory. 
A theory is intended not as a description of what one already has, but as an 
hypothesis, something that goes beyond the evidence by introducing a 
postulated physical structure that could provide a causal account of the data 
to be explained, although it is not (as yet, at least) itself directly observable. 
The structure here is called a ‘model’ every theory has a model associated 
with it, otherwise it could not serve to explain. It would be merely descriptive 
in intent. 40 
McMullin is not exclusively using model here as it is used by the logician, as ‘an 
entity that “satisfies” a formal system; i.e., if this entity be taken as an 
interpretation of the system, it makes all the statements of the system true.’41 The 
theory comes from the model and the model is not to be equated with the theory. 
For McMullin the model constructed by the scientist is built in the hope that it 
contains ‘surplus content’ and a good model does indeed do so. It is true that ‘the 
statements of the theory apply correctly to the model.’42 A model is a system 
whose characteristics are specified by a stipulation as to how its terms are to be 
used, and McMullin’s concept of a model does not exclude examples that meet 
                                            
39 These are cited in Black, M. 1993 ‘More about metaphor’ in Metaphor and Thought 2nd edition 
A. Ortony (Ed), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
40 McMullin, E. 1968 ‘What Do Physical Models Tell Us?’ in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy 
of Science, R. van Rootselaar and J.F. Staal (Eds) Amsterdam: North-Holland p. 388. 
41 McMullin, E. 1974 ‘Models and Analogies in Science’ New Catholic Encyclopedia Washington 
DC: CUA Press (Supplementary Volume) 16, 295-299 p.298. 











the logician’s criteria for a model. For example, a Newtonian Particle System is a 
system that satisfies the three laws of motion and the law of universal gravitation. 
Thus a Newtonian model could be used to represent the Earth/Moon system as a 
two body system uninfluenced by any other matter in the universe (the Earth and 
the Moon might be taken as ideal spheres with a rotation-symmetric mass 
distribution). The resulting model then is an interpretation (or realization) of the 
general law. Obviously, other less idealized models could be made of this 
Newtonian system. 
 
The metaphor parallel is a way of explaining the role of the initial complex of 
model and theory in suggesting modifications that might be made. The model 
and the theory, like a metaphor, are not exactly how things are, but are 
suggestive, often by analogical argument, in getting insight into the way things 
‘really’ are (Greek metaphero, to carry over, translate, change, transfer). The 
theory like a good poetic metaphor suggests to the creative mind ways in which 
the theory/model might be augmented or modified43. These changes are not 
guaranteed to be in the direction of improvement. As Black44 says of metaphor, 
‘Ambiguity is a necessary by-product of the metaphor’s suggestiveness.’ 
McMullin uses the Bohr Theory of the hydrogen atom as an example. The simple 
planetary model of an electron, conceived of as a small particle of mass m 
revolving in fixed orbits around the stationary heavier nucleus of mass M, swiftly 
suggested a modified model where the two particles rotate around a common 
centre. This allowed an explanation for the slight difference between the spectral 
lines of ionized helium and the hydrogen atom because M/m is different in the 
two cases. 
 
                                            
43 Some writers see the use of metaphor in science as distinct from its use in literature and would 
object to this parallel. For a review see Montuschi, E. 2000 ‘Metaphor in Science’ in A Companion 
to the Philosophy of Science W.H. Newton-Smith (Ed) Oxford: Blackwell pp. 277-282. 
44 Black, M. 1993 ‘More about metaphor’ in Metaphor and Thought 2nd edition A. Ortony (Ed) 











McMullin does not give an extensive discussion of his notion of metaphor45, but 
he is suggesting that current theory, like metaphor, is what generates the ideas 
that extend existing theory. 
A fertile theory is one with the capacity to grow and change. These changes 
are not simply logical extensions of the original theory into new contexts; they 
are the product of creative imagination rather than strict logic. They are part of 
the resources of the original theory, not as predictions (novel or otherwise) 
would be, but as the sorts of hints one would expect a good metaphor to 
provide when it is set against new contexts.46 
A metaphor is not best seen as a form of simile – by saying her mother is a tiger 
we are not saying she is like a tiger. As Searle says47,  
Similarity is a vacuous predicate; and any two things are similar in some 
respect or other. …’Juliet is the sun’ does not mean ‘Juliet is for the most part 
gaseous’ or ‘Juliet is 90 million miles from the earth,’ both of which properties 
are salient and well-known features of the sun. 
A metaphor makes us apply concepts from a familiar source domain to a target 
domain. A common example is the treating of life as a journey, the latter being 
familiar – ‘our life together is going nowhere’, ‘it will be a rocky road’, and ‘we 
have reached a dead end’ – to take some gloomy examples. The question is 
whether metaphors can be creative. Black48 illuminates this issue by considering 
the following question, ‘Did the slow-motion appearance of a galloping horse 
exist before the invention of cinematography?’ The metaphor is seen as a 
cognitive instrument, like cinematography here. Likewise I believe the model 
conjoined to the scientific theory is in McMullin’s view a cognitive instrument in 
just this way. 
                                            
45 Bradie, in a generally sympathetic account of McMullin’s position remarks, ’we can nowhere 
find a clear statement of McMullin’s concept of metaphor’ (Bradie, M. 1980 ‘Models, Metaphors, 
and Scientific Realism’ Nature and System 2, 3-20 p. 5). 
46 McMullin, E. 1979 ‘The Ambiguity of ‘Historicism’ Current Research in Philosophy of Science 
P.D. Asquith and H.E. Kyburg (Eds) Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association p. 60. 
47 Searle, J. 1979 ‘Metaphor’ in Metaphor and Thought A. Ortony (Ed) 2nd edition Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press p. 106. 












For McMullin, P-fertility is of vital importance because in his view it provides the 
main, and perhaps the only, support for Scientific Realism. He argues that the 
progressive development of theory in dealing with new data, with anomalies, and 
in being extended to new domains, can only be explained on the basis of 
Scientific Realism. This claim is discussed in the following sections. 
1.5 Scientific Realism and P-fertility 
P-fertile theories and their associated models are successful. It is important to 
recognize that this is an empirical claim. We can take ‘successful’ here to mean 
that they have continued to be used and accepted as ‘approximately true’ by 
practicing scientists. This in turn means that they have proved empirically 
adequate over an extended period (this has involved modification) and have 
appeared to be explanatory. For the scientist a successful theory is an 
acceptable theory, that is, the criterion for acceptability is success. Newton’s 
immensely successful theory was finally superseded because inter alia it could 
not give an adequate account of the Michelson-Morley experiment and there was 
an alternative that could. 
 
To quote McMullin49 on his concept of P-fertility, ‘This kind of fertility is a 
persistent feature of structural explanations in the natural sciences over the last 
three centuries and especially during the last century’. He remarks in an earlier 
paper50, ‘What counts, perhaps, most of all in favour of a theory is not just its 
success in prediction but what might be called its resilience, its ability to meet 
anomaly in a creative and fruitful way.’ Here he is claiming that the historical 
record shows that his P-fertility has been demonstrated to be a feature of long 
standing accepted theories. His point is that this is a contingent feature of the 
history of science. It is possible, for example, in his view, that it could have been 
                                            
49 McMullin, E. 1984 ‘A Case for Scientific Realism’ in Scientific Realism J. Leplin (Ed) Berkeley: 
University of California Press p. 33. 
50 McMullin, E, 1975 ‘History and Philosophy of Science: A Marriage of Convenience?’ Boston 
studies in the philosophy of science 32, 585-601 p. 597. It is clear from the context that McMullin 











the case that long standing successful theories may not have shown P-fertility51. 
Modification to them might have resulted from the compelling nature of evidence 
and a requirement for a radical innovation not related to or stemming from the 
existing version of the theory. Alternatively, it might have been the case that long 
standing successful theories were unattainable; the history of science could have 
been an abrupt erratic kaleidoscope of theoretical positions. His argument for 
Scientific Realism, as I have tried to emphasize, is not an a priori argument52. In 
other words the quoted ‘what counts most’ claim is intended by McMullin to be 
the same claim as the quoted ‘persistent feature’ remark above. The wording of 
the ‘what counts most’ remark could alternatively be interpreted as suggesting 
that P-fertility is the criterion for success and acceptability, but I think this would 
be incorrect53. McMullin is claiming that acceptable/successful theories have 
been P-fertile as a matter of historical fact. It is on this that his Scientific Realist 
claim relies. 
 
The argument thus goes as follows. First, P-fertility has been found from the 
historical record to be a feature of successful/accepted theories. Second, the 
proper unit of theory appraisal is the historically evolving theory. That is, the 
claims for truth or approximate truth are made properly for long standing 
successful theories that of necessity have been modified over time54. Third, the 
theory incorporates a model, and it is primarily the model that suggests the 
modifications to the theory (and to the model itself), that take place over time. 
What makes it heuristically sensible to proceed in this way is the belief that 
the original model does give a relatively good fit to the real structure of the 
                                            
51 McMullin, E. 1984 ‘A Case for Scientific Realism’ in Scientific Realism J. Leplin (Ed) Berkeley: 
University of California Press, pp. 8-40, p. 33. 
52 Some Scientific Anti-realists who point to numerous successful theories that have ultimately 
proved to be false contest McMullin’s empirical claim. The argument then revolves around various 
issues such as whether the theories failed in essential, rather than peripheral, respects. In any 
case, McMullin is rightly insistent that Scientific Realism does not entail the claim that all 
successful theories approach the structure of the ‘real’. 
53 He makes this point clear in his extended account of the development of the Bohr Theory of the 
atom given in several of his papers. 
54 There is an inescapable vagueness about the term ‘long-standing’ here. It is probably fair to 












explanandum object. Without such a fit there would be no reason for the 
model to exhibit this sort of fertility. This gives perhaps the strongest grounds 
for the thesis of scientific realism.55 
 
McMullin says that as a matter of historical fact it can be shown that the theories 
which have been successful have over time shown P-fertility. For this not to be 
circular, McMullin has to persuade us that the criteria for success can be 
asserted independently of P-fertility. His criteria as I understand him are internal 
consistency, consistency with other well established theories, lack of ad hoc 
features, explanatory power, continued empirical adequacy and, where 
appropriate, continued novel prediction56. 
 
Although the history of modern science is immensely complicated, it is useful to 
grant McMullin his not implausible empirical claim, and on this basis, to examine 
the claim that this leads us to Scientific Realism. The acceptance of McMullin’s 
position incorporates the reasonable further concession that each of the theory 
modifications suggested itself to the innovators as at least partially a 
consequence of the then existing theory/model. 
 
Given this empirical fact McMullin then takes for granted that a hypothetical true 
theory, that is, one which described the world as it is, would be successful57. 
Further, he implicitly assumes an approximately true theory, that is, one that in 
his terminology gives an ‘approximate insight into the real structure of the object 
                                            
55 McMullin, E. 1985 ‘Galilean Idealization’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 16, 247-
273 p. 264. 
56 McMullin, E. 1987 ‘Explanatory Success and the Truth of Theory’ in N. Rescher (Ed) Scientific 
Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective Lanham: University Press of America. 
57 Logically, truth is neither necessary nor sufficient for success. It is not necessary since a false 
premise can lead to true conclusions (numerous writers have noted that Ptolemaic astronomy 
was quite successful in predicting eclipses). It is not sufficient since there may currently be no 
evidence for a true theory or a true theory might be conjoined with false auxiliary assumptions 
from another domain (Lyons, T.D. 2003 ’Explaining the Success of a Scientific Theory’ 











studied’58, would be successful and hence acceptable. This is not obvious 
although plausible. However, its degree of plausibility is a subtle question 
involving the complex and elusive notion of approximate truth. I return to this 
important question in Chapter 3. 
 
Now given the empirical claim we have just conceded, and given the claim about 
approximately true theories, the central question is whether the explanation of 
the fact that successful theories are fertile is that they are approximately true. 
 
Obviously, all P-fertile theories are successful – this is inherent in P-fertility 
definition – but we must explain why most successful theories are P-fertile. This 
is explained if P-fertile theories are generally approximately true, since as has 
just been asserted, approximately true theories will be generally be successful. 
This then is an abductive argument; it does not say if a theory is P-fertile then it is 
successful (which as already mentioned is a given from the definition of P-fertile). 
Nor does it say if a theory is successful then it is P-fertile; it says simply that the 
common conjunction of P-fertility and success is explicable if both follow from 
approximate truth59. 
 
If P-fertile theories were not approximately true, how can one otherwise account 
for the commonality of P-fertility and long term success? If they were far from the 
truth, yet empirically adequate, what accounts for the fact that they have the 
inherent capacity for modification which leads to their successful modification? 
                                            
58 McMullin, E. 1970 ‘The History and Philosophy of Science: A Taxonomy’ Minnesota Studies in 
the Philosophy of Science R. Steuewer (Ed) Volume 5 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press pp. 12-67 p. 14. 
59 It seems that each of the successor theories that constitute the P-fertile theory must be 
approximately true. Worrall draws attention to what he calls the non-transitivity of approximate 
truth (Worrall, J. 1989 ‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds’ Dialectica 43, 99-124 
(reprinted in D. Papineau (Ed) 1996 The Philosophy of Science Oxford: Oxford University Press)). 
He says if we took photographs at one second intervals of a developing tadpole, each would be 
approximately like the previous one, but the final photograph would be of a frog, which does not 
resemble a tadpole. McMullin could however respond that all the members of a limited sequence 











As Bradie60 puts McMullin’s argument, ‘The grounds for construing theoretical 
models realistically is the ‘striking success’ enjoyed by the models associated 
with fertile theories.’ 
 
We need however to consider successful P-fertile theories that are now known to 
be false. The usual example is the phlogiston theory of combustion proposed at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century. Briefly, a metal heated in air gave up its 
phlogiston and became the oxide (calx), and a metal oxide heated in the 
presence of charcoal became the metal as a result of absorbing the phlogiston 
from the (phlogiston rich) charcoal. Not only did the theory hold sway for a very 
long time but it also made successful predictions61 despite the fact that 
phlogiston is non existent. 
 
All theories that claim to represent reality do get modified as the result of new 
data. This does not tell us very much – new facts emerge from research and they 
sometimes conflict to a degree with the current theory or theories. If they cannot 
be accommodated by modification we need a Kuhnian revolution62. Whether 
theories are substantially true or substantially false, the gathering of new 
evidence will lead to their modification. In the case of substantially false theories, 
McMullin’s empirical claim is that modification does not in general prove viable. 
So what about the theories involving phlogiston, caloric, or the aether, which 
were false and successfully modified over a considerable period? 
                                            
60 Bradie, M. 1980 ‘Models, Metaphors, and Scientific Realism’ Nature and System 2, 3-20 p. 9. 
61 Joseph Priestly predicted ‘correctly’ that phlogiston, produced by the action of a metal on HCl, 
would convert an oxide to the corresponding metal. Curiously it was well known at the time, and 
indeed had been known well before the phlogiston theory was proposed, that a metal increased 
in mass when converted to its calx. This anomaly was ignored and remained unexplained 
because the theory ‘successfully’ explained what we would now call oxidation and reduction of 
metals, and it had no serious rival (Conant, J.B. 1963 ‘The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory’ in 
Science: Method and Meaning S. Rapport and H. Wright (Eds) New York: New York University 
Press pp. 88-106.) Even more striking is the prediction, made by both Dalton and Gay-Lussac on 
the basis of the caloric theory, that the rate of increase of volume with temperature at constant 
pressure would be the same for all gases (Losee, J. 2004 Theories of Scientific Progress London: 
Routledge Chapter 15). 
62 This is a rather crude account. It is not necessary to accept Kuhn’s radical division between 
normal science and revolutionary science. The point here is merely that if modification is not 












One can immediately say two things in response to the long term success of the 
phlogiston theory. First, McMullin’s claim is that he is drawing conclusions from a 
valid generalization not an exceptionless law. He is making an abductive 
argument and claiming that in the absence of an alternative explanation his is a 
legitimate inference. Second, one cannot ignore the dramatic difference between 
contemporary science and its eighteenth century and earlier predecessors. 
McMullin makes his claim about the P-fertility of successful theories with regard 
to recent science. He could not make his claims about early Greek and 
subsequent speculations about, for example, cosmology or the fundamental 
nature of matter. False theories were commonly generated from what we now 
know to have been hopelessly false theories. However, modern science is hugely 
cumulative and finding examples of twentieth and twenty-first century science 
where we have successful theories which were subsequently abandoned, rather 
than substantially incorporated into later versions, is difficult63. 
 
Smart64 makes this point forcefully: 
One trouble about testing scientific realism in the light of history is that 
science has changed so much over the centuries. The Ptolemaic cosmology 
is so anthropocentric and foreign to us now. We know the distances of the 
sun, stars, and galaxies so that it does not seem at all surprising that the 
Ptolemaic system was overthrown. This should not suggest that all 
contemporary physical theories will one day be overthrown. 
 
Kukla65 makes a related point in resisting the Pessimistic Meta Induction: 
                                            
63 In 1963 D.J. deSolla Price estimated that 80 to 90 percent of all scientists who had ever lived 
were then alive (deSolla Price, D.J. Little Science, Big Science New York: Columbia University 
Press Reissue edition (August 1986)). This is a striking figure since it is conservatively estimated 
that fewer than one in ten of all people who have ever lived is currently alive. The proportion of all 
scientific knowledge that is post nineteenth century science, given the cumulative nature of the 
power of scientific investigation, is probably considerably greater than 90%. 
64 Smart, J.J.C. 2000 ‘What is This Thing Called Philosophy of Science?’ Metascience 9, 172-202 
p. 190. 











Suffice it to say that the falsehood of our past theories, all by itself, is a very 
weak basis for projecting that falsehood onto our present theories. If we were 
marching steadily toward an attainable goal of absolute theoretical truth, our 
interim theoretical accounts of the world might nevertheless all be false until 
we got very close to the end. 
There is clearly some danger in arguing for the superiority of modern science. It 
is a feature of any contemporary view to see itself as substantially correct66. 
There is every reason to believe that the Babylonians had great faith in their 
cosmology. On the other hand, comparing the experimentally determined human 
genome with that of other mammals and then with pre-mammalian creatures, 
and tracing the differences and similarities, seems a different practice from the 
predominately armchair science of previous eras. The human, financial and 
technical resources used in high energy particle physics or genomics to establish 
new data under controlled conditions are so different from the resources 
available to Johannes Kepler or William Harvey and their peers that it seems a 
different enterprise67. The long standing success and seeming P-fertility of older 
theories can be attributed by McMullin to the less severe critical environment.  
 
Another factor supporting the greater credibility of recent science, at least for the 
Scientific Realist, is the cumulative and interactive nature of the enterprise. It has 
often been possible to develop one branch of science as a result of seemingly 
unrelated advances elsewhere. For example, there was for a long time evidence 
from the fossil record that the Earth was very ancient. However, in the nineteenth 
century it seemed impossible to scientists that the Earth could be more than 
about 100 million years old, because there seemed to be no way in which the 
                                            
66 On the other hand, the basis for the claim that past scientific theories have been shown to be 
false is commonly that current theories show them to be false, that is, it is assumed that there is 
significant truth in current theories. 
67 Norris (Norris, C. 2004 Philosophy of Language and the Challenge to Scientific Realism 
London: Routledge p. 12) remarks in a different context, ‘Locke might not have so forcefully 
denied the possibility of advancing from “nominal” to “real” essences or definitions had he been 
less struck by the limits of contemporary scientific knowledge with regard to just such matters.’ It 
does seem a radical change to be able to say that gold is the element of atomic number 79, 











sun could have continued to produce the energy it does and to have existed for 
more than this length of time. Once nuclear fusion was understood this difficulty 
disappeared. 
 
Thus considerations about the difference between contemporary and earlier 
science might suggest that the persistence of false scientific theories prior to the 
Enlightenment is not a legitimate concern for McMullin. However, critics might not 
unreasonably argue that the maturity of different fields will differ chronologically. 
Some might say that the phlogiston theory, considered above, was sufficiently 
sophisticated to be seen as a mature theory in the field of combustion. This 
enjoyed wide support for nearly one hundred years from about 1700. Why was it 
successful and P-fertile, while both false and not continuous with what Lavoisier 
proposed? McMullin might deny that it was P-fertile, and argue with some justice 
that it persisted (in an earlier era) for want of an alternative. Perhaps also he 
might argue that the eighteenth century was still pre-modern as far as this branch 
of chemistry is concerned. Alternatively, he could suggest that it was simply an 
accident that a false theory showed P-fertility; something merely highly unlikely 
but certainly not impossible on McMullin’s stance. The limited scope and 
substantial imprecision of the experimental evidence at the time meant that the 
theory was not easily falsified. Besides, the idea of a fluid used in combustion, 
although empty, can be seen with hindsight to be suggestive. This last would 
demand that historical analysis showed that such success of false P-fertile 
theories was rare in modern science (on the basis of some account of what 
constituted a mature science). Finally, there are those who claim, I believe 
implausibly, that Lavoisier’s theory of combustion is a (substantial) modification 
of the phlogiston theory. (It is odd to claim that a cylinder of phlogiston contains 
the absence of oxygen.) 
1.6 Another Form of Fertility (E-fertility) 
Before considering a major criticism of McMullin’s argument in the following 











relation to the widely held view among scientists of the great value of fertility. It is 
important to disentangle this common view from the evaluation of P-fertility as 
defined by McMullin. The merits or demerits of McMullin’s case may be clouded 
by confusing it with a view that sees fertility either as novel prediction (already 
discussed) or as mere suggestiveness. I consider an example below of 
fruitfulness or fertility which is seen as valuable but has little to do with McMullin’s 
argument. The purpose of the present digression is to make clear the complexity 
of the concept of fertility as it is broadly used as a term of esteem in science, and 
to contrast it with the quite specific P-fertility that provides McMullin’s case for 
Scientific Realism. 
 
Sometimes (rarely) an experiment is determined by theory in that a specific 
definitive experiment is suggested that will discriminate between two rival 
theories. Alternatively, an experiment may test a prediction entailed by a single 
theory, and provide either confirmation or disconfirmation. There are classic 
experiments of this sort, and these are the bread-and-butter of philosophers of 
science. The quintessential example is perhaps the Michelson-Morley 
experiment. However, as I shall argue, many experiments are not of these types; 
they are essentially exploratory. 
 
Commonly, a theory, or the conjunction of a number of theories, suggests an 
experiment, and the unsuspected results of the experiment then suggest a 
modification of a distinct theory, or further experiments. I will provisionally call this 
experimental fertility E-fertility68. It might be defined as the development of new 
theories or theoretical concepts as a result of novel experimental observations 
not entailed by or resulting directly from the existing body of theory. 
 
                                            
68 It is noteworthy that the following example of E-fertility depends on the combination of an 
existing theory and a new experimental technique. This will be a common but not a necessary 
feature of E-fertility. For example, Röntgen’s discovery of X-rays in 1895 was made with existing 











McMullin’s P-fertility requires that the outcome of a fertile theory is a modified 
version of that theory. In contrast, McMullin’s metaphor picture merely suggests 
that a fertile theory is more instrumental in generating new knowledge than a less 
fertile theory. On the metaphor picture one might perhaps argue that a good 
metaphor may result (indirectly) in more E-fertility than a poor one. However the 
situation is almost invariably complex as more than one theory is commonly 
involved69. 
 
Perhaps the argument of this section is best illustrated by an example. Take the 
well established theory that vacant lattice sites (vacancies) are present in a metal 
in an equilibrium concentration proportional to e-U/kT, where T is the absolute 
temperature, U is the activation energy for vacancy formation, and k is 
Boltzman’s constant. The concentration of vacancies will obviously be highest at 
high temperature. Now if the metal is sufficiently rapidly cooled from just below 
the melting point, so that equilibrium cannot be maintained, the now excess 
vacancies will tend to precipitate at the lower temperature. The cooling rate 
required to maintain a non-equilibrium concentration of vacancies will depend on 
the activation energy for vacancy migration Um. U and Um can be calculated 
approximately for a given metal and the values suggest that the required cooling 
rates are experimentally attainable. So much the two theories tell us. However, 
the theory, being about equilibrium, does not tell us in what form the precipitation 
will take place. 
 
In 1956 the technique of transmission electron microscopy was developed70. This 
allowed the direct observation of lattice defects in metals. So, to confirm the 
‘novel prediction’ that vacancies will precipitate, and to investigate the form of the 
                                            
69 The outcome even of a theory specifically designed to test a theory may also be complex. The 
famous Stern-Gerlach experiment showed that classical theory was false, and was designed in 
addition to see if Sommerfeld’s old quantum theory was correct. It was taken to do so, but in fact 
was later seen to be in conflict with it, and to be in accord with the new quantum mechanics 
(Weinert, F. 1995 ‘Wrong Theory – Right Experiment: The Significance of the Stern-Gerlach 
Experiments’ Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 26, 75-86). 
70 Hirsch, P.B., Horne, R.J. and Whelan, M.J. 1956 ‘Direct Observation of the Arrangements and 











precipitation71, a rapid cooling (quenching) experiment was done, and the 
predicted effect observed. However, the nature of the vacancy precipitation in 
different metals as faulted or unfaulted edge dislocation loops or stacking fault 
tetrahedra was unpredicted and proved very informative. Now, typically in these 
circumstances an experimenter will do further experiments arising from quite 
general principles. She will repeat the experiment on a similar metal, and also on 
the same metal with a lower level of impurities (the first experiment having been 
done perhaps with the purest material to hand, say 99.99%, but not the purest 
obtainable at the time, say 99.9999%). 
 
The point is that these experiments are guided by theory not determined by 
theory; nothing about the form of the precipitation is entailed, or even suggested, 
by the established theory, which is about equilibrium. The new experiments are 
deliberately conducted away from equilibrium. The additional experiments are not 
guided by another theory in the area – there isn’t one. They are guided by the 
experimenters’ general knowledge. The variables tried seem reasonable – the 
metal, the purity, and the quenching speed. The experiments are intended to 
gather data on which to begin to form a theory of the non-equilibrium behaviour 
of vacancies in metals. Nature is being interrogated, and one would be foolish to 
await a proper theory in a difficult terrain, when one can swiftly conduct an 
informative experiment. The fertility of the original theory thus need not, and 
commonly does not, lie in the generation of another theory, but rather lies in the 
suggestion of new experiments which may result in modifications of existing 
theories. In addition the new results are, as here, commonly the outcome of the 
conjunction of theories, rather than simply arising from one theory. Moreover, the 
experiments will not, in general, be experiments like the observation of the 
precise orbit of the perihelion of Mercury or the Michelson-Morley experiment. 
That is, they will not be conducted to test a precise prediction of a well-developed 
theory of great generality. There is an understandable tendency in the philosophy 
                                            
71 Experimenters had previously studied the changes in electrical resistivity of quenched 
specimens heated to intermediate temperatures after quenching. These experiments need not 











of science literature to concentrate on a small number of atypical landmark 
experiments. Moreover, although the post-Kuhnian revolution72 did result in 
philosophers looking more closely at the realities of scientific work, they (and 
Kuhn himself) nevertheless continued commonly to focus on the seminal 
experiments. 
 
I have given the quenching example in some detail, but the point is general. For 
example, the vast subject of catalysis is guided by a broad theory, but the 
discovery of numerous effective catalysts has been a matter of intelligent trial 
and error (aided by the huge sums of money available for this potentially lucrative 
area). Then, subsequent to the discovery of a particularly effective catalyst, 
further research has contributed to a refinement of theory. Similarly, research into 
materials for solar power has been guided by theories of electromagnetic energy 
conversion in semiconductors, and the guided empirical development of new or 
improved materials has resulted in advances in the theory. The development of 
(non-equilibrium) optimal precipitation-hardened aluminium alloys, another area 
of commercial significance, has been guided by a general understanding of the 
thermodynamics of alloys, that is, a theory concerning equilibrium. Again, these 
non-equilibrium structures have been to a large extent developed by intensive 
systematic procedures of trial and error, and, as a result, there is an extensive 
theoretical understanding of non-equilibrium aluminium alloy structures. 
 
Scientists regard fertility as a criterion of the value of a theory, and, although it 
seems improbable, in the case of E-fertility this could conceivably be fully 
accounted for by Kuhn’s explanation; he somewhat cynically remarked73: 
This last criterion, fruitfulness, deserves more emphasis than it has yet 
received. A scientist choosing between two theories ordinarily knows that his 
decision will have a bearing on his subsequent research career. Of course he 
                                            
72 Kuhn, T.S. 1970 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
73 Kuhn, T.S. 1977 The Essential Tension Chicago: University of Chicago Press p. 322. This 
remark need not be taken to be wholly cynical; the concrete successes will normally follow the 
choice of what proves to be the correct theory, and that the choice was motivated in part by 











is especially attracted by a theory that promises the concrete successes for 
which scientists are ordinarily rewarded. 
One might ask, in the context of E-fertility, whether a substantially false theory is 
likely to result in fruitful new experiments, if it were to be suggested that E-fertility 
was a genuine epistemic merit in a theory. There seems no reason why a false 
theory should not suggest new experiments. Nor does there seem to be any 
reason why these experiments, undertaken on the basis of a false theory, should 
not produce interesting results. However, the relevant question is whether an 
approximately true theory is more likely to lead to interesting experiments leading 
to valuable new results. The classic case of an extensive experimental 
programme based on a false theory is the history of alchemy. A lot of interesting 
work was done by the alchemists. We now seem to be involved in the impossible 
evaluation of this work in comparison with an equal amount of work based on a 
hypothetical rival approximately true theory. There is an intuitive plausibility to the 
notion that an approximately true theory will be a better guide to progress in 
science than a load of nonsense. However, this last remark is not quite fair, 
because all of the theories in play will have been through the filters of empirical 
adequacy and so on, at least as seen by contemporary scientists. Newton, 
perhaps the greatest scientist in the history of the discipline, devoted huge 
amounts of time and energy to alchemy. 
 
The fertility of scientific investigation in its widest sense – the fact that the 
practice of science has led to a remarkable proliferation of knowledge and that its 
progress does seem autocatalytic – may conceivably be an argument for 
Scientific Realism74. On the other hand, E-fertility may illustrate no more than the 
banal truth that if one insists on looking in the middle of the night for something 
one has lost, it is sensible to look in places where there is some illumination. 
                                            
74 If one assumes the truth of Scientific Realism it is plausible that rational experiments like the 
quenching experiments described above would lead to new knowledge of the assumed mind-
independent world. On the other hand, the Anti-realist might claim, against McMullin’s thesis, that 
the success of the experiments not guided by a ‘theory as metaphor’ indicates that his 











However, it is important to distinguish this from McMullin’s argument, based 
specifically on P-fertility. 
1.7 Is P-fertility Explained Away as Novel Prediction? 
Nolan75 has challenged McMullin’s position. He argues that the claimed value of 
fertility is explicable in terms of the other desirable features of theory. These he 
lists76 as ‘empirical adequacy, simplicity, strength (or comprehensiveness) and 
coherence (both internal consistency, and coherence with other good theories)’. 
Nolan deals first with U-fertility, and makes the valid point that it is simply the 
potential a theory has for developing the other accepted virtues. The principal 
interest in this, he says, is to examine whether there are means of assessing it. If 
one could do this it would be valuable for practicing scientists in deciding which 
of two competing theories to pursue. 
 
In turning to P-fertility, Nolan has interesting things to say. In particular, he 
questions whether P-fertility exists in a meaningful sense. Nolan asks us to 
consider why a new theory U should be thought inferior to an exact contemporary 
V3, which is a successor to earlier successful theories V1 and V2. This is to be 
considered in the case where U and V3 have equal merit in terms of simplicity, 
strength, and coherence. He contends that this is to be explained by regarding 
the V series as successive forms of a more general theory (a less explicit theory) 
or a meta-theory (a theory about theories). Thus, for example, atomic theory is a 
general theory of matter; the earliest form of the kinetic theory of gases is an 
atomic theory, as are subsequent more sophisticated versions of the kinetic 
theory. Thus the earliest version has led to novel predictions in generating the 
later versions of the series, and the merit of the V series is no more than the 
value of novel prediction. Hence fertility per se is subsumed under the value of 
novel prediction, and it is this that lends P-fertility its intuitive plausibility. 
 
                                            
75 Nolan, D. 1999 ‘Is Fertility Virtuous In Its Own Right?’ British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 50, 265-282. 











Nolan explains away McMullin’s P-fertility in terms of an account of novel 
confirmation of either a general or a meta-theory. I want to argue that Nolan’s 
account is inconclusive and that it is unsatisfactory in general. 
 
Nolan’s argument goes as follows. There is a class of V theories, V1, V2 … Vn 
that meet McMullin’s description in that they arise as improvements and 
modifications of one another following on new evidence or new theoretical 
insights. Improvement here means that empirical adequacy was restored or 
improved without serious new problems arising in complexity for example. Why 
should V3 be preferred to U, a new theory which by definition has all the virtues 
of V3 except that it is not a successor to earlier U-type theories77? 
 
Nolan readily acknowledges that P-fertility is not the same as novel confirmation. 
(As he points out a theory may have made numerous correct predictions without 
having been revised at all.) The improvements in the V series need not have 
involved novel confirmation at all, when one simply considers the reasons why 
the successive theories were preferred. However, Nolan says, when we look at 
the meta-theory, which is what unifies the V series, we do have novel 
confirmation of the meta-theory. This is the reason for preferring V3 to U. 
 
As an illustration, consider the meta-theory to be the theory that gases are 
composed of molecules; then the various successive gas laws PV=RT, P(V-
b)=RT, and (P+a/V2)(V-b)=RT (where P is the pressure, V the volume, T the 
absolute temperature, and a, b, and R are constants) are each examples of novel 
confirmation when viewed as developments of the meta-theory. The meta-theory 
was advanced before it was known that a law of the second form would give a 
better fit to the data and a better explanation (because of the finite size of the 
molecules). Likewise the meta-theory was proposed before it was known that the 
third form would be still better (because of the intermolecular attractive forces). 
                                            
77 Nolan incorrectly here implies that P-fertility is used by McMullin as a criterion for theory 
selection, rather than simply as historical evidence for the approximate truth of the theories. 











Thus the merit of P-fertility is the merit of novel confirmation, which was 
discussed above in terms of our intuitions about ‘fudging’. This is so despite the 
fact that P-fertility as defined by McMullin is not novel confirmation. 
 
The question at issue is not, as Nolan couches it, whether a theory that lends 
itself naturally to revision, which enables it to accommodate new data, is to be 
preferred to one without this characteristic. The question is whether the fact that 
successful theories generally have this characteristic can be justifiably assumed 
to be approximately true. Now McMullin claims, and we have for the purposes of 
argument conceded, and Nolan does not deny, that successful long standing 
theories have been established as having this characteristic. For Nolan, these 
successful long standing theories are commonly based on a meta-theory or a 
general theory that enjoys novel confirmation. In our particular example, the 
theory that gases consist of atoms or molecules can be seen with hindsight to 
have been sufficiently flexible to account for the many discoveries about gases 
made since. 
 
The dispute is most easily judged in terms of specifics, and Nolan’s account in 
avoiding specifics has obscured McMullin’s point. Nolan eschews particular 
cases, saying78, ‘actual cases need to be described fairly carefully, and often 
possess features which cloud specific issues’. 
  
If, for example, we now consider the Bohr Theory of the atom, an appropriate 
theory on the Nolan proposal would be that there is a positively charged nucleus 
attracting a negatively charged electron that is confined (arbitrarily) to discrete 
energy levels. In this case history suggests it is the detail in the successive 
theories that gives rise to the successive modifications. First, the finite nuclear 
mass, then the degenerate elliptical orbits, where the degeneracy is removed in 
an electric field (the Stark effect), then the relativistic effects, all seem to be 
understandable modifications of the immediately prior theory. It does not seem 
                                            











reasonable to see them simply as novel predictions of a general theory or a 
meta-theory. For example, there seems to be nothing in the hypothetical ‘Nolan’ 
theory above that suggests the explanation of the Stark effect, and hence the 
propriety of treating it as a novel prediction. 
 
It is useful to consider in detail another example, which is perhaps more typical of 
science, in that it does not involve a revolution like the quantum theory of the 
atom. (I will return to the molecular theory of gases, and the fact that it lends itself 
to the Nolan interpretation.) 
 
We can take a simple contemporary theory like that describing the plastic 
deformation of ductile metals at low temperature79. The phenomenon of the 
increasing stress required to produce a given extension (or, more generally, 
strain) as plastic deformation proceeds is known as work-hardening. The 
phenomenon will be familiar to anyone who has observed a blacksmith at work. 
After a certain amount of hammering a horseshoe into shape, it must be strongly 
heated before it can be shaped further. The heating allows the dissipation of the 
work-hardening, because at high temperatures atoms can move about readily in 
the metal, restoring it to something like its state prior to the hammering. 
 
The beginning of a satisfactory work-hardening theory was the postulation in 
1934 of the dislocation by Taylor80. In the same year both Orowan and Polanyi, 
separately, also postulated the dislocation to explain the anomalously low stress 
at which plastic deformation occurred in many pure metals, but only Taylor 
offered a theory of work-hardening. The dislocation is a line imperfection in the 
crystal lattice; one type can be thought of as the line bounding an extra half plane 
of atoms inserted into an otherwise perfect crystal. The ‘Nolan’ meta-theory might 
be that plasticity takes place by dislocation movement. The work-hardening 
                                            
79 Low temperature does not refer to being near to the absolute zero, but is with reference to the 
melting point, Tm, and is commonly taken approximately to be < Tm/4 where Tm is expressed in 
kelvin. 
80 Taylor, G.I. 1934 ‘The Mechanism of Plastic Deformation of Crystals 1.Theoretical’ Proc Roy 











theory being discussed conforms well to McMullin’s criteria for having high P-
fertility. It has been modified extensively and successfully since the dislocation 
was first proposed to explain plasticity in metals. 
 
As mentioned above, there was a prior problem to the work-hardening problem, 
namely the inexplicably low stresses at which pure metals deform plastically. 
Plastic deformation takes place by shearing one crystal plane over another. The 
preferred planes on which this glide (or slip) occurs are the most densely packed 
(or widely spaced) in the particular crystal structure. Calculation of the stress 
required to move one crystal plane over another gave enormously greater values 
than those observed experimentally. The dislocation, a line imperfection in the 
crystal lattice, allowed this process to occur sequentially across the plane, rather 
than everywhere at once. (The common analogy is the greater ease of moving a 
carpet by moving a ruck across it, rather than moving the whole carpet at once.) 
Thus the plastic properties of crystalline solids are not for the most part directly 
determined by the average behaviour of the atoms, but by that minority of atoms 
located at lattice imperfections. The accounts of the nature of the defect itself, 
and the nature of interactions between dislocations, and the development of the 
dislocation distribution during plastic deformation, have all been the subject of 
successive and successful refinements. The present theory is a recognizable and 
greatly improved version of Taylor’s original proposal. 
 
Taylor, very reasonably in the absence of any data, made the simplest possible 
assumption, namely that the dislocations were arranged in a regular three 
dimensional array of positive and negative dislocations. He arrived at a value for 
the flow stress, and explained the increase in flow stress with continuing 
deformation as a result of increasing dislocation density. That is, a decrease in 












Taylor’s theory gave no mechanism for this postulated increase in dislocation 
density. Frank and Read81 suggested an ingenious mechanism for dislocation 
multiplication, the so-called Frank-Read source. It is important to note that this 
had general ramifications for further development of work-hardening theories, 
and that its invention was driven by the need to explain the dislocation 
multiplication demanded by the earliest work-hardening theory. That is, it was not 
obvious that a dislocation multiplication mechanism was needed simply from the 
postulation of dislocations to explain the anomalously low initial resistance to 
plastic deformation. 
 
Taylor had evidence mainly from polycrystals, the usual form in which metals are 
found. In polycrystals the atoms are everywhere arranged in a regular three 
dimensional lattice; small volumes (called grains) are differently oriented in space 
and are separated by grain boundaries. It is however possible to grow single 
crystals of metals by a variety of techniques, enabling experimental results that 
are more amenable to theoretical treatment. In the development of the theory of 
work-hardening, the most important piece of experimental evidence was that if a 
graph is plotted of stress against strain for a single crystal deformed in tension, it 
shows three distinct stages, named Stage I, Stage II, and Stage III. Stage I is 
approximately linear and shows a very low gradient (the work-hardening rate is 
this gradient), Stage II is steep and also linear, and finally in Stage III the work-
hardening rate falls steadily, the curve being approximately parabolic. These are 
the central facts a work-hardening theory must account for – ideally, 
quantitatively. 
 
In Stage I, dislocations move predominantly on a single slip system, which is that 
on which there is the highest resolved shear stress – the primary system. The 
slip systems (slip planes and slip directions) are determined by the crystal 
structure. Early writers attributed the work-hardening in Stage I simply to the 
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increasing primary dislocation density raising the stress necessary to force 
dislocations past one another. Subsequently, the importance of intersecting 
dislocations as impediments to movement was proposed. In fact detailed 
mechanisms for creating immobile dislocation barriers were postulated. The 
history of the subject (not just in relation to Stage I but quite generally) shows a 
constant iterative communication between theoretical studies of the detailed 
nature of the geometry of possible dislocation interactions on the one hand, and 
theories of the nature of the elastic interactions between postulated dislocation 
configurations on the other. While it is logically possible that each could have 
proceeded without the other on the basis of some meta-theory, the evidence is 
that a development like the recognition of the possibility of the Lomer-Cottrell 
lock82 fostered a variety of ideas about possible contributions to work-hardening 
of interaction between primary and secondary dislocations. The concept of novel 
prediction as Nolan outlines it is not appropriate. Certainly, the existence of 
Lomer-Cottrell locks was predicted and subsequently observed, but the work-
hardening theories which incorporated this were modifications of earlier theories, 
which did not directly depend on this specific dislocation barrier, but rather in a 
general way on the now more plausible postulation of a significant role of the 
interaction between primary and secondary dislocations. Thus while one could 
imagine that the postulation of the Lomer-Cottrell lock could arise from a general 
theory such as I have hypothetically attributed to Nolan, it is simply not the case 
that the development of the Stage I theory of work-hardening can be seen as 
arising from the general theory, rather than from the then current most plausible 
theories. 
 
If we turn to Stage II, the regime of steep, approximately linear hardening, there 
are similar difficulties for the Nolan stance. For example, the Cottrell-Stokes Law 
                                            
82 Lomer, W.M. 1951 ‘A Dislocation Reaction in the Face-Centred Cubic Lattice’ Philosophical 
Magazine 42, 1327-1331; Cottrell, A.H. 1952 ‘The Formation of Immobile Dislocations during 











was found as a result of experiments specifically conducted to attempt to resolve 
conflicts between different then current theories of Stage II work-hardening83. 
 
The law states that the ratio of the temperature dependent and temperature 
independent contributions to the flow stress is approximately constant in Stage II. 
Now this is important in ruling out certain possible work-hardening mechanisms, 
and in supporting the belief that the dislocation distribution remains similar, 
changing only in scale, during Stage II84. There is nothing in the hypothetical 
general theory that could have led to the prediction of the Cottrell-Stokes Law. 
One might claim that the general theory had led to the genesis of the conflicting 
theories, which in turn led to the Cottrell-Stokes Law. However, this is not novel 
prediction in any plausible sense. 
 
Of course it is not possible to prove non-existence but the burden of proof is 
surely on Nolan to justify the profoundly implausible claim that there will in 
general be a theory which lends itself to allowing the construal of the complex 
interaction between theory and experiment, which seems almost invariably to be 
the process of generating theory change, as being the outcome of novel 
prediction from such a hypothetical theory. 
 
It is now generally agreed that the roughly parabolic Stage III work-hardening is 
explained by the exhaustion of work-hardening. The dislocation sources now 
operating are predominantly the edge dislocation dipoles generated in the earlier 
stages of deformation85. Progressively narrower dipoles become available as the 
stress is raised, and because the number of dipoles per unit volume is greater 
the narrower the dipoles, the work-hardening rate falls. The important point for 
                                            
83 Basinski, Z.S. 1959 ‘Thermally Activated Glide in Face-Centred Cubic Metals and its 
application to the Theory of Strain Hardening” Philosophical Magazine 4, 393-432. 
84 See for example Kuhlmann-Wilsdorf, D. 1985 ‘Theory of Workhardening 1934-1984’ 50th 
Anniversary of the Introduction of Dislocations, Metallurgical Transactions 16A, 2091-2108; 
Hirsch, P.B. 1975 ‘Work Hardening’ The Physics of Metals 2 Defects Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press pp. 189-246. 












our purposes is that again this account is not in any way even foreshadowed by 
the meta-theory. Its genesis lies primarily in the transmission electron 
microscope observations of the very high density of edge dislocation dipoles, 
which was not predicted by theory. 
 
The point illustrated by these two examples is that any detailed examination of 
the history of a long standing successful theory is likely to show that it is the 
specifics of the current theoretical and experimental situation that leads to the 
next development. Nolan’s view seems plausible if we consider successive 
versions of the kinetic theory of gases based on the theory that gases consist of 
molecules. Here it seems obvious that the finite size and attractive forces, at first 
ignored, will be incorporated in further advances. However, this is a rather odd 
case. In general it seems wholly implausible that a general theory or a meta-
theory should contain within it, as novel predictions, the future discoveries in its 
domain. First, these are commonly the outcome of unexpected and unpredictable 
experimental discoveries. The contrary view may result from the tendency of 
philosophers of science to focus on seminal historical experiments, designed to 
test an important theory, and the parallel tendency to ignore the sheer 
adventitiousness of scientific developments. Certainly, 'In the fields of 
observation, chance favours only those minds that have been prepared’, as Louis 
Pasteur famously remarked, but few scientists would deny the role of chance. 
Second, the iterative interaction between theory and experiment in a research 
programme, as described in the brief history of work-hardening theory, is the 
norm in science. It is difficult to see how the general theory or the meta-theory 
proposal can encompass this. 
 
It is important to recognize that the P-fertile theory is the original Taylor theory 
and its successors, up to today’s sophisticated theory. That is a theory, as 
McMullin would see it, involving the early simple proposal and now incorporating 
dislocation locking mechanisms, dislocation sources, the Cottrell Stokes Law, the 











experimental results. These experimental results themselves were often the 
result of theory driven investigations (from successive forms of the theory) and 
sometimes adventitious observations by a variety of experimental techniques. 
 
Now it can be said that the current theory does not in fact enjoy a superior status 
because of its P-fertility as opposed to, for example, its power at predicting and 
explaining the evidence. Indeed this is true, but McMullin is not setting these 
against one another. His claim (accepted by Nolan) is that P-fertility and success 
can be shown historically to be commonly conjoined. Nolan, eschewing detail, 
gives us no grounds for the central supposition that there will in general be a 
suitable general theory or meta-theory, and the claim I make is that this is 
implausible. My one detailed example obviously does not constitute proof since 
Nolan does not claim that there will be a meta-theory in every case. My 
contention rather is that the example is typical of science, particularly in the 
messy areas which constitute the bulk of contemporary science. The kinetic 
theory of gases is a fine exemplar of science at its most nearly logical, as 
opposed to merely rational, and is quite unusual. 
 
There is another distinct problem for Nolan, namely that there is a difficulty in 
deciding what the general theory or meta-theory might be. Why in my earlier 
example is it the Bohr Theory rather than Rutherford’s plum pudding model? The 
choice seems arbitrary. For example, I might have chosen to foist on Nolan the 
general theory that dislocations are responsible for work-hardening, rather than 
the somewhat vaguer general theory that they are responsible for plasticity. It 
happens that the 1934 Taylor paper (that corresponds to the first) was submitted 
before the 1934 Polanyi and Orowan papers (that correspond to the second) but 
it actually appeared later. If the general theory is chosen with historical hindsight 
(assuming that one can be found that meets the requirement of resulting in the 
appropriate novel predictions) can these be considered as novel predictions of 
the proposed general theory? In one way it might be argued that Nolan simply 











fertile theory under consideration, since this theory was itself viewed with 
hindsight as P-fertile. This I have argued is in general implausible. However, it is 
a further nice question as to whether one can properly view the consequences of 
such a hypothetical general theory, proposed with hindsight, as novel predictions. 
The novel prediction argument is not that it confers logical plausibility on a theory 
but that it downgrades the likelihood of ‘fudging’, and this hardly seems 
applicable to the case we are now considering since the meta theory is merely 
hypothetical. 
 
In summary, the essence of McMullin’s argument is that the successive 
successful modifications of numerous major scientific theories would be an 
inexplicable historical phenomenon were it not for their increasing approximate 
truth. In addition, he is claiming that it is the metaphorical suggestiveness of the 
successive approximately true theories that generates the successive theories. 
Nolan’s account does not explain the claimed empirical historical fact that long 
standing successful theories are P-fertile. Consequently, McMullin’s claim still 
requires a rebuttal from Scientific Anti-realists, either via a historical analysis 
which successfully rejects the empirical claim he makes, or by some new counter 
argument. 
1.8 The ‘No Miracles Argument’ 
Whether one accepts Nolan’s argument or not, it is reasonable to ask how 
McMullin’s fertility argument differs from the standard ‘no miracles argument’ 
(NMA) usually associated with Putnam86. Why is the particular aspect McMullin 
emphasizes, namely his P-fertility, more persuasive than the broad general 
argument that the success of science as such should convince us of Scientific 
Realism? 
 
                                            
86 Putnam, H. 1975 Philosophical Papers Volume 1, Mathematics, Matter and Method 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p. 73. The priority for the ‘no miracles’ argument actually 
belongs to Smart (Smart, J.J.C. 1963 Philosophy and Scientific Realism, London: Routledge and 











The well known Smart/Putnam argument says that since science is successful 
and since true theories would be successful, the success of science would be a 
miracle if scientific theories were not approximately true (the assumption here is 
that approximately true theories share to a substantial degree the success that 
true theories would have)87. This argument is what Peirce would have called 
abduction88, and one counter is that one individual’s abductive argument is 
another individual’s affirming the consequent, as Laudan has forcefully argued89. 
 
It can be argued that since McMullin’s argument necessitates Inference to the 
Best Explanation, it is superfluous since, given this acceptance, the NMA covers 
the ground. However, this is not right. The NMA explains success while the 
McMullin argument explains the conjunction of success and P-fertility. It may well 
be that there are Anti-realist arguments which explain the former and not the 
latter, leaving intact McMullin’s claim that his argument is the best defense of 
Scientific Realism. Mc Mullin himself seems to want to avoid using the term 
Inference to the Best Explanation and to talk in terms of inferring to a good 
explanation90. This is because we can never know that we have the best 
explanation. In this context this does not seem to be a significant caveat; the 
Putnam and the McMullin arguments are what is normally termed an Inference to 
the Best Explanation (or affirming of the consequent). 
                                            
87 This is not uniformly accepted. Some writers maintain not only that the success of science is 
not a miracle, but to be expected, since false theories are often successful, indeed nearly all, if 
not all, successful theories are false (Horwich, P.G. 1991 ‘On the Nature and Norms of 
Theoretical Commitment’ Philosophy of Science 58, 1-14 p. 9). The defenders of the NMA usually 
ascribe an important role to successful prediction as part of success to further their argument for 
the meaningfulness of the NMA (see for example Wright, J. 2002 ‘The Explanatory Role of 
Realism’ Philosophia 29, 35-56). 
88 Sometimes called retroduction or hypothetic inference (Peirce, C.S. 1935 The Collected Papers 
of Charles Sanders Peirce C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Eds) Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 5.189) 
89 Laudan, L. 1981 ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’ Philosophy of Science 48, 19-48. 
Laudan draws attention to past successful theories now known to be false, thus denying that 
success implies truth or approximate truth. Others have drawn attention to the problem of 
unconceived alternatives, giving historical examples of current theoretical accounts, unconceived 
of at an earlier time, and for which evidence was available at that time, while an earlier theory 
was being championed as the best explanation (Stanford, P.K. 2006 ‘Darwin’s Pangenesis and 
the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57, 121-
144). 












In this context it is worth considering a critique of the NMA which would at the 
same time undermine McMullin’s argument if the critique was sound. Van 
Fraassen91 has proposed a skeptical explanation of the success of science. Thus 
he rejects the NMA and advances an ‘evolutionary’ argument – only the 
successful theories survive. However, this is specious; it explains why we have 
successful theories but not why they are successful, as Leplin92 has pointed out. 
Competition explains why Wimbledon finalists are great tennis players or British 
Open winners are great golfers, but not why Rod Laver was the former and Jack 
Nicklaus the latter93. Sankey, who accepts the NMA as one strand in the 
argument for Scientific Realism, argues that the methods of scientific theory 
selection are truth conducive and thus that true or approximately true theories 
are selected. Hence van Fraassen is right, but in addition the explanation of why 
the selected theories are approximately true is that this particular ‘evolution’ is 
not ‘blind’, like natural selection, but is directed towards truth by the methodology 
of science94. This last is dependent inter alia on the resolution of the difficult 
question of arriving at a plausible account of something general but distinctive 
that constitutes the method of science, and showing that it selects true, not 
merely successful, theories. Boyd95 has earlier argued on empirical grounds for 
this truth-conducive view of scientific practice; however the argument must seem 
circular to the Anti-realist. This last does not of course mean that the argument is 
invalid. 
 
                                            
91 van Fraassen, B.C. 1980 The Scientific Image Oxford: Clarendon Press p. 40. 
92 Leplin, J. 1997 A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 8-9. 
In fairness to van Fraassen, he is in fact claiming only that his account explains why we have 
successful theories, because he believes this is sufficient to dissipate the force of the NMA (van 
Fraassen 1980 ibid p. 219 footnote 34). 
93 Weston (Weston, T. 1992 ‘Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism’ Philosophy of Science 59, 
53-74, p. 39) argues that the van Fraassen proposal is inadequate on a different ground, namely 
that it does not explain successful novel prediction. But van Fraassen could respond that this is a 
feature considered in retaining or discarding theories. 
94 Sankey, H. 2004 ‘Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defense’ Knowledge and the World: 
Challenges beyond the Science Wars M. Carrier, J. Roggenhofer, G. Küppers and P. Blanchard 
(Eds) Berlin: Springer Verlag pp. 69-72. 
95 Boyd, R. 1990 ‘Realism, Approximate Truth, and Philosophical Method’ reprinted in D. 











Without claiming that there is something unique that can be called the scientific 
method or that such a method is truth conducive, it seems that it may be 
legitimate to suggest that science is designed to increase our factual information 
about the world rather than to generate true theories; that is science generates 
instrumental success and information. Will96, who is in fact a Realist, put it as 
follows. 
The practices of science are practices developed for the exploration of nature; 
they are the gears and levers of a great engine that has been fashioned over 
the years for the purpose of expanding knowledge of a certain kind, of using 
achieved knowledge to generate further knowledge … 
 
Brown97 has offered a different objection to van Fraassen’s ‘evolutionary’ 
argument, which, Brown claims, assumes that rational choice and success go 
together. But Brown points out that the former often includes super-empirical 
criteria, so that the theory rationally chosen may not be the most successful. 
Hence, the ‘evolutionary’ argument gives no explanation of the fact that the 
historically chosen theories are successful. 
 
Van Fraassen’s argument in any case does less than justice to Darwin’s theory, 
since it implies that successful theories survive because they are successful. 
Darwin is sometimes wrongly criticized on the grounds that his arguments, like 
this one, are tautological. Darwin himself gave accounts as to what were the 
specific competitive advantages that fostered the survival and reproductive 
success of a plant or animal species under the relevant environmental 
circumstances. These were not necessary and sufficient conditions but were 
plausible accounts as to why a particular set of environmental circumstances 
probably existed and would have favoured a particular heritable feature of a 
given species98. 
                                            
96 Will, F.L. 1997 Pragmatism and Realism Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield p.98. 
97 Brown, J.R. 1985 ‘Explaining the Success of Science’ Ratio 27, 49-66. 
98 Thus, for example, competition for scarce reproductive opportunities is a persuasive 












McMullin would also argue against van Fraassen that it is peculiarly convincing 
that one can in practice repeatedly find a modification to deal with new facts. If 
the revised theory were not a step in the direction of more nearly representing 
reality then it is highly unlikely that it would continue to encompass the original 
facts and the new ones. A part of this argument is the metaphor parallel and 
particularly the extended success over time of the progressively modified theory. 
It is each successor theory that suggests its own successor, and again this is an 
empirical observation, according to McMullin. A succession of theories, each no 
nearer to reality, will not lead to empirically adequate theories. This is what would 
be too much of a coincidence. 
1.9 Conclusion 
The picture put forward by McMullin, of scientific theory as metaphor, has much 
to recommend it. In particular, as I proposed in my analysis of the history of the 
development of the theory of work-hardening in section 1.7, his historical 
viewpoint and his metaphor concept attempt to deal with the messy diffuse areas 
typical of science in practice. This contrasts with the concentration on 
mathematical physics which, for example, characterizes the seminal work of the 
Logical Positivists. Mathematical physics, while perhaps rightly seen as the most 
developed aspect of science, is in fact atypical. 
 
McMullin sees good metaphor as an intrinsic part of the creative scientific 
process. In developing new ideas on the basis of existing theory there will need 
to be some sort of extension, in part via analogical reasoning from existing ideas, 
thus enabling a move beyond preconceptions. As Norris puts it99 ‘…some 
metaphors prove themselves capable of progressive ‘rectification’ through a 
                                                                                                                                  
competition and/or sexual selection by the hind. Numerous well documented examples have 
been given since Darwin wrote. The visibility to bees of UV radiation (which is more readily 
polarized on reflection than light in the human visibility range) is one: bees make use of the 
polarization of scattered sunlight for orientation. The adaptation of moth’s colouring to the 
industrial environment in the UK as a survival advantage is another. 











process of jointly conceptual and empirical research’. The importance of 
metaphor in the advance from pre-scientific thought has been discussed at 
length by Derrida, who emphasized that much of what we take to be literal, in 
philosophy as elsewhere, is also metaphorical. Many followers of Derrida have 
focused almost exclusively on his point that the metaphorical characteristics of a 
language limit the possibility of mastering the subject under discussion. Norris100 
argues that this is to neglect Derrida’s significant and detailed argument 
concerning the direct relationship between the use of metaphor and scientific 
creativity and theory development. 
 
McMullin, within the framework of his notion of scientific theory as metaphor, 
offers a specific argument that P-fertility is a virtue independent of the other 
virtues, and is found to be commonly present in successful theories. This he 
argues is inextricably connected to the metaphorical role of theory, and both are 
explained by the substantial truth of the incomplete theories. Hence Scientific 
Realism is vindicated. The argument, as has already been said, is an Inference 
to the Best Explanation. 
 
The importance for epistemology of a belief in or a denial of Scientific Realism 
warrants a more detailed study of the validity of the conjunction of P-fertility and 
success as a criterion of an approximately true theory. The diachronic view of 
theories is an essential element of the P-fertility discourse and is examined in 
Chapter 2. The notion of approximate truth or some surrogate for it seems to be 
an essential element in McMullin’s case for Scientific Realism, despite his own 
disavowal of the need for the concept, and is the subject of Chapters 3 and 4. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE DIACHRONIC VIEW OF 
THEORIES 
2.1 Introduction 
A necessity for McMullin’s case for Scientific Realism is the conjunction of P-
fertility and long term success. It will be recalled that this conjunction, which I will 
refer to as the McMullin Conjunction, has been assumed to hold. This in turn 
requires that we accept a sequence of theories for consideration as one long 
standing successful theory. McMullin argues that a detailed account of what this 
acceptance entails is not needed. However, this is not obviously the case and the 
issue of what is required for an account if diachronicity is pursued in this chapter. 
 
A possible objection to the abductive argument in favour of Realism is that the 
very notion of theory identity across time is only supportable from a Realist 
position. Consequently, it might be claimed that the argument begs the question 
against Anti-realist views (who won’t grant the terms in which the argument is 
framed). The objection is refuted by showing how to make sense of theory 
identity across time from the major Anti-realist positions. Moreover it is necessary 
to examine the implications of P-fertility and how it relates to various Anti-realist 
points of view. If an alternative Anti-realist position is as good as or better than 
that of the Scientific Realist, when the McMullin Conjunction and hence 
diachronicity are accepted, McMullin’s abductive argument for Scientific Realism 
becomes problematic. 
 
In a situation where a theory is modified, what criteria entitle one to classify the 
outcome as a new theory, and conversely what criteria enable it properly to be 
classified as a modification of the existing theory? What are the essential 
features of this second case where the current and the earlier theory can be 
treated as one theory? It is part of the notion of P-fertility that some temporal 











legitimately be regarded as successive versions of a theory T. Is there a basis for 
this legitimation? 
 
McMullin writes101 in relation to this question that the unit of appraisal for his 
judgment of P-fertility is, ‘… a historical explanatory system which may undergo 
numerous modifications over the years, and yet be presumed still the “same” 
theory, on the basis of some usually not-very-well-defined continuities of basic 
structure’. He gives some further clues as to what is intended when he writes102 
of the usage of scientists, ‘… who will speak of the “wave-theory of light” for 
example, as something which developed over several centuries’. Elsewhere he 
gives an indication of the bounds of his proposed categorizations when he states 
that the career of the Bohr Theory of the H-atom from 1911 to 1926 is 
unequivocally one theory103, whereas Thompson’s electron and Dirac’s have little 
in common104. 
 
The ‘usage of scientists’ which McMullin invokes is inappropriate as a guide. 
Scientists will quite properly speak very broadly of theories of the solar system or 
theories of electron diffraction, or, alternatively, quite specifically of theories of 
the action of a particular catalyst in a specific chemical reaction. There is no 
implication in the former broad usage that the theories which fall under the 
umbrella term ‘wave theories of light’ may not be radically different. McMullin 
perhaps makes his position clearest when, in response to a criticism of his 
alleged failure to enable a distinction between two stages of the same theory or 
two distinct theories, he writes105: 
Are continental drift and the plate tectonic model two stages of the same 
theory or two different theories? It all depends on how ‘theory’ is defined and 
                                            
101 McMullin, E. 1976 ‘The fertility of theory and the unit for appraisal in science’ in R.S. Cohen et 
al (Eds), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, p 417. 
102 McMullin, E. 1976 ibid p. 416. 
103 McMullin E. 1976 ibid p. 420. 
104 McMullin, E. 1984 ‘A Case for Scientific Realism’ in Scientific Realism J. Leplin (Ed) Berkeley: 
University of California Press p. 29. 











how sharply theories are individuated. I do not see that very much hangs on 
this decision, one way or another. 
The important thing to note is that there are structural continuities from one 
case to the next, even though there are important structural modifications. 
What ‘hangs on this decision’ in the general case (i.e. not confining ourselves to 
the motion of the continents) is whether it is possible to give a meaningful 
account of P-fertility. If the ideal gas theory and the van der Waals theory are 
distinct theories, then it is not possible to say that a unit for appraisal (and for the 
judgment of P-fertility) is the van der Waals theory viewed as an historical entity 
resulting from the modification of the earlier accounts of the behaviour of gases. 
This seems clearly to be a truism if one goes to an extreme case and tries to 
claim (as McMullin does not) that the special theory of relativity is P-fertile 
because Aristotle’s and Newton’s mechanics have undergone successive 
modifications arising from the metaphorical suggestiveness of Aristotle’s and 
then Newton’s accounts of the motion of projectiles. 
 
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that an argument cannot be mounted to 
permit a distinction between modification and novelty. It may well be that a ‘not-
very-well-defined’ account of what constitutes a single historical theory can 
sometimes make this distinction. Indeed, as well as clear discontinuity, which has 
just been instanced, there are innumerable cases where a theoretical account is 
subject only to a minute modification. 
 
In section 2.2 I consider how one might give an account of diachronicity and of 
continuity versus novelty. In section 2.3 I consider an alternative account (to that 
given by McMullin) of the McMullin Conjunction which is available to the Scientific 
Realist. In section 2.4 I examine this stance from within Anti-realism. In section 
2.5 I look at how these considerations determine the meaningfulness of the 
concept of P-fertility under some prominent Anti-realist stances. In section 2.6, in 
the light of these alternative views, I briefly examine how McMullin’s account of 











2.2 What Makes Theories T1 and T2 a Single Theory? 
Consider a temporal sequence of theories in a given domain. Some of these 
have been discarded altogether, others still have some adherents, and the 
current most widely accepted theories in the relevant scientific community are 
generally regarded as better theories than all of their predecessors. Better does 
not mean simply containing fewer falsehoods; indeed the opposite may often be 
true. To say that gases consist of molecules is an inferior theory to one that is 
more specific, more explanatory, more informative, and less likely to be wholly 
true. In the temporal sequenceT1, T2, T3, T4, it may be that the theory T3, seen 
from the standpoint of T4, is unquestionably inferior to T2. It is perhaps now 
perceived to have been a fortunate (but not necessarily accidental) cancellation 
of errors that led to its empirical adequacy. Nevertheless, for the Scientific Realist 
there is a true theory T, and it may be that T4 is further from T than T3 despite this 
perception. 
 
The claim made by McMullin is that the temporal sequence (within what Kuhn 
would call normal science) can be taken to be one long standing successful 
theory in so far as there has not been the introduction of some radical new 
concept. The long standing success is the ongoing ability to make successful 
predictions and account for new observations. This, together with P-fertility (the 
ongoing capacity for effective modification via the theory’s metaphorical 
suggestiveness and the scientist’s creative input), then grounds the hypothesis 
that the sequence of theories is such that the latest is nearest to the true theory 
T, and that each of the earlier theories is better than its predecessor and was 
also in some sense near to T.  
 
There is no basis for an assumption that there exists a unique temporal 
sequence. To take just one example, the various successive theories of the 











their contemporaries Pauling or Wilkins or Franklin106. These in turn were 
different from one another. It is simply not the case that there was a unique 
series of theories or that the later theories were always better than earlier ones. 
In general the McMullin position cannot rest on a simple notion of temporal 
sequence. There is an implicit notion of historical distance and an ordering (with 
the wisdom of hindsight) of the successive consensus positions attained at 
various times by the relevant scientific community as a whole. Indeed the thrust 
of McMullin’s arguments is that a marriage is needed between the history and the 
philosophy of science107. 
 
It is difficult to give a precise account of what constitutes a single theory to be 
viewed diachronically, and McMullin does not regard it as important to do so. My 
proposal as to what makes theories Tn and Tn+1 historical versions of a single 
theory T apt for consideration with respect to P-fertility is the following: 
(i) Tn+1 contains a significant set of significant claims made in Tn and 
(ii) there is an appropriate causal chain linking Tn to Tn+1 
or 
(iii) (∀Ti)(∀Tj) {(∃T)( Ti ≈ T & T ≈ Tj) → Ti ≈ Tj} 
Clause (i) is one requirement if two theories are regarded as being part of one 
ongoing theory; if no significant claim were retained the two theories would 
commonly be distinct. Clause (ii) incorporates McMullin’s point that the earlier 
version of the theory is important in the genesis of its successor and in particular 
excludes the case of distinct rival theories with a common claim. Clause (iii) is to 
ensure transitivity: theories count as diachronically similar (symbolized by ≈) if 
they emerge via a process of evolution through diachronically similar theories. 
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The Third Man of the Double Helix Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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I will call these the ‘Continuity Conditions’108. There is of course here an implied 
notion of similitude in allowing for a modifiable long standing theory, in that the 
successive versions of the theory bear a resemblance to their predecessor. 
However, there is here no problem with the context dependence of this notion, 
nor need there be the notion of any of the theories being approximately true. 
(The significance of this point about approximate truth is taken up in Chapters 3 
and 4.) 
 
In accepting McMullin’s historical claim, as I have done throughout, the 
diachronic view of theories has necessarily been accepted. In the foregoing I 
have simply given a more explicit account than is given by McMullin of what 
constitutes a single theory. 
 
An immediate question is what is meant by ‘significant’ in (i). It is not difficult to 
give plausible examples from the history of science. For many cases it seems 
that a claim can be said to be significant if it plays an essential explanatory role. 
For example, species variation and natural selection are significant claims in the 
theory of evolution, the impossibility of two electrons with the same spin 
occupying a given state is a significant claim in the theory of the Periodic Table, 
and the existence of molecules is a significant claim in the kinetic theory of 
gases. It is however difficult to be more precise when considering the broad 
spectrum of science. 
 
We can illustrate the desiderata in a little more detail by viewing them in the light 
of the theory of work-hardening described in section 1.7. The claim that there are 
dislocations is significant and distinguishes the Taylor theory from earlier 
theories. There is structural continuity in that the entity responsible for the 
plasticity is the dislocation. The dislocation has progressively been described in 
more detail; first the simple edge dislocation, then the screw dislocation, and later 
                                            












the partial dislocations possible in various crystal structures. The stress field 
around a dislocation and the nature of dislocation interactions has been amplified 
and refined. In the successive refinements of the theory changes have been 
incremental rather than radical. For example, the account of the plasticity of 
precipitation hardened aluminium alloys required the introduction of the stress 
field around precipitate particles and the interaction of dislocations with these. 
The various developments described in section 1.7 have all been accepted in 
broad outline as refinements of the theory. Finally, no major feature of what G.I. 
Taylor described in his 1934 paper has been discarded. 
 
Einstein’s rejection of absolute space, Lavoisier’s rejection of phlogiston, 
Planck’s introduction of quanta in place of the continuous nature of energy 
transfer, are all examples of the arrival of a new theory . For example, in the case 
of the quantization of energy, the application of classical mechanics and 
electromagnetism ceased to be tenable in discussing atomic structure, and 
indeed in principle elsewhere. Of course, between these instances and the work-
hardening theory I have taken as an example, there are borderline cases. This is 
inevitable; ‘being a new theory’ is a vague predicate. Given this vagueness of the 
criteria, the difficulty is to establish the general legitimacy of treating a so called 
‘long standing successful theory’ as a single theory undergoing modification. The 
problem thus remains that, even if my Continuity Conditions are acceptable as 
far as they go, it is unclear whether different historians of science would draw the 
same conclusion about continuity in the different cases of importance to 
McMullin’s argument. 
2.3 An Alternative Realist Explanation of P-fertility 
As already discussed in section 1.2, McMullin’s claim is that the contingent 
historical fact, that I have labeled the McMullin Conjunction, ‘finds its best 
explanation in a broadly realist account of science’.109 In the paper just cited he 
                                            
109 McMullin, E. 1984 ‘A Case for Scientific Realism’ in Scientific Realism J. Leplin (Ed) Berkeley: 











gives a historical account of a series of scientific explorations emphasizing the 
‘structural types of explanation and … the role played by the criterion of fertility in 
such explanations.’110 In essence, the illustrations he gives are of the naturalness 
of the development of the theories on the basis of the assumption that each 
phase of the development of the theory successfully represents the structure of 
the real. 
 
It is useful to quote him in relation to a particular example111. 
The complex molecules of both inorganic and organic chemistry have been 
more accurately charted over the last century. The atomic constituents and 
the spatial relations among them can be specified on the basis both of 
measurement, using X-ray diffraction patterns, for example, and on the basis 
of a theory that specifies where each kind of atom ought to fit. … 
 
These structures are coming to be more exactly charted, using a variety of 
techniques both experimental and theoretical. The coherence of the outcome 
of these widely different techniques, and the reliability of the chemist’s 
intuitions as he decides which atom must fit in a particular spot in the lattice, 
are most easily understood in terms of the realist thesis. 
This account, which McMullin rightly remarks is characteristic of much of 
contemporary science, emphasizes the ‘chemist’s intuitions’ and it is these 
creative intuitions which are engendered by the approximate truth and hence the 
metaphorical suggestiveness of the current version of the theory. That is, it is the 
fertility, born of the approximate truth of the current interim version of the 
successful theory, which results in these reliable intuitions. 
 
For the Scientific Realist, in the light of the Continuity Conditions set out in 
section 2.2, there is an alternative explanation of the McMullin Conjunction which 
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does not however provide support for McMullin’s case for Scientific Realism. The 
origin of both the success and the P-fertility is simply the true claims in the 
successive versions of the theory112. This account does not require that the 
successive versions of the theory are approximately true. Thus, to take the 
example discussed in detail in Chapter 1, the assertion that there are dislocations 
does a great deal to explain the P-fertility of work-hardening theory without 
making the assumption that the Taylor theory and its various successors are 
each approximately true. 
2.4 Anti-realist Truth and P-fertility 
A move for the Anti-realist in giving an account of the McMullin Conjunction is to 
make a claim like that just outlined, namely that the theories satisfying the 
Conjunction contain significant truths. The question that needs to be faced is 
whether this claim has sufficient explanatory power when truth is understood 
Anti-realistically. 
 
This question could be tackled in two ways. One might fix on the notion of truth 
admitted by the Anti-realist and then ask whether this has adequate explanatory 
power. The disadvantage of this is that there is no generally accepted Anti-realist 
account of truth113. Alternatively, one could see what demands the explanatory 
project here places on the notion of truth and then examine whether any of them 
runs counter to Anti-realism. Because of the problem of finding a sufficiently 
widely Anti-realistically acceptable notion of truth I shall adopt the second 
procedure. 
 
What we want to explain is that a long-standing successful theory is P-fertile. 
Assume that such a theory contains significant truths. Assume too that truth is a 
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stable property of claims: if a claim is true then it continues to be so114. If our 
theory does contain significant truths then these truths continue to be so. If these 
truths survive into (causally) successor theories then clause (i) in the Continuity 
Conditions is satisfied and clause (ii) is satisfied by the definition of succession. 
So the theories count as diachronically similar and we have P-fertility. 
 
The theories are explained as being successful because they contain significant 
truths, so the presence of significant truths explains the McMullin Conjunction if 
we have reason to think that a theory containing significant truths is likely to pass 
them on to its successor. Nothing so far assumes anything more than that truth is 
stable and that is usually granted by the Anti-realist (e.g., it is one of the 
platitudes on Wright’s minimal conception of truth115). 
 
Thus the question is whether there is any reason to suppose that a theory will 
transmit its significant truths. There is no guarantee to be had here; nothing 
ensures that the evolution of a successful theory may not proceed via a stage 
where truths are lost. However we can legitimately build the assumption that they 
are not into our explanation. The McMullin Conjunction is explained by the fact 
that in general long standing successful theories contain significant truths which 
are passed on to their successors. Nothing thus far draws on a realist notion of 
truth unless it is supposed that if scientific practice tends to preserve truths this 
must be explained in Realist terms. However, there is no reason to question the 
adequacy of an Anti-realist notion of truth here, for if truth is constitutively linked 
to epistemological factors it will be exceptional for an implementation of 
epistemological procedures to involve the loss of truth. Hence an epistemological 
notion of truth which exhibits the property of stability suffices to explain the 
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McMullin Conjunction. Both superassertibility116 and idealized rational 
acceptability117 would seem to meet the requirement. 
 
Thus if one accepts this account and that given in section 2.3 above, the 
empirical observation of the McMullin Conjunction is neutral between Scientific 
Realism and Anti-realism. 
2.5 Anti-realism and P-fertility 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Four major types of theories of science that can be characterized as Anti-realist 
have been identified and extensively discussed in the literature118. (Nothing 
hangs on this characterization in my discussion of the theories, and some of the 
authors and/or the advocates of some of them regard them as Realist theories.) 
These are Structural Realism (Worrall), Entity Realism (Cartwright, Hacking), 
Instrumentalism (van Fraassen)119, and Internal Realism (Putnam)120. They can 
be so characterized at least in the sense that they do not meet the account of 
Scientific Realism given in section 1.3. I very briefly discuss why I characterize 
these as Anti-realist in the consideration of each of them. I consider the nature of 
the explanation of the McMullin Conjunction in the context of the first three of 
these in the following sections121. If they can give a satisfactory alternative 
                                            
116 A statement is superassertible …if and only if it is, or can be, warranted and some warrant for 
it would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive increments to or 
other forms of improvement of information (Wright, C. ibid p. 48) 
117 Putnam, H. 1983 Philosophical Papers Volume 3 Realism and Reason Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 84. Unlike rational acceptability, idealized rational acceptability is seen by 
Putnam as stable; his conception of idealized rational acceptability is discussed in Chapter 6. 
118 See for example Psillos, S. 1999 Scientific realism: how science tracks truth New York: 
Routledge. 
119 There are a number of distinct Instrumentalist theories. I have chosen to focus on van 
Fraassen’s theory as this is currently widely regarded as the most plausible. Thus when referring 
to Instrumentalism I will be referring to this. 
120 I have indicated in parentheses here the principal recognized proponents of these theories. 
Van Fraassen calls his Instrumentalist position ‘Constructive Empiricism’ rather than 
Instrumentalism because he thinks scientific theories have a truth value (this he thinks is 
irrelevant to scientific practice). Specific references to these and other writers are given in the 
further discussion. 











account of the McMullin Conjunction, this historical observation is neutral 
between Scientific Realism and Anti-realism. 
2.5.2 Structural Realism 
As has already been mentioned, the history of science is littered with failed 
theories. Moreover, many of these have been successful for long periods and 
have successfully made predictions, and indeed have had all the hallmarks of 
theories currently accepted as true or at least approximately true. This has led to 
the so called Pessimistic Meta Induction (PMI) – the view that current theories 
are likely also to be false. I have already discussed some responses to this in 
Chapter 1, but one response, not discussed there, is of interest in the present 
context of concern with possible Anti-realist accounts of P-fertility and the 
McMullin Conjunction. This is the response given by Worrall122 and known as 
Structural Realism, whereby Worrall attempts to reconcile the contradictory PMI 
and NMA. How, he asks, can we reconcile the evident success of science and 
the conclusion therefore that we have latched onto truth about the world, and the 
equally evident periodic overthrow of well established successful theories? The 
latter show that numerous successful theories were not even approximately true 
on any interpretation of this expression. 
 
Worrall confines his attempted reconciliation to mature science. He defines a 
mature science as one that is predictive of general types of phenomena, without 
those phenomena having been ‘written into’ the theory123. For him Fresnel’s 
optics is mature science, chemistry before Lavoisier is not. Worrall would 
characterize as mature any long standing successful theory, in McMullin’s 
terminology, that had not been discredited (as the phlogiston theory for example 
has been). 
                                            
122 Worrall, J. 1989 ‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds’ Dialectica 43, 99-124 (reprinted 
in D. Papineau (Ed) 1996 The Philosophy of Science Oxford: Oxford University Press). Worrall is 
non-committal in this article as to whether he sees himself as a Scientific Realist or not. He does 
not say that current best theories are approximately true in the way that expression is ordinarily 
used. 
123 Worrall, J. 1989 ibid (D. Papineau (Ed) 1996 The Philosophy of Science Oxford: Oxford 












Worrall’s argues that most of the mathematical structure of mature theories is 
retained even in what Kuhn would call scientific revolutions. Thus the structure of 
Fresnel’s theory of light is retained in Maxwell’s theory, but the proposed nature 
of light is not. Fresnel’s theory is not claimed to be approximately true, because 
there is now known to be no elastic medium through which light is propagated, 
which is an essential part of his theory. His equations however are absorbed into 
the later theory. The theory is ‘realist’ in that this mathematical structure is 
representative of the real relations between unobservables of the actual structure 
of the world, and this distinguishes Worrall’s stance from Instrumentalism. As I 
remarked above, some writers do characterize Structural Realism as a form of 
Scientific Realism124. I treat it as Anti-realist in terms of the definition given by 
Ladyman, cited in section 1.3, because Worrall does not claim that ‘the entities or 
kinds of entities talked about and/or described by a discourse about S exist’, 
where S is the theory. 
 
Worrall has made a rare proposal for dealing with a central problem, namely the 
reconciling of the PMI with arguments for having faith in current theories on the 
basis of the NMA, given that revolutionary changes do occur regularly within 
science. It is worth asking how P-fertility can be dealt with on the basis of 
Structural Realism. 
 
Structural Realism does not require that discarded scientific theories are 
approximately true. Fresnel’s theory is not seen as approximately true but there 
is structural continuity. The continuity of mathematical structure may transcend 
scientific revolutions, so that there is no general claim that this structural 
continuity reflects a continuing theory revision as distinct from the genesis of a 
new theory. 
                                            
124 See for example Chakravartty, A. 2004 ‘Structuralism as a form of scientific realism’ 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18, 151-171; Ritchie, J. 2008 ‘Structural 
realism and Davidson’ Synthese 162, 85-100. In fact Chakravartty says ‘Many sophisticated 












In the transition from Newton to Einstein continuity of structure might be claimed 
by arguing that as the velocity of light becomes infinite the equations of special 
relativity become those of classical mechanics. This seems to be going too far, 
and indeed Worrall would not make this claim. In this case a scientific revolution 
in Kuhn’s sense has resulted in a new theory. Newton’s claims of absolute space 
and the independence of mass and velocity are discarded, and the equations of 
motion are quite different in the two theories. 
 
There may however be a difference between the Structural Realist and the 
Scientific Realist on the question of what constitutes a successful long standing 
theory. There are numerous theories where the criterion of structural continuity in 
Worrall’s sense is impossible to discern. For example, most theories in biology 
do not have the sort of structure that makes them amenable to a judgment on 
Worrall’s criteria. Worrall is untroubled by this because his purpose is to put 
forward a Realist perspective on theory structure, and thus to make a claim about 
the truth of theories in this sense, while not defending Realism about the entities 
postulated. Thus it seems that it is primarily useful to consider his theory in the 
domain of mathematical physics. Presumably Worrall might argue that a 
successful demonstration of the reality of structural relations in this domain can 
be used as a foundation for a more general Structural Realism when theories in 
other areas become sufficiently mature to have a mathematical structure. 
 
How, on the basis of Structural Realism, can one explain the fact that ‘long 
standing successful theories’ in mathematical physics are ‘P-fertile’? Suppose we 
consider the successive versions of the p, V, T relations in the kinetic theory of 
gases. Are the theories distinct for the Structural Realist since the equations 
arising are different? Alternatively can one regard the theories as showing 
structural continuity since the successive equations are modest modifications of 
their predecessor? It seems here one could accept the latter since there is an 











plausible utilization of the most appropriate and convenient mathematical 
formalism. The intermolecular attractive and repulsive forces provide just such an 
argument. Thus in this case Structural Realism explains the conjunction of P-
fertility and long standing success. 
 
Now in accepting the factual status of the McMullin Conjunction, we are claiming 
that these distinct theories are part of a general pattern in the history of science, 
namely that such successive distinct theories arise naturally from their 
predecessor and continue to account for the new experimental observations that 
arise over time. 
 
For the Structural Realist metaphorical suggestiveness and P-fertility arise from 
the true claims in the false theories125 not from any claim about approximate 
truth. This bears a distant resemblance to the ‘general theory’ proposal of Nolan 
discussed in Chapter 1 because it is indeed the particular instance that suits 
Nolan’s argument. However, it is not now being suggested that the subsequent 
developments are novel predictions of some general theory. On the contrary, 
each revision commonly arises from its predecessor in the manner proposed by 
McMullin. The difference from McMullin is that it is not the overall approximate 
truth of the theory, but the true claims about the structural relations within the 
theories that provide the metaphorical suggestiveness. 
 
It is not clear how Worrall’s Structural Realism can be extended beyond 
mathematical physics, or at least how it can be extended beyond theories with a 
mathematical structure. It is true that there will be structural relations in non-
mathematical theories but in this case separating out the structural component 
would seem to be an intractable problem. If one looks, to choose just one 
                                            
125 It is of course perfectly possible for fruitful suggestions to arise from the false elements in 
theories that contain significant truths or in theories that are substantially false. Lyons has drawn 
attention in a careful historical analysis to the central importance of numbers of false views held 
by Kepler in successful prediction and in subsequent theoretical development (Lyons, T.D. 2006 
‘Scientific Realism and the Strategema de Divide et Impera’ British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 57, 537-560). Moreover, Lyons cites evidence that this is by no means an isolated 











example, at the development of Molecular Biology since Watson and Crick’s 
1953 paper (when it became a mature science by any reasonable definition), it 
has made huge strides, without any parallel retention of structure as distinct from 
nature. The nature/structure of DNA has been elaborated and theories of the 
precise role of RNA and DNA have been and are continuing to be developed in a 
series of major advances. This is no argument against the applicability of 
Structural Realism in the appropriate domain. Nevertheless, it is an argument 
against the theory as a full explanation of the McMullin Conjunction because the 
claimed scope of this is wider than the scope of the explanations offered by 
Structural Realism. 
 
This last is perhaps something of an oversimplification since the Structural 
Realists can argue that where their theories do not apply they can adopt an 
alternative stance which is in no way contradictory. Thus Worrall could agree that 
successive theories which do not share a common structure, because no 
mathematical structure is postulated in any of them, can be viewed as 
successive versions of the same theory. The basis for this could simply be that 
the theories, despite their different structural equations, are closely similar and 
meet what I have called the Continuity Conditions (section 2.2). 
2.5.3 Entity Realism 
To consider the P-fertility issues in the context of Entity Realism I first give a brief 
account of the view. Rather than claiming that the relevant theories are 
approximately true and in general successively more closely approaching the 
truth, Entity Realism makes the more modest claim that the postulated entities 
exist. It is not claimed that the description of the entities in the relevant theory is 
approximately true. I treat it as Anti-realist in terms of the definition given by 
Ladyman, cited in section 1.3, because the Entity Realist does not in general 
claim that, ‘truth conditions for statements of S are objective and determine the 
truth or falsity of those statements depending on how things stand in the world’, 











are knowable and we do in fact know some of them, and hence the terms of S 
successfully refer to things in the world.’ Although it is true she might claim one 
or other of these in relation to specific theoretical claims in a restricted domain. 
 
Cartwright argues for an Instrumentalist view of general theories combined with a 
realist stance on entities and an acceptance of the low-level phenomenological 
laws of science. Her scepticism about fundamental theories arises because she 
says they are hedged with ceteris paribus clauses of such ubiquity and 
seriousness that the theories cannot be believed to be of universal validity. The 
fundamental laws of electrostatics assume per impossibile that no gravitational 
forces are acting. Falling autumn leaves are inescapably affected by forces other 
than those due to gravity. As a result the fundamental laws are false and 
corrections are always needed to bring the theoretical account closer to reality126. 
From a Scientific Realist stance, the fact that allowing for air resistance gives a 
better account of the trajectory of a projectile in a medium such as air does not 
undermine Newton’s theory as applied to motion in a vacuum127. Cartwright can 
respond that a universal law confined to motion in a vacuum is not a credible 
universal law any more than one referring to point masses and inextensible 
strings. Her position is that the widely accepted universal laws are not laws of 
nature, but make a patchwork of discrete accounts which enable ordering and 
prediction in various aspects of a world which may well be a messy reality. As 
                                            
126 It is really the fundamentalism about the laws of physics and the belief in their universal 
applicability that Cartwright denies (Cartwright, N. 1994 ‘Fundamentalism vs The Patchwork of 
Laws’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93, 279-92). Cartwright regards the ‘laws of nature’ 
as descriptive rather than prescriptive, that is, rather than as counter factual conditionals that 
apply at all times with appropriate ceteris paribus clauses. 
127 Both Cartwright and the Scientific Realist would agree that better agreement with experiment 
is obtained by the avowedly instrumentalist step of introducing a resistance term proportional to 
velocity in calculating the trajectory of a projectile. Cartwright takes a wholly Instrumentalist 
stance towards this fact. The Scientific Realist view is that if we were able to solve the intractable 
problems of turbulent flow in a medium like air to calculate the forces between the medium and 
the projectile over the course of its flight, we would arrive at a result that showed that taking the 
resistance to be linearly proportional to velocity was a good approximation to the truth. That is, a 
good approximation to an extremely complex formula (involving local pressures, projectile 
interface temperatures and other variables) actually quite closely describing the reality of 










she puts it128: ‘We may use the fundamental equations of physics to calculate 
precise quantitative facts about real situations, but abstract fundamental laws are 
nothing like the complicated, messy laws which describe reality.’ 
 
The Scientific Realist counter argument, as exemplified by the air resistance 
example above, relies on a faith in the composition of causes. We can, it is 
claimed, make an idealized model and subsequently ‘de-idealize’ it to allow for its 
known oversimplification, made initially to attain a more tractable theory/model129. 
Cartwright responds by saying that ‘it is rarely the case that models of the 
phenomena are arrived at as de-idealizations of theoretical models.’130 She might 
well also respond that it is far from obvious that it is proper or possible in this way 
to make a quantum mechanical calculation involving elementary particles 
ignoring relativistic effects, and then simply to add them in. 
 
Cartwright would agree that it is not merely proper, but essential, for scientists to 
conduct their experiments under highly artificial laboratory conditions. This is the 
only way scientists can produce uniform, precise, lawlike results that can be 
replicated (or not) by other experimenters at other times in different laboratories. 
Her claim is that this necessity vitiates the claim that universal laws have been 
discovered. This is not merely a matter of terminology. Cartwright believes that 
there are no established universal laws. 
                                            
128 Cartwright, N. 1986 ‘Fitting Facts to Equations’ Philosophical Grounds of Rationality R.E. 
Grundy and R. Warner (Eds) Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
129 Morrison denies that the plausible argument about de-idealization given above in the example 
of air resistance can be generalized. She points out that in most cases the more refined model 
introduces new concepts and hence the ‘composition of causes’ argument cannot be invoked. For 
example, the ideal gas law gives no possibility of a phase change, whereas the van der Waals 
equation makes (incorrect) predictions about the critical phenomena. The inclusion of attractive 
intermolecular forces allows for the possibility of liquefaction. The situation, she says, is even 
worse for contemporary theories in particle physics, where there is no way of knowing the 
relationship between the postulated model and a hypothetical true structure. Indeed, she claims, 
the models in elementary particle theory are largely heuristic. (Morrison, M. 2005 ‘Approximating 
the Real: The Role of Idealizations in Physical Theory’ Idealization XII: Correcting the Model. 
Idealization and Abstraction in the Sciences M.R. Jones and N. Cartwright (Eds) (Poznan Studies 
in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities Volume 86) pp. 145-172. 
130 Cartwright, N., Shomar, T. and Saurez, M. 1995 ‘The Tool Box of Science’ in Theories and 
Models in Scientific Processes W.E. Herfel, W. Krajewski, W.I. Niiniluoto and R. Wojicki (Eds) 












According to Cartwright to ask what the best theory of the electron is, for 
example, is to make a mistake. Theories are not in competition, but are chosen 
to make predictions, guide experiments, design equipment and the like. Newton’s 
theory is good for sending rockets to the moon but not adequate for designing 
high energy particle accelerators. This does of course accord with scientific 
practice in many areas. In discussing the lamellar flow of liquids we assume that 
water is a continuum, while in explaining the freezing of water we assume it has 
discrete molecules in a (more or less) random array in the liquid form, and these 
molecules form a regular lattice in ice. Cartwright believes in the entity, the H2O 
molecule, because its presence in water explains solidification, Brownian motion, 
and the results of the nuclear magnetic resonance, optical and X-ray experiments 
on water, ice and water vapour. 
 
Hacking131 has a somewhat different Entity Realist perspective. He argues that 
the fact that we can manipulate the postulated unobservable entities of physics is 
convincing evidence that they are real. It may be that our description of the 
electron is faulty, but the fact that we can focus them to produce an image in the 
electron microscope shows that they exist132. Hacking does also endorse other 
arguments for Entity Realism, including the ‘continuum argument’ mentioned in 
section 1.1; that is, the argument that the naked eye, the magnifying glass, the 
optical microscope133, and the electron microscope allow the observation of 
                                            
131 Hacking, I. 1983 Representing and Intervening Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
132 Hacking gives various examples; this one is mine and is not one of his. Kukla suggests that for 
this ‘manipulability’ argument to have any force it must be argued that you can spray electrons, to 
use Hacking’s example, ‘in a sense that doesn’t presuppose their existence’. The only appeal the 
argument has, Kukla says, is to one’s intuitions, and these are precisely what the Anti-realist 
denies (Kukla, A. 1998 Studies in Scientific Realism Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 90). 
133 Hacking has also given a detailed argument for accepting the veracity of optical microscope 
observation (despite the necessary intervention of some interpretative theory of imaging) by 
showing that optical microscopes operating on quite different theoretical principles give similar 
results. Quinton has given a further argument to the ‘continuum argument’ of Maxwell (cited in 
section 1.1) for accepting the results obtained from the instrumental extensions of human vision, 
by pointing out that at each stage of increased magnification, objects visible in the previous stage 
can still be seen to be the same object. Thus if one accepts naked eye observations one should 
also accept the deliverances of magnifying instruments (Quinton, A. 1973 The Nature of Things 











progressively smaller entities, and there are no grounds for privileging the naked 
eye within this continuous spectrum134. 
 
Entity Realists must accept that there is some element of truth in the account 
given of say the elementary particles of physics135. However they do not need to 
claim that the theories overall are true or approximately true. They would agree 
that136 ‘a viable realism must endorse some theoretical properties as well as a 
theoretical ontology’. Thus, for example, they might agree that it is true that 
electrons obey Fermi-Dirac statistics, and that their charge and mass are with a 
few hundredths of a percent of the present accepted values. Hacking137, for 
example, asserts, ‘We know an enormous amount about the behaviour of 
electrons’. This leaves scope for not believing that Quantum Electrodynamics is 
true or approximately true. 
 
On the Entity Realist stance there are some interesting questions about what is 
meant by the concept of diachronicity. The Entity Realist is in part, like the 
Structural Realist, responding to the PMI. Science is successful because it 
correctly identifies the (unobservable) entities which explain the phenomena, in 
particular the results of carefully controlled scientific experiments. McMullin’s 
diachronic view of theories is not really applicable in the same way as the 
Scientific Realist would use it – what survives theory change is related to the 
                                            
134 Van Fraassen, who treats observable as observable by unaided humans, has a response to 
the continuum argument. He says, ‘Contrary to Sextus Empiricus there is a real distinction 
between touching your mother’s toe with your little finger and having incestuous intercourse, even 
if the difference is a matter of degree, and the line is drawn differently in different contexts.’ (van 
Fraassen, B.C. 2000 ‘Constructive Empiricism Now’ 
http://webware.princeton.edu/vanfraas/mss/APA-Albuq2.htm p. 8) The example is also used, 
differently put, in his The Scientific Image Oxford: Clarendon Press p.16. Kukla has a careful 
discussion which points out the difficulty with van Fraassen’s argument that since it is human 
science, so an unaided human perspective is appropriate for observability. Just as a blind 
scientist can be part of the scientific community, so could a mutant scientist with extraordinary 
visual capacities (Kukla, A. 1998 Studies in Scientific Realism Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Chapter 10). 
135 Psillos, S. 1999 Scientific realism: how science tracks truth New York: Routledge p. 256. 
136 Leplin, J. 2006 ‘Realism’ The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia S. Sarkar and J Pfeifer 
(Eds) London: Routledge p. 687. 












postulated entities as much as to the theories. However, this does not pose a 
problem for the Entity Realist in accepting the diachronic view of theories; there 
may be a need to word the Continuity Conditions somewhat differently. 
 
The success of the theory modified over time can in this case be interpreted in a 
manner parallel to the McMullin approach. For the Entity Realist the argument 
would be that the correct identification of some important aspect of the causal 
unobservable entity is the origin of the success of the theory viewed 
instrumentally. In other words, it is again the significant true claims of the theory 
which give it its metaphoric suggestiveness and lead to the successful 
modifications and the P-fertility. 
 
To consider an example, the Entity Realist might agree with the Scientific Realist 
that the water molecule, H2O, exists. Currently, molecular weight, bond angles, 
energy levels of excited states, and numerous other features are described in 
great quantitative detail. The Entity Realist does not believe the current detailed 
interpretation of the whole of this because she does not believe the relevant 
theory describes the lawlike behaviour that the Scientific Realist assumes for 
natural kinds like H2O. Let us suppose the current theory has a long history of 
successful modification to meet new observations. Can this be accounted for by 
the simple assumption that there are H2O molecules with two hydrogen atoms, 
hydrogen bonded to an oxygen atom, and no more? More realistically, is more 
required and if so how much more, and how much of this does the Entity Realist 
accept? 
  
These questions raise some complex issues. There is a theory of the water 
molecule that has resulted from a large body of experimental evidence. There will 
be results from spectroscopic studies of water in the liquid and gaseous forms 
over a range of wavelengths. That is, these studies will range from nuclear 
magnetic resonance to the optical and the ultra violet end of the electromagnetic 











crystallographic forms of ice. There will be studies of the physical, mechanical, 
thermal and electrical properties of H2O over a range of temperatures, which for 
some of these properties, will be carried out in the solid, liquid, and gaseous 
states. 
 
The importance of the details of the picture of the water molecule will be different 
in a theory of each of the following arbitrarily chosen phenomena involving the 
molecule. 
(i) the viscosity of water; 
(ii) the thermal conductivity of water; 
(iii) the thermal conductivity of water vapour (H2O in the gaseous state); 
(iv) the absorption spectrum of water vapour for electromagnetic waves; 
(v) the temperature dependence of the conductivity of ice; 
(vi) the allotropic transformations of ice138; 
(vii) the plastic deformation of ice. 
Understanding (vi), the origin of the various crystalline structures of ice formed at 
different temperatures and pressures, and (iv) the absorption spectrum of water 
vapour, is importantly dependent on the picture of the H2O molecule. The present 
(limited) understanding of (vii), the plasticity of the predominant form of terrestrial 
ice, is not greatly dependent on the detail of the molecular structure. Relating the 
properties of dislocations to atomic structure, even in the simple, near to close-
packed hexagonal structures of metallic elements like zinc, constitutes a 
formidable many body problem. The complex hexagonal structure of the common 
form of ice makes relating dislocation structure to the details of the non-
spherically symmetric intermolecular forces quite intractable. 
 
What then is the significance for Entity Realism of a successful long standing P-
fertile theory in one of these areas? It depends on the extent to which the 
(possibly false) theory (in its successive forms) is dependent on the detailed 
knowledge of the entity itself demanded within the particular theory. 
                                            












First, consider Hacking’s stance based on the view that we know water 
molecules exist because we can manipulate them. This, for example, would 
seem every bit as satisfactory as full blown Scientific Realism to account for the 
fact that water when heated becomes a gas with some 1700 times the volume 
per unit mass of the liquid, and further that latent heat is required for the process. 
However, we cannot ‘manipulate’ the hydrogen bond that is postulated to be an 
essential element in the stability of the H2O molecule, so that many other 
theories about the behaviour of water which depend on our understanding of the 
hydrogen bond remain unexplained, and likewise the P-fertility of these theories. 
Hacking would respond that this is in order. We believe in the reality of the H2O 
molecule (thus taking us beyond the Instrumentalist in our realism) but suspend 
judgment about the reality of the hydrogen bond. 
 
Thus the situation is reminiscent of the Structural Realist position. Within its 
domain of applicability Hacking’s Entity Realism is able to account for P-fertility 
and the McMullin Conjunction. It does so via the true claims about the entities 
considered and does not invoke the approximate truth or verisimilitude of the 
relevant theories. Again there is a lack of generality in the explanation as in the 
Structural Realism case (assuming always the fact of the McMullin Conjunction). 
 
Cartwright’s position is somewhat different. She does not require manipulability. 
If light is bent as it passes close to the sun, she is prepared to accept the general 
theory of relativity as an explanation of the phenomenon. What she does not 
accept is the general theory of relativity as an account of the behaviour of space-
time. She is not an Instrumentalist because, like Hacking, she believes in 
electrons and their causal power and their real existence. However, she, unlike 
Hacking, ‘believes’ that space-time is curved because this is the best account we 
have of a number of important experiments. I have put believes here in inverted 
commas because Cartwright does not believe that the general theory of relativity 











independent world. In her view we do not have such an account, and we have no 
reason to believe there is such an account. She states139: ‘To grant that a law is 
true – even a law of “basic” physics or a law about the so-called fundamental 
particles – is far from admitting that it is universal, that it holds everywhere and 
governs in all domains.’ 
 
Cartwright, with regard to any and all reliable scientific data and scientific 
theorizing, would draw exactly the same conclusions as an Instrumentalist. Her 
departure from Instrumentalism is her belief in the real existence of unobservable 
entities. In her case this would include entities like the hydrogen bond with its 
causal powers. Her instrumentalism is explicit in so far as she does not merely 
deny that we do or can know the laws of nature, but asserts that there are no 
such laws. If there are no laws of nature then the theories introduced to bring 
order to observations and to make predictions are most sensibly viewed from an 
Instrumentalist standpoint. Cartwright adds to this the plausible idea that there 
are entities like the electron or the atom or the hydrogen bond, and we do know 
something about them. We do not have a theory which we are justified in taking 
to be universally true. 
I use the image of the tool-box of science to describe a kind of 
instrumentalism that I defend as part of this movement to undermine the 
domination of theory. … Our scientific understanding and its corresponding 
image of the world is encoded as much in our instruments, our mathematical 
techniques, our methods of approximation, the shape of our laboratories and 
the pattern of industrial developments as in our scientific theories ... these bits 
of understanding so encoded should not be viewed as claims about the 
nature and structure of reality which ought to have a proper propositional 
                                            
139 Cartwright, N. 1994 ‘Fundamentalism vs The Patchwork of Laws’ Proceedings of the 











expression that is a candidate for truth or falsehood. Rather they should be 
viewed as adaptable tools in a common scientific toolbox.140 
I will therefore consider the implications of Cartwright’s stance as part of the 
following section on Instrumentalism. 
2.5.4 Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism is Anti-realist because, unlike the Scientific Realist, the 
Instrumentalist believes that empirical adequacy rather than truth is what 
scientific theories deliver141. Thus in terms of the definition given in section 1.3 
the Instrumentalist inter alia does not believe the important assertions: 
(i) The entities or kinds of entities talked about and/or described by a 
discourse about S exist. 
(v) Truths about S are knowable and we do in fact know some of them, and 
hence the terms of S successfully refer to things in the world. 
 
In considering how the McMullin Conjunction can be accounted for on the basis 
of an Instrumentalist account of scientific theories it is useful to look at an 
example. I have chosen one of the most fertile (as distinct from P-fertile) theories 
in the history of science – Dalton’s Atomic Theory (circa 1803). 
  
The theory stated 
(i) elements consist of atoms 
(ii) the atoms of an element are qualitatively identical 
(iii) the atoms of an element are different from those of any other element 
(iv) atoms of one element can combine with atoms of other elements to 
form compounds and a given compound always has the same relative 
numbers of types of atoms 
                                            
140 Cartwright, N., Shomar, T. and Saurez, M. 1995 ‘The Tool Box of Science’ in Theories and 
Models in Scientific Processes W.E. Herfel, W. Krajewski, W.I. Niiniluoto and R. Wojicki (Eds) 
Amsterdam: Rodopi p. 138. 












(v) atoms cannot be created, divided into smaller particles, nor can they 
be destroyed in the chemical process142. 
Based on this atomic theory, Dalton said that when compounds form between 
elements the ratio of the masses will be whole numbers. 
 
However, Dalton added the doctrine that unless there was some compelling 
reason, compounds were binary, for example, water was HO. Thus he believed 
the observation that two volumes of hydrogen and one volume of oxygen 
combined to form two volumes of water vapour (2 H2 + O2  2 H2O) was 
erroneous143. Thus Dalton’s theory often did not agree with experiment. The 
explanation was given by Avogadro in 1811; he made the distinction between 
elemental molecules and elemental atoms, a distinction that Dalton had not 
considered (since Dalton believed that like atoms would not attract one another 
to form molecules of an element in the gaseous state). Avogadro’s work was 
ignored, in part because of Dalton’s prestige, until resurrected by Cannizaro 
some 50 years later. In the intervening period, chemistry made great progress, 
as experimental techniques improved, and closely confirmed Gay-Lussac’s early 
observation (1809) that when gases combined in chemical reactions they did so 
in ratios, by volume, that were always simple whole numbers. 
 
Dalton’s theory was a triumph, but the Instrumentalist is entitled in the nineteenth 
century to her sceptical stance about the existence of atoms. Indeed it is now 
accepted that Dalton’s indestructible atoms were in a legitimate sense a useful 
fiction144, and the Instrumentalist might well claim the same is likely to be true of 
current elementary particle theory (the so called Standard Model). 
 
                                            
142 It is of course the specificity of clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv) that distinguishes Dalton’s work from 
the various earlier ‘atomic theories’. 
143 Precise measurements on gaseous reactions were not easily made at the time, and Dalton 
was in any case extremely sceptical of the results of other scientists. Hence he did not regard this 
observation as a compelling reason to abandon his belief that water was HO. 
144 It is now well known that atoms are not indestructible (Marie Curie observed radioactivity in 
1897 although its significance was not then wholly clear), and that atoms of the same element 











For the Instrumentalist a long standing successful theory is simply one that 
works. It makes successful predictions and over time it accounts for new 
observations by modest modifications. If either the postulated entities or the 
theoretical postulates change radically, the Instrumentalist would not regard the 
theory as being the same theory. On the other hand, the long standing success 
of a theory has no more implication than simple success as far as truth is 
concerned. Dalton’s theory was a long standing successful theory and was 
successfully modified over a long period viewed from an Instrumentalist 
perspective. The Instrumentalist need not believe in Dalton’s indestructible 
atoms. 
 
Why it is that this long standing successful theory (that is false) can be readily 
modified to accommodate new data. In this case, the theory is wrong in 
proposing that atoms are indestructible and wrong in saying that all the atoms of 
a given element are qualitatively identical. The reason that it might be P-fertile 
(given that it is successful) is again because it contains significant claims that are 
true and it is these which give rise to P-fertility. Atoms are not destroyed in 
chemical reactions and atoms of a given element which differ (atoms of different 
isotopes) will still behave identically in chemical reactions. As a result the true 
features of a false (and not approximately true) story can lead to P-fertility in 
more or less precisely the manner that is claimed for (what we can say for the 
moment is) the meaningless notion of approximate truth. In the present case the 
features of the atomic theory that led to progress in fields such as chemistry and 
the kinetic theory of gases are present in Dalton’s false story145.  
 
The immediate question is whether this type of account can be invoked more 
generally. All P-fertile theories are successful. It is plausible that all (or at least 
most) long standing successful theories contain true claims, and this accounts for 
                                            
145 This progress took considerable time and it is not suggested that the developments were 
obvious on the basis of Dalton’s theory. For example, Dalton took the atmosphere to be a mixture 
like sand in water, and could not understand why the heavier oxygen did not sink to the bottom 












their P-fertility. For van Fraassen, science is interested in empirical adequacy, 
not truth, but he has no need to resist the notion that a successful theory (i.e., an 
empirically adequate theory) contains true claims. He would for example say that 
the van der Waals theory of gases was empirically adequate in some respects, 
for some gases, under some conditions, but was certainly not true. But within the 
framework of Constructive Empiricism it seems to me that one could perfectly 
well accept that it is true that there are intermolecular attractive forces in gases. It 
is certainly no part of Constructive Empiricism to assert that all the postulates of 
empirically adequate scientific theories are false. A Constructive Empiricist might 
assert that there is no reason to take any of them to be true, but she would 
undertake unnecessary baggage by denying that the most obvious claims are 
true. Her concern is to deny that it is rational to take the theories to be true. 
 
Does the possession of significant true claims within an empirically adequate 
theory give as adequate an account of the McMullin Conjunction as does 
approximate truth? The question can be considered in the first instance by asking 
whether my example of Dalton’s atomic theory can be taken as typical. The two 
notions differ in that approximate truth incorporates the idea of nearness to truth. 
The Instrumentalist denies the relevance of such a concept to scientific 
theorizing. The committed Scientific Realist could in some circumstances take 
my account of what I have described as a theory containing significant true 
claims as a proper account of an approximately true theory. We are back in the 
dilemma posed by the concept of the approximate truth of theories. How is one to 
decide whether or not Dalton’s theory is or is not approximately true? 
 
However, the present question is whether the Instrumentalist has an explanation 
for the McMullin Conjunction. In my example of Dalton’s theory, I have given an 
explanation in the terms a Scientific Realist would use. Namely, much but not all 
of what Dalton postulated is true of the mind-independent world. The 
Instrumentalist makes no such claim and simply asserts that the theory is 











reason a useful theory is readily modified to accommodate new data. It is 
contrary to the spirit of van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism to appeal to 
truths within the theory. Nevertheless the explanation of the McMullin 
Conjunction must indeed be that the theories considered contain true claims as 
suggested above in the example of the intermolecular attractive forces in real 
gases. 
 
In light of the view that making sense of the very idea of fertility requires taking 
the fertile theory to be something over and above a recipe for prediction and 
control, or the claim that the theory is empirically adequate, it can be argued that 
Constructive Empiricism can offer no satisfactory account of the McMullin 
Conjunction. The point here is that if the aim of science is merely to organize the 
data and thus make predictions, McMullin’s idea of scientific theories as fruitful 
metaphor seems difficult to sustain. The generative capacity of the successive 
versions of long standing successful theories can no longer helpfully be 
described as fertility. It seems that someone who merely accepts a theory as van 
Fraassen proposes, rather than believing in it, has no ground for regarding it as 
generative. Her explanation of the McMullin Conjunction, as I have said, may be 
that the assertions in the theory which may be true (although she does not 
necessarily believe them to be true) are possibly the origin of the seeming 
capacity of the theory to lead to further empirically adequate theories. However, it 
might be more consistent with van Fraassen’s stance simply to argue that given 
new experimental evidence scientists modify their theories, and it is an 
interesting historical fact of no great significance that they are often successful in 
intelligently elaborating their theories. Further, the Constructive Empiricist might 
say the supposed McMullin Conjunction is more salient than is of any real 
significance because the very common unsuccessful elaborations are mostly lost 
to history. 
 
However, a Constructive Empiricist might take a strong line and argue that there 











true, rather than merely arguing that the theory can not be taken to be true or 
approximately true. If it cannot be asserted that there are truths within the theory, 
she has no obvious explanation for the McMullin Conjunction, and the most 
reasonable response is to adopt towards it the sceptical stance outlined above, 
namely that it not significant. 
 
The Entity Realist is perhaps in a slightly better position. If her claims about the 
entities are accepted, then it may be that the explanation of the metaphorical 
suggestiveness of the theories results from the correct identification of aspects of 
these entities. While this is not implausible in the Dalton example, it is not at all 
clear that arguments along these lines are plausible in elementary particle 
physics where the entities and the theory are inseparable. This is not to suggest 
that Cartwright may not be correct in her rejection of universal laws, but only to 
say in this last area, among others, she has no obvious account of the McMullin 
Conjunction. Of course, she has no obligation to accept the premise I have 
adopted for the purpose of argument, namely that the McMullin Conjunction 
holds. 
 
The question remains as to whether Instrumentalism, in particular van 
Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism, is itself a plausible form of Anti-realism, and 
this has been extensively discussed in the literature146. One immediate question 
is whether Instrumentalism can account for the Pessimistic Meta Induction. This 
does not seem to be a serious concern. Since no use is made of the No Miracles 
Argument, scientific theories are not taken to be true and there is no reason to 
suppose that new experimental evidence will not show them to be false. As 
                                            
146 See for example Psillos, S. 1999 Scientific realism: how science tracks truth New York: 
Routledge; Niiniluoto, I. 1999 Critical Scientific Realism Oxford: Oxford University Press; Horwich, 
P.G. 1991 ‘On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment’ Philosophy of Science 58, 1-
14; Kukla, A. 1992 ‘On the Coherence of Instrumentalism’ Philosophy of Science 59, 492-497; 
Norris, C. 2004 Philosophy of Language and the Challenge to Scientific Realism London: 
Routledge; Dicken, P. and Lipton, P. 2006 ‘What can Bas believe? Musgrave and van Fraassen 
on observability’ Analysis 66, 226-233; Muller, F.A. and van Fraassen, B.C. 2008 ‘How to talk 
about unobservables’ Analysis 68, 197-205; Dicken, P. 2009 ‘On the syntax and semantics of 











Popper forcefully argued147, this last is straightforward compared with 
establishing veracity. 
 
The arguments advanced by Scientific Realists against Instrumentalism are 
sometimes simply advocacy of the greater plausibility of Scientific Realism itself, 
and sometimes claims that the position collapses or is incoherent because of the 
failure of van Fraassen’s distinction between acceptance and belief or between 
observables and unobservables. They will not be rehearsed here. However, a 
novel argument for scepticism about Instrumentalism is contained in Appendix A. 
2.6 Conclusion 
McMullin’s account of P-fertility in terms of approximate truth seems 
straightforward. The price paid for this is the introduction of the concept of the 
approximate truth of scientific theories. By considering the criteria justifying the 
diachronic stance one can see that successive sub-theories may be sufficiently 
similar without drawing on the concept of approximate truth or approximate 
similarity. On McMullin’s own account it would be desirable that each theory 
suggested its successor. However, perhaps one can justify dispensing with this 
criterion in the instances where we can establish the proximity of the successive 
theories. The important issues of (i) the difficulties of giving a meaning to the 
concept of the approximate truth of scientific theories and (ii) the legitimacy of 
using the concept to account for the McMullin Conjunction are taken up in 
Chapter 3. 
 
The Anti-realist148 is not committed to either the notion of P-fertility or to the 
acceptance of its conjunction with long standing success. It is the McMullin 
                                            
147 Popper, K.R. 1959 The Logic of Scientific Discovery London: Hutchinson; Popper, K.R. 1963 
Conjectures and Refutations, New York: Harper and Rowe. 
148 I am here, of course, persisting with the characterization of Structural Realism, Entity Realism, 
Constructive Empiricism, and Internal Realism as Anti-realist. I have, as mentioned earlier, 
postponed the discussion of Internal Realism to Chapter 6. What is clear is that McMullin’s full 
blooded Scientific Realism contrasts with all of these positions. McMullin writes, ’If the resources 
of the theory have shown that it was able to cope with the unexpected, the argument is that this 











argument for Scientific Realism that draws on this dual commitment. However, if 
the McMullin Conjunction is accepted on the basis of the historical evidence, 
Anti-realism does require that it be explained. Here the Anti-realist can fall back 
on the idea that successive theories may indeed be suggested by their 
predecessor as a consequence of the significant true claims contained within 
them. The Anti-realist is not required to invoke the approximate truth of 
successor forms of a P-fertile theory. Every member of such a sequence of 
theories can be false. 
 
It could be argued by a Scientific Realist that contra McMullin, the McMullin 
Conjunction can be explained by the true claims in the successive theories, and 
not by their approximate truth. The acceptance of the approximate truth of 
theories has been imputed by me to McMullin as a necessary part of his position 
as discussed in section 1.2. If we allow the ‘true claims’ account on a Realist 
construal then we have parity between Scientific Realism and Anti-realism, and 
the abductive argument for the former is considerably weakened. However, in 
Chapter 5 I argue for a stronger Anti-realist case, namely that Scientific Realism 
requires the approximate truth of theories. 
 
Why does containing significant true claim suffice to give a theory its 
metaphorical suggestiveness? A Scientific Realist could accept that an 
approximately true theory made significant true claims and that it is 
predominantly these that make for P-fertility. After all the Scientific Realist is not 
claiming that the intermediary theories are true. Equally a Scientific Realist, from 
what has been argued so far, could dispense with approximate truth, and use the 
                                                                                                                                  
to the structures of the real.’ (McMullin, E. 1976 ‘The fertility of theory and the unit for appraisal in 
science’ in R.S. Cohen et al (Eds), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Dordrecht: D. Reidel p. 
423.) Or as he writes elsewhere, ‘realism has to do with the existence implications of the 
theoretical entities of successful theories.’ (McMullin, E. 1984 ‘A Case for Scientific Realism’ in 
Scientific Realism J. Leplin (Ed) Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 13.) or ‘realism has to 
do with the reality of certain postulated entities’ (McMullin, E. 2003 ‘Van Fraassen’s 
Unappreciated Realism’ Philosophy of Science 70, 455-478 p. 457).Thus the first of these claims 
would set Scientific Realism against all four Anti-realist positions, the second pair would allow 
Entity Realism, but the truth of the claim of ‘existence implications’ or ‘reality’ would not be 











significant true claims argument of the Anti-realist. (As mentioned above, I return 
in Chapter 5 to a discussion of this claim that the approximate truth of theories 
can be dispensed with by the Scientific Realist.) 
 
Dalton’s atomic theory made the significant true claim that atoms are not 
destroyed in chemical reactions. This is entailed by the false claim that atoms are 
indestructible. It is the former claim that led to the success of Dalton’s theory. 
Indeed the significant true claims account can be applied to theories that the 
Scientific Realist would take to be false, in addition to those taken to be 
approximately true. As Almeder149 writes, 
the occurrence of the sensory phenomena that we would expect if the 
designated theoretical claims were true might just as easily be the result of 
other theoretical or nontheoretical claims made in the theory, claims that 
serve as auxiliary hypotheses or simple observational claims, while the 
designated theoretical claims are literally false. This hypothesis, for example, 
would constitute one plausible way to explain the predictive success of 
Ptolemy’s astronomy. While the designated theoretical claims of Ptolemy’s 
astronomy can he viewed as literally false, the predictive success of such 
claims would need to be a function of other true claims made in the theory. 
 
The argument can be summarized as follow 
(i) In accepting the empirical claim of the McMullin Conjunction we have 
accepted the diachronic view of theories and hence some notion of 
similitude of theories and a commitment to some notion of significant 
continuing claims within the successive versions of the theory. 
(ii) The diachronic view of theories is acceptable to the Scientific Realist 
and the Anti-realist. 
                                            











(iii) P-fertility can be explained by both Scientific Realism and Antirealism 
on the basis of the significant true claims in the successive versions of 
the long standing successful theories. 
(iv) Hence the historical observation of the McMullin Conjunction is neutral 
between Scientific Realism and Anti-realism unless McMullin’s 
explanation for the conjunction is accepted and is seen to be more 
plausible. 
 
McMullin’s novel argument for Scientific Realism rests on the claim that the 
successive versions of the long standing successful theories are approximately 
true. The status of the claim of the approximate truth of scientific theories, 












Instrumentalism has been criticized on a variety of grounds by various writers150. 
One difficulty that seems not to have been considered lies in the interesting 
cases where a macroscopic model faithfully represents some ‘unobservable’ that 
the Instrumentalist claims we are not justified in taking as a real existent. This is 
illustrated in the following two examples. 
 
Bragg’s soap bubble raft model of a crystal seems to be an excellent 
macroscopic simulation of a two dimensional crystal. A bubble raft is produced by 
forcing pressurized air through a micropipette submerged in a glycerine-soap 
solution, resulting in uniformly sized bubbles of about 1 mm diameter. The 
interaction of the bubbles is qualitatively similar to the inter-atomic pair potential 
of face-centred cubic metals. Now the Instrumentalist will readily concede that 
there are visible dislocations in the bubble raft. Nevertheless, she is compelled to 
say that this gives us no reason to believe in the unobservable151 dislocations in 
real crystals. The bubble raft simulation shows macroscopically (in two 
dimensions) numerous features of dislocation behaviour that theory predicts in 
three dimensional real crystals. Moreover, some of these observed features were 
successively encompassed in the progressive refinements of dislocation theory 
as applied to real crystals. The inter-atomic forces are by no means identical to 
those between the soap bubbles, but the similarity in relevant respects to the 
forces in face-centred cubic metals makes it plausible that the observed 
dislocation behaviour in the bubble raft is a simulation of dislocation behaviour in 
these crystals. It does seem mysterious that the ‘useful fiction’ of the 
unobservable entities can be paralleled by identical observable entities in the 
simulation. The explanation that there are dislocations in crystals seems in this 
                                            
150 See for example Psillos, S. 1999 Scientific realism: how science tracks truth New York: 
Routledge; Niiniluoto, I. 1999 Critical Scientific Realism Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
151 Of course both the Scientific Realist and many Anti-realists deny that dislocations are 











case to account in a natural way for the behaviour of real crystals and the 
behaviour of the bubble raft. 
 
The Instrumentalist might argue that in some way the dislocation hypothesis 
reflects an underlying structure, albeit one which may not actually include 
dislocations. This seems difficult to rule out completely, and the Instrumentalist 
will maintain that belief in the postulated entities adds nothing to our 
understanding. However, one is left with no explanation for the parallel between 
the bubble raft and real solids. 
 
A similar but even more striking example is the play of light from opals, caused 
by the diffraction of light, which in every qualitative and quantitative respect 
replicates the diffraction of X-rays by crystals152. Opals consist of a close packed 
array of silica spheres of approximately constant size whose diameter is a few 
hundred nanometers (i.e., about the wavelength of visible light)153. An 
Instrumentalist who does not believe the current account of X-ray diffraction from 
regular arrays of unobservable atoms154 (again arranged as close packed 
spheres) but does accept the precisely parallel account of the diffraction of light 
by opals seems to be faced with a difficulty. She must presumably accept that X-
rays, on the one hand, and light in the range of human visibility on the other, are 
identical forms of electromagnetic waves, differing only in wavelength155. How 
then can she explain the identical behaviours while denying the existence of 
atoms?  
 
                                            
152 Sanders, J.V. 1968 ‘Diffraction of light by opals’ Acta Crystallographica A24, 427-434. 
153 The naturally occurring opals have been deposited over geological times (sometimes in 
sedimentary rocks and sometimes in rocks of volcanic origin) from an aqueous solution of silica in 
certain restricted circumstances of composition, cooling rate and pressure. The diffraction 
experiments have been repeated on artificial opals, created in the laboratory by manufacturing 
and depositing tiny silica spheres of uniform diameter. 
154 Here the inter-atomic spacing is about 0.3 nanometers, about the same as the wavelength of 
the X-rays, paralleling on a scale about 1000 times smaller, the opal case. 
155 Van Fraassen might be imagined to argue that the small manufactured silica spheres are also 
in the category of unobservables. However, diffraction experiments can be done using microwave 
radiation of centimetre wavelengths, and indeed are commonly done in undergraduate 











Of course Instrumentalism is an elusive doctrine and a contemporary 
Instrumentalist could believe in dislocations and atoms but not necessarily in 
quarks. However, this is at least partially to join the ranks of the Scientific 











CHAPTER 3 SCIENTIFIC REALISM, TRUTH, 
APPROXIMATE TRUTH 
3.1 Introduction 
McMullin’s argument, outlined in Chapter 1, makes the claim that explanatory 
structures ‘roughly like’ those postulated by contemporary long standing 
successful scientific theories exist. In other words these theories are 
approximately true. So what is approximate truth156? The purpose of the present 
chapter is to examine the difficulties of the concept of approximate truth. The 
crucial issue is the admissibility of the concept of the approximate truth of 
scientific theories, as distinct for example from the approximate truth of an 
estimate of a single numerical variable. 
 
It is important to note here that we have thus far put aside a distinction as to what 
different philosophical stances intend by the claim that ‘electrons exist’. For an 
Anti-realist the claim may be rationally acceptable or warrantably assertible, and 
she may nevertheless characterize herself as a Scientific Realist. She would be a 
realist about scientific ontology. A Scientific Realist for whom truth was non-
epistemic would make the claim that electrons exist and add that the claim could 
be false, however compelling the evidence was for the existence of electrons. 
Truth conditions are separate from verification conditions. She would be an 
ontological and semantic realist. For the purposes of this chapter the nature of 
approximate truth can be considered in relation to a truth concept that is not 
firmly specified. 
 
The basis for the contention that the postulated unobservable entities exist, 
outlined in Chapter 1, is that changes in scientific theories over time are such that 
                                            
156 I will use approximate truth as approximating to the truth, a concept that will require further 
clarification. I exclude the sense where one might say that something that is vague but not false is 
approximately true, like, for example, John is tall, when John is 180cm, where one might argue 











the successful theories become progressively closer to describing the mind-
independent-world (progress need not be monotonic). That is, they become more 
nearly approximately true, as evidenced by the fact that only this can 
satisfactorily explain the observation that successful long standing theories show 
P-fertility. 
 
One further point needs to be emphasized. What I have said so far does not 
apply in quite the same way to all theories. Not all legitimate and powerful 
scientific theories claim to be approximately true in the sense that I have just 
outlined. Scientific models may be abstractions, which incorporate only features 
deemed important, or idealizations, which make useful but knowingly false 
moves, like replacing extended masses with hypothetical point masses, or they 
may be a mixture of both. As Sklar157 writes: 
Science is replete both with schemes intended to truly characterize ‘how 
things are’ and with other schemes intended only as knowingly false but 
useful models of the real situation. But only the science itself can do the job of 
explicating the intended purpose of its own descriptive and explanatory 
schemes. 
Thus, for example, the liquid drop model of the nucleus was a powerful device, 
but nobody thinks the nucleus resembles a drop of liquid (except for specific 
analogies useful for many important calculations). However, Sklar’s statement 
somewhat oversimplifies the situation158, since at a given time the same 
model/theory may be differently viewed by its supporters. For example, 
                                            
157 Sklar, L. 2003 ‘Dappled Theories in a Uniform World’ Philosophy of Science 70, 424-441 p. 
431. 
158 Cartwright believes that Sklar’s position is false rather than an oversimplification; no scheme 
truly characterizes how things are. She writes: ‘We construct different models for different 
purposes, with different equations to describe them. Which is the right model, which is the “true” 
set of equations? The question is a mistake.’ (Cartwright, N. 1983 How the Laws of Physics Lie 
Oxford: Clarendon Press p. 11.) Cartwright’s position is that we have no inductive justification for 
accepting the underlying Scientific Realist belief in the existence of universal fundamental laws. 
These laws, according to her, are either false as generalizations of such universal scope or so 
hedged with ceteris paribus clauses as to make them vacuous – the fundamental law is true 
except when it is not. She does not deny that these laws are both useful and wisely chosen to 












advocates of the computational theory of mind differ radically in the extent to 
which they believe that the brain resembles an electronic computer. The point is 
an important one with respect to the so-called Pessimistic Meta Induction – the 
view that the long human history of numerous successful theories, which 
ultimately proved to be false, should make us sceptical of Scientific Realism159. 
Those who resist the Pessimistic Meta Induction sometimes argue that the 
falsely postulated entities in past successful theories were really used only as 
heuristic devices160. 
 
Of the avowedly false theories most are extremely useful. For example, 
sophisticated theories in fluid dynamics are used to make accurate predictions of 
the aerodynamics of aeroplane wings and ship’s hulls and the like. These 
theories assume a liquid is a continuum, whereas we know liquids consist of 
atoms, molecules or ions. Such theories are not taken to be true, but usefully 
model some major aspects of the behaviour of fluids. In these theories a fully 
described model is proposed, and it is then proposed that the world is 
approximately like this model in relevant respects. Such a continuum theory of 
fluid mechanics is quite useless in trying to decide when a given liquid might 
                                            
159 The Pessimistic Meta Induction is a sort of negative mirror image of the famous ‘no miracles 
argument’ – science has an endless succession of failed refuted theories, so we should be 
sceptical of current theories. This is a related issue to that discussed in section 1.5, where the 
concern was that there have been successful theories whose central entities are now known not 
to exist – phlogiston being the best known example. However, the argument about the improved 
nature of modern science can again be invoked in this case to blunt the Pessimistic Meta 
Induction. Indeed, if this last is accepted it can be claimed that no scepticism is warranted, and 
that the Pessimistic Meta Induction is an example of the false positives fallacy (Lewis, P. 2001 
‘Why the Pessimistic Induction is a Fallacy’ Synthese 129, 371-380).  
160 The Pessimistic Meta Induction is an important Scientific Anti-realist argument. Realists often 
argue that the relevant aspects of the successful false theories were in fact those that were true. 
However, Stanford (Stanford, P.K. 2003 ‘Pyrrhic Victories for Scientific Realism’ The Journal of 
Philosophy 100, 553-572) points out that this is a poor defense, since there is good historical 
evidence that at the time the false theories were accepted, the presently agreed false features of 
these theories were viewed as essential elements in them. Hence, the Realist has a new 
difficulty, namely her inability to give good grounds for her current belief in the essential elements 
of current theory. Thus in the process of attempting to explain away the anomaly (for her) of past 
successful false theories, the Realist counter argument to the Pessimistic Meta Induction 
undermines the Realists’ current belief claims. I have already referred in section 1.5, in discussing 
the phlogiston theory, to what I regard as a better defense for the Scientific Realist – the 












crystallize, since such a phase transition is wholly dependent on the fact that a 
liquid is not a continuum, but consists of molecules, atoms or ions. Obviously, the 
same is true of an attempt to explain on such a theory the random movement, 
known as Brownian motion, of tiny particles like pollen in a liquid. Brownian 
motion is caused by the bombardment of the particles by the molecules of the 
liquid; it was analyzed in 1905 in a fundamental paper by Einstein. 
 
As already stressed, many scientific theories are assumed to be true or 
approximately true – our theories of the atom, or the nucleus, or our theory of the 
way metals deform plastically under stress. Scientists believe that there are 
molecules and electrons and protons and quarks and DNA, and these entities 
cause the experimental observations we make. These theories I will refer to as 
causal theories. A somewhat different type of theory, that can also be called 
causal, is something like the theory of evolution, where processes like natural 
selection and species diversity are believed to account for species change. Here 
again, scientists believe on the basis of the theory that about 300 million years 
ago there lived a common ancestor of ourselves and the ostriches. 
 
Thus I have divided the theories considered into two categories161. First, there 
are those that might be called modeling theories, where an avowed idealization is 
claimed to approximate the world or an aspect of the world. Second, there are 
those that might be called causal, where a theoretical account is given of entities 
which are supposed to cause the phenomena of the world, and that account is 
approximately true, and the entities exist. 
 
Before looking at the approximate truth of theories, I will in section 3.2 look at 
how approximate is used in ordinary language. This inter alia provides a 
viewpoint on two equivalent alternative definitions of approximate truth for 
sentences. I will then in section 3.3 and 3.4 look at approximate truth for simple 
and complex sentences; section 3.5 then discusses approximate truth for 
                                            











theories. Finally in section 3.6 I discuss the suggestion that while we cannot 
satisfactorily specify the approximate truth of theories, we can accept our intuitive 
notion of the concept. 
3.2 Ordinary Language and Approximate Truth 
3.2.1 Introduction 
It is worth briefly examining what sorts of things can be spoken of as 
approximately true in ordinary usage. What sorts of things can be approximated 
and what sort of statements can be approximately true? Curves can be 
approximated – a function can be expanded in a power series and only a few 
terms kept. It is a separate claim to say that it is approximately true that the 
expansion represents the original curve. People cannot be approximately 
immoral, they cannot approximately move, one cannot be approximately killed. 
Figures can be approximately identical or square or circular. Articles cannot be 
approximately coloured, people can’t be approximately tall or short or fat, but 
they can be approximately 180 cm tall. Dogs can approximately follow a circular 
route or precisely follow an approximately circular route. People can be 
approximately forty years old but they cannot be approximately old. 
 
It is perhaps worth seeking some systematic categorization. 
3.2.2 Vague Terms 
One possible category seems to be terms that are not precise, such as old, 
young, tall, fat, beautiful, ugly, bald, hairy or pleasant or nasty or heavy or light. 
These terms are all significantly dependent on the standards applicable in the 
context in which they are applied – a hairy gorilla is somewhat differently so than 
is a hairy man. One might think that most things are not easily described as 
approximately approximate (although perhaps one can be approximately middle-
aged) and indeed one does not talk of being approximately old, young, tall, fat, 
beautiful, ugly, bald, hairy or pleasant or nasty or heavy or light. Approximately 











feasible to think of measuring baldness and less so to think of some measure of 
being pleasant. 
 
Nevertheless concepts that are already approximate are tricky, as just mentioned 
with regard to being middle-aged. Colour terms are used in an approximate way, 
and snow can be approximately white. Here it is perhaps because colours, in a 
sense, are both precise and approximate. One could specify a range of 
wavelengths to be deemed red and a narrower range to be deemed magenta. It 
is clear to people with normal vision under good natural light that something is 
not magenta if it is well outside this wavelength range. On the other hand, there 
may well be disagreements if the sample is at the edges of the range. 
3.2.3 Precise Terms 
Another category consists of certain terms that are necessarily precise. A 
number that is not a prime is not approximately prime, even if it differs in 
magnitude from a number that is a prime by one millionth of one percent, or has 
only one divisor (other than one and itself) when other equally large non-prime 
numbers may have a million distinct divisors. This category is also tricky because 
the term rectangle is precise, but things can be approximately rectangular, and 
events can be approximately simultaneous, another precise term. It seems 
significant here that it is possible to resemble a rectangle and by nearness in 
time to resemble simultaneity but no number that is not a prime resembles a 
prime in any meaningful sense. 
 
Another ‘precise’ category is that of many actions; one cannot approximately kill 
or move or drink or eat or laugh or cry. This is not because one cannot come 
very close to killing, but one either kills or one does not; whereas a rectangle with 
sides of length 1.000 and 1.001 is approximately a square, although it is not a 
square. One would say Fred very nearly killed Mary, and this rectangle is very 
nearly square, but one would not use approximately in the former case. The point 










whereas this is not so from life to death. However, one can approximately 
determine, count, measure and calculate, so not all actions are ruled out. 
3.2.4 Possessing Qualities 
In some cases, statements or propositions can be approximately true of the 
possession of qualities which themselves cannot be approximate. It can be 
approximately true that Fred is idle or conscientious. Here there is a continuum 
stretching from the ideally industrious to the completely idle person, and a 
comparison is appropriate. It can be approximately true that I am idle, but I 
cannot be approximately idle. It seems in saying that it is approximately true that 
Fred is idle one is averaging over time (Fred might be idle most but not all of the 
time) or over respects (Fred might be conscientious at work but reluctant faced 
with domestic tasks). 
3.2.5 ‘Averaging’ Over Degrees and/or Respects of Approximation 
There are questions of averaging over the degree of departure from truth. An 
approximately true account of the plot of Shakespeare’s Hamlet might be one 
saying that eating poison had killed Hamlet’s father and Ophelia killed herself by 
leaping off the parapet at Ellsinore. The account would not be accepted as 
approximately true if either enough details were false in these minor ways, or if 
all else was correct except that it was claimed that Hamlet murdered Ophelia. 
 
It is worth noting at this point that the foregoing assumes an acceptance of an 
implicit weighting scheme. For example, I have said, not unreasonably, that the 
statement that poison was poured in the ear of Hamlet’s sleeping father is a 
minor detail. However, doubtless there are Shakespeare scholars who would 
disagree. One might claim that the sinister use of words is importantly 
represented by images of ears and hearing. Ears receive both truth and poison. 
In addition to Claudius’s murder of the king there is Hamlet’s claim to Horatio that 
‘I have words to speak in thine ear will make thee dumb’162. The ghost uses the 
                                            











poison poured in the king’s ear to symbolize the corrosive effect of Claudius’s 
dishonesty on Denmark’s health. 
3.3 Approximate Truth of Simple Sentences 
Before considering the approximate truth of theories, it is worth examining the 
concept of the approximate truth of simple sentences. By simple sentences I 
mean something like ‘that is green’, namely logically simple sentences. 
 
There seems to be a problem with two obvious accounts of approximate truth of 
sentences. The first, given by Horwich163: 
(1) ‘Snow is white’ is approximately true iff snow is approximately white. 
The second given by Smith164: 
(2) ‘Snow is white’ is approximately true iff approximately snow is white. 
Smith qualifies this by insisting that the modifier ‘approximately’ can sensibly be 
applied to the proposition165, which it clearly can in my example. 
 
In (1) the approximation operator is modifying the property and in (2) it is 
modifying the proposition. These are generally identical in intent and application 
– the only way they can be seen to differ in the example above would be on the 
eccentric interpretation that (2) was referring to something known as 
‘approximately snow’. However, the second formulation might be better in 
general, as can perhaps be vindicated by comparing (3) and (4). 
(3) ‘Fred is idle’ is approximately true iff Fred is approximately idle. 
The second given by Smith: 
(4) ‘Fred is idle’ is approximately true iff approximately Fred is idle. 
 
Problems arise when we explore what we mean by saying something is 
approximately true. 
                                            
163 Horwich, P.G. 1990 Truth Oxford: Blackwell p. 66. 
164 Smith, P. 1998 ‘Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories’ British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science 49, 253-277. 











(5) ‘Figure A is square’ is approximately true iff approximately Figure A is 
square. 
Now does this mean that the figure has approximately (four sides, four straight 
sides, four sides of equal length, four equal internal angles of π/2, four-fold and 
twofold rotation symmetry)? 
 
One’s first intuitive response is perhaps that for (5) to be acceptable, Figure A 
has to be near to having all of these attributes. How near is not clear. 
 
However, suppose it turns out that the four sides of Figure A are not straight; 
they are arcs of circles of large radius of curvature or lines whose gradient 
changes infinitely many times in a finite length. The equation for these does not 
resemble the equation for a straight line. Now it can truly be said that Figure A 
looks like a square and it is not a square, but is it approximately true that it is a 
square. Moreover, if it had none of the attributes of a square, it could still look 
extremely like a square and in some vague sense still be like a square. For 
example, it could have all its corners very slightly and differently truncated. It 
would not then be unreasonable to say that it was approximately square. This is 
despite the fact that it has none of the defining attributes of a square, and despite 
the fact that it now has eight sides, which could hardly be called near to having 
four sides. 
 
These remarks seem to point to three issues. First, we do not always have an 
obvious criterion for saying something is approximately true, even in the simple 
case where there is only one variable, like the whiteness of snow. How near must 
snow be to white? Second, if there are respects as well as a degree in the 
definition of something, in which respects must there be nearness? It seems that 
in different circumstances it may be all, some, or none. Third, if we are to make 
comparisons as to whether a given sentence is more nearly approximately true 
than another sentence, there is an immediate question concerning which 












The first of these issues seems only to be the usual problem with vague 
predicates. Someone who is thirty nine years old is approximately forty, and thirty 
seven might be acceptable and thirty unacceptable. 
 
The second and third issues require that generally we can only speak of 
approximate truth with respect to some criterion of salience. If symmetry is 
paramount, and retaining all the symmetry properties is the criterion, then a circle 
approximates a square more closely than a rectangle does. If right angles and 
straight sides matter, then a rectangle of edge lengths a, b with b≠a, and say 
a<1.01b<1.01a resembles a square more closely than does a circle. 
3.4 Approximate Truth of Sentences Involving Logical 
Vocabulary 
3.4.1 The Existential Quantifier 
As I remarked earlier, it is not unreasonable to say: 
‘Snow is white’ is approximately true iff snow is approximately white. 
However, one’s intuition is that there is something seriously wrong with: 
(6) ‘π is given by a rational number’ is approximately true iff π is given 
approximately by a rational number or, 
(7) ‘π is given by a rational number’ is approximately true iff approximately π is 
given by a rational number. 
Statement (6) is false: the left hand side of the biconditional is false, π ≠ p/q 
where p and q are integers; the right hand side is true π ≈ 3.141592654. 
Statement (7) seems difficult to interpret. The left hand side of the biconditional is 
false, and on the most obvious, albeit dubious, interpretation the right hand side 
is also false – compare approximately 1.01 is given by an integer. 
 
Now we can symbolize that π can be given approximately by a rational number 











is F’ is approximately true iff x is approximately F – nothing has been said about 
how approximate truth is defined for sentences of the form: (∃x)(x is F). Now that 
‘(∃x)(x is F)’ is true cannot require that a sentence of the form ‘x is F’ is true, 
since there may not be a relevant named object. Thus it may be true for example 
that there exist macroscopic objects between 11,000 and 11,001 light years from 
the Earth, but none is named. The same applies to approximate truth. However, 
if a sentence ‘x is F’ is true, then it follows that ‘(∃x)(x is F)’ is true. In contrast, in 
the case of approximate truth, ‘x is approximately F’ does not imply ‘(∃x)(x is F)’ 
is approximately true. 
 
This can be put more formally. 
For reductio assume 
(1) 'x is F' is approximately true entails '(There is an x such that x is F)' is 
approximately true. 
Where F is any predicate 
(2) 'Fx' is approximately true iff ApproxFx. 
Where ‘Fx’ is an open sentence. 
Hence, 
(3) ApproxFx entails '(There is an x such that x is F)' is 
approximately true, hypothetical syllogism (1) and (2). 
Hence, 
(4) π is approximately equal to a rational number entails ‘π is equal to a rational 
number’ is approximately true. 
(4) is false, hence (1) Is false. 
 
In other words, 'There is something that is F' is approximately true is not the 
same as: ‘There is something that is approximately F’. For example, take F ≡ 
equal to a transcendental number166. We can consider the statement, ‘There is 
an integer that is F is approximately true.’ This is false. Whereas the statement: 
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‘There is an integer that is approximately F’ is true. The integer 377 is 
approximately equal to the transcendental number 120π (actually very close to 
376.99). Thus a number is either equal to a transcendental number or it is not, 
but a number that is not equal to a transcendental number can be approximately 
equal to one. Indeed it always is to any desired degree of approximation. It is not 
possible to be both an integer and a transcendental number, but every integer 
differs from a transcendental number by as little as one cares to specify. 
 
Of course, 'There is something that is F' is approximately true may be true at the 
same time as: ‘There is something that is approximately F’. We might say this of 
a heap of coloured papers ranging from teal to violet. There is something that is 
approximately blue and it is approximately true that there is something that is 
blue. 
 
Thus the existential quantifier does not in general approximate. 
3.4.2 The Universal Quantifier 
A statement like, ‘everything is F is approximately true’ needs to be accompanied 
by a consideration of what is meant. There are three obvious possibilities. 
(8) For all x, x is F or x is approximately F 
(9) x is F for nearly all x 
(10) x is F or approximately F for all or nearly all x 
Consider the sentence S: 
‘Every planet in a certain planetary system is spherical’ is approximately true. 
Case1. 
All but one of the planets is spherical and one is approximately spherical. 
S is then true under all of (8) (9) and (10). 
Case 2: 
All but one of the planets is spherical and one is an oblate spheroid of great 
eccentricity. 












All but one of the planets is approximately spherical but not precisely spherical 
and one is an oblate spheroid of great eccentricity. 
Under (8) S is again false. Under (9) S is also false; under (10) S is true; nearly 
every planet is nearly spherical. 
 
The version of (8) (9) and (10) that perhaps best accords with the usual intuitions 
of nearness to truth is (8). It seems plausible first to consider (8) as a possible 
basis for discussing approximate truth in the context of scientific theories. A 
serious difficulty with (9) and (10) is the vagueness of the phrase ‘nearly all’. 
Moreover, a well established single serious exception is a cause for profound 
concern in science. 
 
For (8), consider the following sentence, 
(11) ‘Everything Socrates says is true’ is approximately true iff nearly 
everything Socrates says is true or approximately true. 
Now ipso facto the predicate true can be qualified by approximately. 
Nevertheless, (11) is false. Nothing that Socrates says may be true, while 
everything that he says may be approximately true. He may say only things like, 
the population of South Africa is 40 million, π = 3.142. 
 
For (9) consider the sentence, 
(12) ‘Everything Socrates says is true’ is approximately true iff nearly 
everything Socrates says is true. 
This might seem to be false, as Socrates may utter a vast number of platitudes 
but also a significant number of statements like ‘there is a greatest prime’, ‘the 
square root of every integer is a rational number’, and the like which may imply 
an unlimited number of falsehoods. However, if we confine ourselves to the 
statements made by Socrates, i.e. not their implication, then (12) seems correct 











However in the context of scientific theories this approach seems implausible – 
some generalizations are the norm and their implications are of central 
importance. That is, problems with the use of universal quantification are of 
concern when approximate truth is being invoked. 
3.5 Approximate Truth of Scientific Theories 
It is difficult to ignore the difficulties considered thus far, since scientific theories 
do make vital use of universal quantification and of existential claims. ‘Every 
body continues in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line …’ Causal 
theories as I initially described them seem to depend on the use of approximate 
truth of complex sentences. 
 
There is a further difficulty with the approximate truth of theories. 
 
If we consider a theory as a set of core statements P, Q, R … and the theory is 
true if each of P, Q, R … is true, this will usually involve also the truth of (P&Q&R 
…) which one is entitled to assume. As Smith167 points out in the case of 
approximate truth as distinct from truth, 
... how do we move the approximation operator across the conjunctions? 
Approximately (P & Q & R …) is not equivalent to 'approximately P & 
approximately Q & approximately R ...', since the latter plainly does not imply 
the former. We will therefore need, in particular cases, some principled way of 
distributing the effect of the approximation operator across a theory 
conjunction. 
For example, something that actually weighs 1001 kg weighs approximately 990 
kg and also weighs approximately 1000 kg, but it would be incorrect to say that it 
was approximately true that it weighed 990 kg and 1000 kg. 
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This example is somewhat misleading since the two approximations given are 
mutually exclusive. In dealing with scientific theories it should be the case 
(although it cannot always be known with certainty) that the postulates are not 
mutually exclusive. In this case approximately P & approximately Q & 
approximately R… is commonly equivalent to approximately (P&Q&R…)168. 
Hence the problem as set up by Smith does not arise. Nevertheless, it is true that 
the use in a theory asserting approximately true statements P, Q, R… can lead to 
outcomes that are not approximately true. Thus 40 terms in error each by 1% can 
lead to a large error in their product. 
 
Smith believes that an overall account of approximate truth is not possible. He 
believes that the problem must be differently considered for particular classes of 
theories; in addition, that in each case approximate truth will be interest relative; 
and that the problem is commonly insoluble, essentially for the reasons I have 
given in relation to simple sentences and logically complex sentences. 
 
However, Smith claims in one special case that there is a legitimate way to talk 
about the approximate truth of theories. These are what he calls geometrical 
modeling theories (GM theories) and, as Smith says, these constitute quite a 
large class of scientific theories, at least in physics. These belong to the class I 
have called modeling theories. 
 
I think that these theories do not offer any comfort to Scientific Realists in 
supplying a notion of the approximate truth of theories that serves their needs. 
 
A GM theory has two components – component M is the purely mathematical 
model and component A is the geometrical structure to be found in some real 
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world phenomenon. This is most easily illustrated by an example. We can take 
as a model of a simple pendulum that it consists of a massless inextensible string 
and a point mass and there is no friction. The mathematics of this model system 
can be handled exactly. The theory then is that a real system can be described 
by this model169. Thus, since there are no approximations in M, we can say 
(10) If ‘(M & approximately A)’ then approximately (M & A). 
Which as Smith acknowledges says no more than if ‘(bachelors are unmarried 
men and approximately T = 2π√l/g)’ then approximately (bachelors are 
unmarried men and T = 2π√l/g). 
 
The heart of Smith’s claim is that GM theories are such that from M we can 
define a phase space in which the trajectories of the variables are plotted. If the 
trajectories derived from M depart from the experimentally observed trajectories 
in this defined phase space everywhere by an amount less than some ε, we can 
justifiably say we have an approximately true theory. As Smith puts it170 
… a GM-theory is approximately true is to be taken as the claim that the 
geometrical structure in question approximately replicates the relevant 
structure to be found in the target real world phenomenon … where the 
structures in question are both curves embedded in the same space … it is 
natural to say that one structure approximates to the other if the first curve 
can be distorted into the second by a transformation which (a) moves points 
by no more than some ε, and (b) preserves smoothness … 
 
In other words, over the whole range of the variables the departure from that 
predicted by theory must be small. This is intended as a stipulation of what is 
meant by approximate truth, as I will argue. The merit of this approach is that we 
                                            
169 This is of course a Newtonian model in a non-Newtonian world. One cannot have an 
inextensible string in a relativistic world, since signals could be propagated along it 
instantaneously. 
170 Smith, P. 1998 ‘Approximate Truth and Dynamical Theories’ British Journal for the Philosophy 











have a precise definition of empirical adequacy for a GM theory. But it tells us 
little about approximate truth that is relevant to the claims of the Scientific Realist. 
 
While a model GM theory is a given, it is not a self-evident truth that the 
parameters of the experimental situation will be the same as those of the model. 
To take the simple pendulum example, one cannot assume that the motion of a 
real pendulum will remain in the plane of the original motion. The mass is not a 
point mass, nor is it uniform, the string is extensible and we have air resistance. 
The geometrical model says nothing, for example, about motion out of the plane 
of the initial motion, that is, the conceptualization and the structure in the world 
do not necessarily occupy the same phase space (variable range) and it begs the 
question of its approximate truth to assume that it does so. 
 
To continue with the simple pendulum case, if we assume that the model of a 
light inextensible string and a point mass is approximately true and we find that 
the parameters we measure on this assumption differ by an amount as small we 
please (or more realistically a small as we can measure) from those predicted on 
this assumption, then we supposedly have an approximately true theory. But this 
begs the question. This is so whether it is a GM theory or any other sort of 
theory. Smith has ‘defined’ approximate truth as empirical adequacy in 
circumstances where empirical adequacy is precisely defined in terms of a 
theoretical model that is exact. Now this is perhaps an improvement on the many 
cases where one cannot even give a precise definition of what one means by 
empirical adequacy, but it is no solution to the problem of approximate truth in 
the context of experimental science. None of this is to deny that the greater the 
explicitness of the system variables, and the higher the degree of agreement 
between theory and experiment, the more convinced is the scientist of the truth 
of her theory. This seems very reasonable because it is what one would expect if 
the theory were true; however it is not germane to the question of avoiding the 
problems of the concept of approximate truth for scientific theories, even in the 











approximate truth is that it is indeterminate in relation to relevant respects as well 
as degree. 
 
As Chakravartty171 puts it: ‘From a realistic perspective, talk of geometrical 
structures is at best a shorthand for finer grained theoretical claims which are 
either true or false, concerning those parameters whose values map out 
geometrical structures to begin with.’ 
3.6 Intuitive Approximate Truth 
3.6.1 Approximately True Theories 
Psillos comes to the conclusion that no formal definition of approximate truth is 
possible172 and offers what he refers to as an intuitive account which he believes 
is satisfactory. He rightly remarks that real science proceeds without a defined 
notion of approximate truth, despite the fact that its theories are not true. As he 
says, idealizations and simplification are necessary in theories explaining and 
describing empirical observations; experimental results are never free of error. 
 
Psillos gives an account of his intuitive notion of approximate truth as follows173: 
a theory is approximately true if the entities of the general kind postulated to 
play a central causal role in the theories exist, and if the basic mechanisms 
and laws postulated by the theory approximate those holding in the world, 
under specific conditions of approximation. 
He spells this out more formally as ‘A description D is approximately true of a 
state S if there is another state S’ such that S and S’ are linked by specific 
conditions of approximation, and D is true of S’.’ 
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Realism’ Synthese 127, 325-345 p. 341. 
172 Psillos, S. 1999 Scientific realism: how science tracks truth New York: Routledge p. 276 











Intuitively one believes that one can be nearer to or further from the truth. As an 
instance of an approximately true theory Psillos says that the orbit of Mars 
around the Sun can be approximated by an ellipse and this is derived from the 
assumption that the Mars-Sun interaction can be treated as a two body problem 
in classical mechanics because the gravitational effects on Mars from the other 
planets can be taken to be negligible. The error resulting from this ‘approximately 
true’ theory can be estimated. There are innumerable similar examples of very 
good agreement between approximate theories and experiment (where the 
approximate theory is often also explanatory). Indeed this is similar to the Smith 
account of GM-theories discussed above. 
 
The Mars-Sun example, Psillos says, is truthlike because the approximations 
made result in small errors. Moreover, the extent of error can be specified. We 
have, quite generally, an intuitive notion of this which can be spelled out in 
various ways. The fact of small errors alone is not sufficient for an approximately 
true theory, but here the fact that the errors can be accounted for within the 
assumptions of the theory combined with its generality and explanatory power, 
Psillos argues, is enough for the Scientific Realist. The argument has been 
questioned as a general defense of approximate truth, as Smith is at pains to 
make clear in his narrower defense of the validity of the concept for GM-
theories174 
But what of clams like ‘Bohr’s theory of the atom was approximately true’ or 
‘Mendelian genetics is approximately true’ or ‘the theory of mind deficit of 
autism is approximately true’? On our framework account to say that Bohr’s 
theory of the atom was approximately true is to assert approximately B, where 
B is a long story encapsulating Bohr’s theory. And how are we to construe 
that? Without some extended gloss (e.g. about which parts are supposed to 
approximate to what according to what metric) the assertion approximately B 
is simply opaque; likewise for other cases. 
                                            












As Psillos is aware, the intuitive notion as exemplified in the Mars-Sun example 
does little more than confirm that empirical adequacy can be understood and 
justified. (There is, of course, a very real sense in which Newton’s theory is not 
approximately true.) 
 
However, I think Psillos and similar thinkers are not, in using ‘intuitive’, asking us 
to trust our intuitions, although some writers do invoke them in their support. The 
claim is rather that approximate truth or truthlikeness is both vague and a cluster 
concept, meaning different things in different circumstances. It is none the less a 
legitimate concept as is the famous concept of a game, with games having family 
resemblances without necessarily having any one common feature175. We know 
what games are and we know what approximate truth is. 
 
Bueno176 objects that approximate truth has been defined by Psillos in terms of 
truth, and given that the Scientific Realist is interested in truth we need therefore 
to get to truth via thruthlikeness. Either truth is a limiting case of truthlikeness177, 
which seems unacceptable given that truthlikeness is defined in terms of truth, or 
we need some other route to truth. However, unlike truth, approximate truth is 
context dependent as discussed earlier (it is approximately true that the earth is 
spherical in the context of space exploration but not in the context of international 
aviation). This seems to create an unbridgeable gap between the two concepts, 
since truth is not so dependent. However, it can be argued against Bueno that it 
is proper to define approximate truth in terms of truth, and then to justify this 
definition by virtue of experimental results which demonstrate the convergence of 
approximate truth on truth in each of the circumstances where a theory is 
claimed to be approximately true. Thus Psillos might say PV=RT is approximately 
                                            
175 Wittgenstein, L. 1953 Philosophical Investigations Oxford: Blackwell § 66. Worrall remarks of 
this sort of strategy, ‘anti-realists might be tempted to regard this as an example of the well known 
injunction: “if you can’t get what you’d like, like what you can get.”‘ (Worrall, J. 1994 The Ontology 
of Science Vermont: Dartmouth p. xix.). 
176 Bueno, O. 2001 ‘Quests of a Realist’ Metascience 10, 341-370 p. 361. 
177 This is the proposal of Aronson et al (Aronson, J.L., Harre, R. and Way, E.C. 1994 Realism 











true for the inert gases at high temperatures and low pressures, and experiments 
will ‘confirm’ this. 
 
The question that naturally arises is how effective is an intuitive notion of 
approximate truth for the purpose of vindicating McMullin’s account of the 
McMullin Conjunction. This is taken up in the following section. 
3.6.2 McMullin’s Argument and Intuitive Approximate Truth 
The important question for our purposes is whether the notion of intuitive 
approximate truth of theories can serve to underpin McMullin’s argument for 
Scientific Realism. It remains necessary for McMullin to be able to compare the 
relative approximate truth of different versions of the successful theories since 
his claim is that successive versions are more accurately describing the 
hypothesized mind-independent world. 
 
On the intuitive concept comparing theories will have to be done with regard to 
some criterion or criteria, as was discussed above in relation to a decision as to 
which imperfect figure most closely resembled a square. Now one might 
compare theories on the basis of their empirical adequacy, with some agreed 
weighting for the variables considered. For example, in comparing theories of the 
characteristic of real gases one could consider comparing the prediction of the 
pressures at various temperatures at constant volume. Alternatively or 
additionally one might compare the values of the critical constants. However, as 
soon as these pragmatic criteria are introduced, the improvement over time of 
successive versions of the theories, as judged by the chosen criteria, ceases to 
provide a good argument for a Scientific Realist account along McMullin’s lines. 
All that has now been shown by the improved performance is that a better fit to 
some subset of the data has been found, i.e. the later version of the theory is 
better than the earlier for some purpose. For McMullin’s argument to go through 
he needs to argue that the successive versions of the theory are better theories 











necessarily somewhat arbitrarily weighted subset of observations is inadequate 
for the Scientific Realist argument McMullin is proposing. In fact a Scientific 
Realist might well be disposed to acknowledge that a theory near to giving a true 
description of the mind-independent world might well give poor agreement with 
some interpretation of the data assumed to be important in a theory adjudged to 
be approximately true178. 
 
The Scientific Realist assumes that there is an unknown true theory. The 
necessarily vague notion of approximate truth of a scientific theory is how close 
the theory is to the hypothesized true theory. She judges the approximate truth of 
previous theories on the basis of nearness to the current best theory. In addition 
the salient interests used in making this judgment are also based on this current 
best theory. Consequently, as a basis for McMullin’s explanation of the McMullin 
Conjunction this argument must make the assumption that the current best 
theory is approximately true. For example, if Descartes vortex theory were the 
current best theory, the observation that the planets all orbit the sun in the same 
direction would support the belief that the theory was approximately true. In fact, 
of course, this has nothing to do with the explanation of the stable motion of the 
planets in their orbits and the periodicity of this planetary motion, but is a 
consequence of the genesis of the solar system. 
 
There is a further point in relation to the way approximate truth of a scientific 
theory is specified as being close to the hypothesized true theory. Psillos in his 
account of intuitive approximate truth refers to the ‘specific conditions of 
approximation’ but does not spell out how these are to be judged. A scientific 
theory is approximately true iff if it is judged to be close to the Scientific Realist’s 
hypothesized true theory. The judgment of approximate truth is made on the 
basis of the current best scientific theory, and hence the salient respects used in 
                                            
178 It is not being suggested that correctly interpreted experimental results would conflict with a 
true theory. Rather an approximately true theory (by Scientific Realist lights) might wrongly 
suggest that a correctly measured variable should vary in a certain way with another and it might 











this judgment are also based on the current best theory. If the current best theory 
was far from the truth179, an erroneous judgment would probably be made on this 
basis. Irrelevant or minor variables would be treated as significant so that a 
proposed revision of the theory could well be judged an improvement when it 
was in fact further from the Scientific Realist’s hypothesized true theory. 
Consequently, for the successive revisions of the theory to be based on a 
rational assessment, the current best theory must be taken to be approximately 
true, and so the approximate truth of a scientific theory is being accounted for in 
terms of the approximate truth of a scientific theory. This contrasts, for example, 
with our knowledge that it is approximately true that the former standard meter 
kept in Paris is one meter long. (The meter is now defined as the distance light 
travels, in a vacuum, in 1/299,792,458 seconds, with time measured by a 
cesium-133 atomic clock.) In this last case we know with great precision what it is 
to be one meter in length, and we can set a precise value on the maximum 
departure of the former standard meter from one meter and express this as a 
fraction of the length of the standard meter. 
 
An important general point here with regard to the approximate truth of theories 
is that scientific theories are not normally merely narratives180, for example like 
those given in discussing a well defined ideal entity like a simple pendulum. Here 
we are given by fiat an inextensible string, a point mass, a frictionless 
environment, a constant gravitational field, planar motion and a Newtonian world. 
All of these idealizations are false and unattainable in any experimental set-up 
but they allow a complete (fictional) story. However, the notion of approximate 
truth of a scientific theory only makes sense against a circumscribed set of 
background questions (specified independently of the theory), and that is not in 
general possible for an interesting scientific theory, which must be interrogated in 
any number of ingenious and unanticipatable ways. That indeed is the basis of 
                                            
179 Psillos is aware of the difficulty discussed here but discounts it on the basis of the ‘impressive 
predictive successes’ of current theories. 
180 As McMullin remarks, ‘The language of theoretical explanation is of a quite special sort. It is 
open-ended and capable of ever further development’ (McMullin, E. 1984 ‘A Case for Scientific 











experimental science. As Ritchie181 comments in another context, ‘Science 
forces us to revise our conceptions of what is and is not possible, of where a 
concept can be meaningfully deployed and where it can’t. Who knows how things 
will look in the future?’ 
 
Thus the discussion, given in section 3.2.5 above, about the problems in deciding 
whether a brief account of the plot of Shakespeare’s Hamlet might be 
approximately true, deals with the difficulties of giving appropriate weight to 
known facts about the text. The problem of say the approximate truth of the 
current sophisticated theory of the development of the mammalian embryo is 
altogether more intractable. We have very little idea of how future developments 
in biochemistry, molecular biology, and genetics (or indeed in other relevant 
branches of science) will impact on our assessment of the present theory. 
3.7 Conclusion 
It seems that we cannot sustain a well defined view of the approximate truth of 
scientific theories. Our intuition that some statements can be further from the 
truth than others lends credibility to the notion of approximate truth. However, this 
intuition is a little undermined by Brink’s182 rhetorical question: ‘given that spiders 
have eight legs, are we all agreed that the theory that spiders have seven legs is 
better than the theory that they have six?’ More importantly the intuition stems 
primarily from our common use of the notion in circumstances where there is only 
one variable. To enable talk of the approximate truth of scientific theories 
requires a more closely specified account than is required in the case of our 
normal acceptance that someone 199 cm in height is approximately 2 metres tall 
or that a closed account of some series of past events is substantially accurate. 
 
Even if one were prepared to accept a necessarily imprecise notion of the 
approximate truth of theories, McMullin’s Inference to the Best Explanation from 
                                            
181 Ritchie, J. 2008 Understanding Naturalism Stocksfield: Acumen p. 147. 
182 Brink, C. 1989 ‘Verisimilitude: Views and Reviews’ History and Philosophy of Logic 10, 181-











the conjunction of long standing success and P-fertility is poorly motivated on 
such a basis. This is because the successive versions of the theories cannot 
convincingly be seen as progressively better theories rather than merely seeming 
more empirically adequate on the basis of the presumed approximate truth of the 
current best theory. 
 
A major attempt to get out of the problems associated with the concept of the 
approximate truth of theories has been to use the concept of verisimilitude 











CHAPTER 4 VERISIMILITUDE 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 it was suggested that the conjunction of P-fertility and long standing 
success might provide grounds for Scientific Realism. This was because the 
successful successive modifications of a scientific theory could perhaps not be 
explained so readily on the basis of an alternative Instrumentalist or other 
Scientific Anti-realist stance. That is, while the success of science (particularly 
the predictive success), is seen by some as grounds for Scientific Realism, it can 
perhaps be explained otherwise; in contrast McMullin argues P-fertility cannot. 
However, it is essential to the Scientific Realist position that science is 
progressive, that is, it is in general the case that successive scientific theories 
approximate more closely to some hypothesized true theory. It is also essential 
that not only is this so, but in addition the current well established theories are in 
general close to this hypothesized true theory. The problematic notion of the 
approximate truth of theories was explored in Chapter 3 and there seem to be 
substantial difficulties in making the notion clear. This chapter considers the 
alternative to approximate truth commonly advanced, namely the concept of 
verisimilitude183. 
 
Verisimilitude invokes nearness to the Truth, that is, to the ‘one whole truth’. It 
incorporates notions like information (minimizing ignorance) as well as avoiding 
error. Rather than saying that a theory is approximately true, we can consider 
how near it is to the ‘Truth’ where the ‘Truth’ is the whole truth and nothing but 
the truth. In this sense, a false theory may be nearer the Truth than a true theory 
by virtue of saying more true things than a theory that, for example, says a small 
number of obviously true things. Or a false theory may only be true of a set of 
‘close’ worlds whereas a true theory may be true of many including ‘very distant’ 
                                            
183 Numerous authors use the term truthlikeness as a synonym for verisimilitude; some however 
use it as a synonym for approximate truth (see, for example, Kukla, A. 1998 Studies in Scientific 











worlds. The essential point here is that verisimilitude takes into account the 
importance of information content in a theory, and not merely the avoidance or 
the minimization of error. 
 
Popper184 was the first to give an account of verisimilitude. Because of his 
combination of a falsificationist stance and his enthusiasm for science as a 
source of knowledge, Popper needed to justify the view that, in general, later 
(false) theories, which were to displace falsified theories, were in fact superior. 
 
Popper’s proposal is that a theory Y is superior to a theory X in truthlikeness iff 
either  X ∩ T ⊆ Y ∩ T   and   Y  ∩  F ⊂  X  ∩  F 
or  X ∩ T ⊂ Y ∩ T   and   Y  ∩  F ⊆  X  ∩  F 
Where T is the set of true sentences and F is the set of false sentences. This 
then relies on theory content and deductive logic alone. 
 
This approach has the hugely attractive feature that it makes no use whatsoever 
of the notion of approximate truth. Statements are either true or false. At the 
same time, Popper captures the notion that theories are better if they correspond 
more closely to the way the world is. 
 
As we shall see, Popper’s definition of verisimilitude is untenable. Nevertheless, 
a number of authors defend the concept in a modified form. They argue that 
some sort of weighted sum over distances from the many truths that constitute 
the whole truth is a defensible development of Popper’s concept. However, as I 
will argue, the problems identified as problems of approximate truth infect such 
concepts in their application to scientific theories. 
 
In section 4.2 I discuss Popper’s proposal. In section 4.3 I discuss verisimilitude 
as it has been defended post-Popper, and consider the difficulties posed by the 
                                            
184 Popper, K.R. 1963 Conjectures and Refutations, New York: Harper and Rowe p. 391. I 











modern concept. In section 4.4 I discuss the problems of applying the concept to 
ranking scientific theories in a given domain even if the difficulties posed by the 
concept itself could be circumvented. 
4.2 Popper’s Verisimilitude 
Popper’s theory has attractive features within the class of true theories. First, the 
whole truth is best. Second, the set of logical truths is at the bottom of true 
theories, which makes sense, since it is the least informative set. Unfortunately, 
the account has a disastrous flaw – it can readily be proved185 that it entails that 
no false theory is nearer to the truth than any other false theory. Since we are 
concerned entirely with false theories, hopefully of progressively greater merit 
(truthlikeness), this approach seems unhelpful. 
 
It is worth giving the derivation of this important result. I use that given in a review 
by Oddie186. 
Let us suppose that A and B are both false, and that A's truth content 
exceeds B's. Let a be a true sentences entailed by A but not by B. Let f be 
any falsehood entailed by A. Since A entails both a and f the conjunction a&f 
is a falsehood entailed by A, and so part of A's falsity content. If a&f were also 
part of B's falsity content B would entail both a and f. But then it would contain 
a contrary to the assumption. Hence a&f is in A's falsity content and not in 
B's. So A's truth content cannot exceed B's without A’s falsity content also 
exceeding B's. Suppose now that B's falsity content exceeds A's. Let g be 
some falsehood entailed by B but not by A, and let f, as before, be some 
falsehood entailed by A. The sentence f materially implies g is a truth, and 
since it is entailed by g, is in B's truth content. If it were also in A's then both f 
and f materially implies g would be consequences of A and hence so would g, 
                                            
185 The proof was given independently by Miller (Miller, D. 1974 ‘Popper’s Qualitative Definition of 
Verisimilitude’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25, 168-177) and Tichy (Tichy, 
P.1974 ‘On Popper’s definition of Verisimilitude’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25, 
155-160). 
186 Oddie, G. 2000 ‘Truthlikeness’ The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (Fall 2000 Edition) 











contrary to the assumption. Thus A's truth content lacks a sentence, f 
materially implies g, which is in B's. So B's falsity content cannot exceed A's 
without B's truth content also exceeding A's. 
[Oddie seems to have omitted quotation marks around some expressions but his 
meaning is perfectly clear.] 
 
The argument is in essence saying if we try to get an improved theory B from a 
false theory A by adding truths to A, we add falsehoods to B that are not 
falsehoods from A. If we try to get a better B from A by subtracting falsehoods 
from A we subtract truths from A that are not truths of B (when errors of falsity 
are decreased errors of ignorance are increased187). 
 
It might be argued that one need consider only the subset of theories that is 
empirically adequate and that for these one needs to consider only truth content 
as a guide to relative merit. However, this leads to an unsatisfactory position. 
Consider the following two theories. ‘Roses are red’, ‘grass is green’, and 
‘elephants are fish.’ ‘Roses are red’, ‘grass is green’, and ‘all living creatures are 
fish’. The latter does not seem more truthlike. It is also true that if we consider 
truth alone, a false theory may be a better theory than a true theory. However, 
this is acceptable, and indeed will be common since a tautology is true but 
contains little truth. 
 
An alternative approach to salvaging Popper’s theory might be to consider only 
atomic sentences. Such a move would defeat the flaw in Popper’s theory. 
However, this does not seem acceptable. A theory is answerable for logical 
deductions from its postulates188, and, in any case, some postulates may not be 
                                            
187 Niiniluoto, I. 1999 Critical Scientific Realism Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 67. 
188 An attempt to rescue Popper’s concept has been made via denying this proposition. It can be 
argued that scientists do not want all the logical consequences of a theory – some are irrelevant 
and/or superfluous. Thus if P is a consequence of theory T, it is of no interest that (P or Q), for 
arbitrary Q, is a consequence. It is such irrelevant or superfluous consequences that are used to 
undermine Popper (Brink, C. 1989 ‘Verisimilitude: Views and Reviews’ History and Philosophy of 











expressible as atomic sentences (e.g., a body continues in its state of rest or 
uniform motion …). It may however be possible to assess content in terms of 
atomic sentences included or entailed by the postulates. However, this would be 
a formidable task for a natural language and probably also for a more restricted 
scientific language. 
 
There are important additional concerns relating to Popper’s argument. It is a 
very inadequate measure of a theory to simply count the number of bull’s eyes 
and the number of misses a theory makes. 
 
The Scientific Realist claims not only that the observational consequences of 
scientific theories are true or approximately true, but also that the postulates of 
the theory are true or approximately true and that the entities postulated exist. 
Popper’s verisimilitude is silent about this. (He was entitled to his silence since 
he believed that theories are merely careful and powerful explanatory 
conjectures which scientists must attempt to falsify. Popper’s falsificationist 
stance says nothing about nearness to the truth – a later theory is better than an 
earlier one because it has not yet been falsified.) 
 
As Oddie says189 
The fundamental problem with the original content approach lies not in the 
way it has been articulated, but rather in the basic underlying assumption: 
that truthlikeness is a function of just two variables — content and truth value. 
This assumption has a number of rather problematic consequences. 
 
Two things follow if truthlikeness is a function just of the logical content of a 
proposition and of its truth value. Firstly, any given proposition A can have 
only two degrees of verisimilitude: one in case it is false and the other in case 
it is true. This is obviously wrong. A theory can be false in very many different 
                                            











ways. The proposition that there are eight planets is false whether there are 
nine planets or a thousand planets, but its degree of truthlikeness is much 
higher in the first case than in the latter. … Secondly, if we combine the value 
of content for truths and the value of content for falsehoods, then if we fix 
truth value, verisimilitude will vary only according to amount of content. So, for 
example, two equally strong false theories will have to have the same degree 
of verisimilitude. That's pretty far-fetched. That there are ten planets and that 
there are ten billion planets are (roughly) equally strong, and both are false in 
fact, but the latter seems much further from the truth than the former. 
4.3 Verisimilitude Post Popper 
Various subsequent writers have proposed that verisimilitude is nevertheless a 
viable criterion for judging the relative merits of different theories. 
 
Niiniluoto190 illustrates the problems of finding a motivated basis for theory 
comparison with the following anecdote. (Note that in the following account 
distance from the truth of particular sentences is considered, not merely their 
truth or falsity, reinforcing the point made by Oddie as cited above.) 
Suppose that you drive on Friday through a village with your yellow car. 
Suppose further that three villagers give later their report about this occasion. 
Mr A says that he saw you driving on Wednesday in an orange car; Mr B 
claims that he saw you in a red car on Wednesday; and Mr C insists on 
having seen you driving on Thursday with a red car. Whose report is closest 
to the truth?  
Most of us would agree that Mr A's report has more truthlikeness than Mr B's, 
since they make the same mistake about the day and A's mistake concerning 
the colour is smaller than B's mistake. For the same reason, Mr C's report is 
closer to the truth than Mr B's. However, no easy answer is available in the 
comparison of the reports of Mr A and Mr C. Two alternatives seem possible 
here: (1) one may follow Keynes and say that the reports of Mr A and Mr C 
                                            











belong to "different orders of similarity", i.e., they are incomparable with 
respect to similarity (cf. Keynes, 1921, A Treatise on Probability, London: 
Macmillan (New Edition, New York: Harper and Rowe, 1962 pp. 36 – 38)); or 
(2) one may decide how much weight is given to the relative mistakes with 
respect to the date and to the colour, and then obtain, relative to this decision, 
a measure for the relevant degrees of similarity. The latter alternative makes 
all the given reports comparable, but only at the price of the introduction of 
pragmatic factors into a measure of truthlikeness. 
Miller191 pointed out this problem with the various measures of distance from the 
truth in the verisimilitude accounts in the literature. It is often called the language 
dependence problem. Essentially, Miller claims that the similarity-distance 
relationships thus far proposed are not translation invariant. They depend on the 
language used in perfectly inter-translatable languages, and hence are inherently 
arbitrary. This is essentially a re-statement of the problem as dealt with by 
Keynes in the passage referenced above and reflects the interest dependence of 
similarity. 
 
If we consider the problem after weights are given to things that ‘belong to a 
different order of similarity’ this problem can then be seen as the problem of the 
interest dependence of the weights. 
 
Mott192 puts it clearly. 
The interest-dependence of verisimilitude appears, in the literature, in a rather 
disguised form as ‘language-dependence’. To see how this occurs consider 
the theories X=Cn{P,Q,~R} and Y=Cn{~P,~Q,~R} where the truth is P&Q&R. 
Now it seems that we can tell at a glance X is better than Y. But note that in X 
we have ~(P≡R) and ~(Q≡R) while in Y are found P≡R and Q≡R. In this 
regard Y appears better than X. From an interest point of view there need be 
no mystery here. Relative to the problems ‘Whether P≡R’, ‘Whether Q≡R’, we 
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see that Y is best. Relative to the problems ‘Whether P’, ‘Whether Q’ then X is 
the better. Perhaps we should leave it at that, and make verisimilitude relative 
to a deliberately chosen list of problems. ...  
We have in no way produced an argument to the effect that Y's successes 
are unreal or to be deprecated in any way at all. We have noted that we feel 
that an answer the question ‘Whether P’ is more important than an answer to 
the question say ‘Whether P≡Q v (R&S)’. And this feeling is based, I suggest, 
not on any deliberately chosen list of problems but upon a more or less 
implicit and automatic choice: the sentence letters of a language. This choice 
is not to be defended – but it is to be noted. 
This may seem to be a quibble, since the alternative query here seems 
improbable, but it is important in drawing our attention to the way in which the 
problem being investigated is a determinant of what is relevant. 
 
Miller’s language dependence argument is controversial because it appears to 
threaten a range of measures of similarity, and complex counter arguments, both 
epistemic and metaphysical, have been advanced by various writers193. 
Verisimilitude presents other problems in the context of scientific theories, one 
being that false propositions increase in verisimilitude when independent 
variables are added to the consideration of a system194. (This will be discussed 
further and is illustrated in Table 3 and in Appendix B.) 
 
Niiniluoto195 maintains that despite these acknowledged difficulties, and, 
additionally, the fact that avoidance of error and maximizing truth (avoiding 
agnosticism) pull in opposite directions, we can nevertheless use truthlikeness to 
ground Scientific Realism. It is desirable to examine the claims of verisimilitude in 
more detail. 
                                            
193 Barnes, E. 1991 ‘Beyond Verisimilitude: A Linguistically Invariant Basis for Scientific Progress’ 
Synthese 88, 309-339; Britton, T. 2004 ‘The Problem of Verisimilitude and Counting Partially 
Identical Properties’ Synthese 141, 77-95. 
194 Psillos, S. 1999 Scientific realism: how science tracks truth New York: Routledge pp. 267-269. 












Since Popper’s proposal there has been something of a verisimilitude industry, 
with various new definitions having been proposed and it is claimed that these 
can rank competing false theories. Verisimilitude is often discussed in terms of 
simple model worlds which vary over a limited range of parameters, each 
commonly taken to having only two possible states. 
 
I will take the simple world which can be hot or not and rainy or not. There are 
then various possible worlds as shown in the table, where we take the actual 




 hot (h) rainy (r) 
   
W1 T T 
W2 T F 
W3 F T 
W4 F F 
 
These four possible worlds, including the actual world, WA, which we have 
arbitrarily said is W1, can be characterized by their distance from the actual world 
– zero in the case of W1 to a maximum in the case of W4. Intermediate worlds 
will be at different distances from the actual world and this distance will inter alia 
depend on the weighting of hot and rainy. 
 
The analysis can be made quantitative by adopting the following natural seeming 
definition of verisimilitude196. I will return to the naturalness of this shortly. 
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The truthlikeness of a proposition is a function of the ratio of the sum of the 
distances between the actual world WA and the world in which the proposition 
holds divided by the total number of worlds in which the proposition is true. We 
assign weights ti to the basic states such that ∑ ti = 1, we then define the 
numerical distance between the actual world and a possible world as the sum of 
the weights of the basic states over which the two worlds disagree for those 
worlds in which the proposition holds. Then the distance of a proposition from the 
truth is given by this figure divided by the cardinality q of the set of propositions in 
which the proposition under consideration holds. 
 
Dt(q) = {∑Dt (W/WA)}/q 
 
 Where WA is the actual world; the verisimilitude is this distance subtracted from 
1, i.e. 1 – Dt(q). 
 
This distance will depend on the weighting of hot and rainy (how important they 
are in relation to the truth). Clearly this will be different if one is hoping to fill the 
farm dam or planning to hang out the washing. The distance will also depend on 
the way we define the measure of distance from the truth, which is an intuitive 
judgment197. 
 
We can consider the situation in more detail when, for example, we arbitrarily 
make the weightings equal and look at the combinations in the left hand column 
of Table 2. 
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201). The measures are defended by arguments from intuitions in simple cases. As Brink points 














 Holds in world Cardinality 
q 
Dt(q) Dt(q)/q 1-Dt(q)/q 
h&r W1 1 0 0 1 
h W1,W2 2 0+1/2 1/4 3/4 
r W1,W3 2 0+1/2 1/4 3/4 
h&~r W2 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 
~h&r W3 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 
~h W3W4 2 1/2+1 3/4 1/4 
~r W2W4 2 1/2+1 3/4 1/4 
~h&~r W4 1 1/2+1/2 1 0 
 
It turns out that verisimilitude varies in interesting ways with the number of 
variables. If one moves from the simplest example given above, using two 
variables, to three variables (adding say windy) and then to four (adding say 










h 3/4 2/3 5/8 
~h 1/4 1/3 3/8 
~h&r 1/2 1/2 1/2 
 
Table 3 indicates what is shown by analysis, namely that the verisimilitude of h 
tends to decrease towards one half and that of ~h to increase towards one half 
                                            











as the number of variables increases199. At the same time, the value of ~h&r 
remains constant at the value of one half. Given that it is avowedly hot, it is 
sometimes suggested that it is somewhat counter intuitive that the verisimilitude 
of its being hot should converge on that for being not hot, as the number of 
independent variables increases. However, the important point for our purposes 
is that in comparing the verisimilitude of different theories if irrelevant variables 
are considered (as they may be since we do not know the truth) the rankings 
may alter on an unacceptable basis. 
 
Clearly, this result is an integral part of the proposed metric, and one question is 
whether it is physically reasonable that a model of a weather system should 
show these characteristics. In other words, if it is in fact hot and rainy, and further 
investigation shows that it is either windy or not, is it reasonable that the 
verisimilitude of it being hot or not become closer to one another. Some 
commentators argue that given the assumption that windiness is an independent 
variable, that this should not be the case. However intuitions differ and Niiniluoto 
has responded to this by pointing out that verisimilitude is context dependent200. 
If I ask only how many members of the current English cricket team have scored 
Test centuries and the answer given, correctly say, is five, then this has a certain 
verisimilitude. If in addition I ask how many are competent slips fielders and how 
many are over 1.8m in height, it is not unreasonable that the answer five to the 
first question now has lower verisimilitude, since in the new context it is less 
informative. Nevertheless, this dependence might still seem worrying in 
comparing truthlikeness of scientific theories because what may be a totally 
irrelevant variables (believed to be relevant in the different theories) will influence 
the ranking of theories vis-a-vis the supposed truth. 
 
In the foregoing all the variables have been given equal weight. Weighting itself 
is also problematic, and this will be discussed in the context of real theories. 
                                            
199 In fact h is given by (n+1)/2n and ~h by (n-1)/2n, where n is the number of variables. 
200 Psillos cites a private communication (Psillos, S. 1999 Scientific realism: how science tracks 











(This is not intended to imply that is not also problematic in the simple theories of 
the hot, rainy, windy type discussed in this section.) 
 
Aronson et al201 have attempted to overcome some of these problems by giving 
an account of verisimilitude via a theory involving the ordering of natural kinds 
into a hierarchy of types. Aronson states202 ‘it is the structure of natural kind 
hierarchies that provides us with similarity differentiation …’ Smith remarks203, ‘it 
just seems a mistake to suppose as he [Aronson] apparently does, that the 
ordering of natural kinds into subtypes and supertypes could provide the basis for 
some general theory of approximate truth.’ In fact Aronson and his colleagues do 
believe that a general theory of verisimilitude can be based on a type hierarchy of 
natural kinds204. (This has already been mentioned in 3.6 in the context of their 
belief that truth is to be defined as the limiting case of verisimilitude.) The type 
hierarchy notion is given some plausibility in their example of kingdom, phylum … 
genus, species and sub-species in the natural world, where evolution has 
provided an historical ordering of descent205. However, it is odd to think there is 
some hierarchical ordering among, for example, the elements in the periodic 
table. Is Lead near to Tin because they are both in Group IV and have somewhat 
similar properties, or is Lead of mass number 210 near to Bismuth because in 22 
years half of it will have become Bismuth, also of mass number 210. There is of 
course ordering among the elements, but it nicely illustrates the complexity and 
interest dependence of ordering. The Periodic Table shows two major types of 
ordering determined by the electronic structure. The structure of the nucleus 
allows yet another perspective. The point is that verisimilitude and approximate 
                                            
201 Aronson, J.L., Harre, R. and Way, E.C. 1994 Realism Rescued London: Duckworth Chapter 6; 
Aronson, J.L. 1997 ‘Truth Verisimilitude, and Natural Kinds’ Philosophical Papers 26, 71-104. 
202 Aronson, J.L. 1997 ibid p. 80. 
203 Smith, P. 1998 ‘Approximate Truth for Minimalists’ Philosophical Papers 27, 119-128 p. 128. 
204 Aronson, J.L., Harre, R. and Way, E.C. 1994 op. cit. 
205 Even here the biologists face difficulties. For example, there are ring species where population 
A can mate with population B and so on, but finally population P cannot mate with population A. 
What population is most similar to another requires a decision as to what has primacy, genome 
studies or phenetic issues, and within either category further, somewhat arbitrary, decisions are 
required. Also, where there is sexual dimorphism, males and females of one population are 
regarded as more similar than two males of neighbouring populations whose genetic or 











truth are context dependent as Aronson et al acknowledge. Even in their 
favoured example of biological kinds, there are formidable difficulties with a type 
hierarchy. Dogs belong to one biological species. The Australian dingo has 
probably adapted twice, first to become domesticated in prehistoric Asia, and 
then to become a wild species in Australia when it was introduced there about 
3,500 years ago. Accordingly the dingo can be classified among dogs with the 
wolf as a wild animal or with the Pekinese as a domesticated animal, although it 
is otherwise unlike either animal. The type hierarchy here is legitimated by 
certain commonalities of DNA or ability to interbreed but seems not to bear on 
any ordinary notion of verisimilitude. 
 
The ordering in the type hierarchy will depend on the purpose to which it is to be 
put, as is always the case, although this fact can be obscured by examples 
where there is an obvious ordering. On the biological classification, backed by 
DNA studies, we can say a dolphin is more like the other mammals than it is like 
a shark. But something must make this the contextually relevant type hierarchy, 
something not evident in all of the theories we might have about the ecology of 
the oceans. The notion of type hierarchy seems less useful in formulating a 
concept of verisimilitude than the possible worlds approach described earlier. 
4.4 Verisimilitude and Ranking Scientific Theories 
Even if one were to ignore the difficulties of the concept of verisimilitude arising 
from the arbitrariness of the chosen metric, there are formidable difficulties in 
assigning weighting. 
 
For any actual scientific theories the variables generally will be continuous, not of 
the simple form hot or not hot. One could of course introduce a measure of say 
hotness giving it a value from 0 to 1. Complications result in that the variables in 
a scientific theory will commonly not be independent. (In reality this complication 
already exists but has been ignored, in that it is more likely in many countries to 











linear function of the values of the variables. Heavy rain may commonly drive the 
temperature down more than light rain206. A decision must also be made on how 
relatively important are departures from the data in each of the variables. This is 
the problem discussed earlier in considering whether one of two figures which is 
not square is more like a square – is it angles or edge length or symmetry, and 
so on. 
 
An interesting historical example has been given in another context by Eco. In 
this instance something with maximum weight on one theory has zero weight on 
a competing theory. 
 
The platypus207 was first observed by colonists in 1797 (it had been observed for 
some 40 000 years by the original Australians, but they were uninterested in its 
biological classification). There were two schools of thought. One school believed 
it was a mammal, namely it belonged to the category where the female suckles 
its young, and has mammary glands with nipples and does not lay eggs. No 
evidence for mammary glands was found in the early specimens, supporting 
those who believed that the platypus was oviparous (egg laying) and ‘therefore 
not a mammal’. In fact, as was discovered in 1824, the female platypus has 
mammae but no nipples, and the mammae are visible externally only when she 
is lactating. The infant suckles by licking the pore-like mammae, so the platypus 
is a mammal, and, as it later turned out, does lay eggs. Now prior to the 
discovery of the mammae the anatomical evidence suggested that the platypus 
was oviparous (the discovery of actual platypus eggs occurred much later). The 
point of interest for our purposes is the weight that would have been given, prior 
to 1824, by the two schools of thought, to the discovery of platypus eggs. For 
those who believed the platypus was a mammal despite the anatomical evidence 
of egg laying (because it seemed wrong to argue that it was a reptile, bird, or a 
                                            
206 Brink’s account (op. cit.) discusses many of the numerous complications in deriving 
verisimilitude. 
207 In giving the history, I have broadly followed the account given by Eco (Eco, U. 1997 Kant and 











fish), the discovery of eggs was unimportant. They could accept this and 
maintain their view that the platypus was a mammal. By contrast, those who 
believed the platypus was not a mammal, on the grounds of the anatomical 
evidence that it laid eggs, believed that the discovery of eggs would 
unequivocally confirm the anatomical evidence and prove that the platypus was 
not a mammal. 
 
This platypus story illustrates a problem with the weighting of evidence. This 
problem will commonly manifest itself in the problem of the weighting of the 
possible states (like hot, rainy, and windy). Consider theories of the evolutionary 
origin of the platypus. In such theories factors like oviparous, possessing 
mammae, having aquatic habitat will be among a large set of variables. The 
weighting of these will be suggested on the basis of the theory. Consequently, 
comparisons of calculated verisimilitude may not be useful, since each is made in 
a different theoretical framework. In contrast, the various worlds in the simple 
picture of Table 1 are all being compared in a fixed framework. 
 
Another problem in considering a real theory is that theories are approximate and 
their relative merits are the extent to which they combine being empirically 
adequate with being explanatory. Thus judging them bears little resemblance to 
the toy model of hot, rainy and windy, or not, which is commonly discussed208. 
 
The questions one might ask and the variables involved in even a simple but real 
theory are vastly more complex and numerous, and additionally, as mentioned 
earlier, are often at least partially interdependent. Most importantly, the toy 
theories do not require consideration of significant background assumptions in 
contrast to the case of real theories. 
                                            
208 These are not without interest, and have shown, for example, Popper’s seemingly plausible 
general principle whereby ‘a true theory is the nearer to the truth the stronger it is’ is false. 
Consider the following theories: (a) ‘red roses are red or grass is green’, and (b) ‘red roses are 
red or (grass is green and the moon is made of green cheese)’. It would be odd to claim that to go 
from (a) to (b) it is to make progress toward the truth. Yet this is what Popper's stance requires, 












It is useful in this context to consider a simple but more realistic theory. For this 
purpose, consider the theory of the mechanical properties of a simple model 
precipitation-hardened aluminium alloy with only one alloying element, copper. 
The postulates209 are as follows. 
(i) Plastic deformation takes place by the movement of dislocations (a 
postulated unobservable entity). 
(ii) The hardening (compared with pure aluminium) is due to the 
precipitate particles (introduced in a non-equilibrium distribution by the 
process of controlled heating, quenching, and subsequent annealing) 
that obstruct dislocation motion. (These particles are also 
unobservable in the usual Scientific Anti-realist sense.) 
  
One can then predict that there will be an optimum particle-size distribution to 
maximize strengthening. If the particles are too large the dislocations can readily 
bypass them; if they are too small the dislocations can readily cut through them. 
The variables to produce the optimum particle size will be the temperatures T1 
(the temperature from which the specimen is quenched), T2 (the temperature to 
which the specimen is quenched), the quenching speed, S, the annealing 
temperature T3 (T2<T3<T1) and the annealing time t. Providing T1 is high 
enough and T2 low enough and S high enough we can ignore these variables for 
a given copper content. One can experiment with T3 and t to produce alloys of 
different strength. 
 
This is a theory of precipitation hardening. The further role of theorizing is to 
enable quantitative predictions of the hardening under different experimental 
regimes. For this purpose, different theories will use different approximations to 
make the problem mathematically tractable. For example, one theory might 
assume the particles are all of the same size, and are randomly distributed; 
                                            
209 There is a good deal of existing theory from other areas embedded in these postulates; for 












another might assume an approximately Gaussian distribution of particle sizes 
and uniformly spaced particles. The force field between the particles and the 
dislocations would be approximated in various ways (perhaps on the assumption 
that the matrix is elastically isotropic, for example). These theories will make 
predictions of the strength of the alloy for various values of T3 and t. 
 
Now how are we to estimate the relative weighted verisimilitude of these 
theories? Are we to use the integral of the distance between the curves of the 
predicted and observed strength, versus pairs of values of T3 and t? Are we to 
use the prediction of the value(s) of T3 and t that confers maximum strength? On 
the earlier argument, it is some weighted average of these and other possible 
measurements. How might we arrive at a weighting? The theories are avowedly 
false, in that they have deliberately made approximations. Hence, the idea of 
weighted verisimilitude relates in an immensely complex way to the theory and to 
its agreement with experiment. 
 
Now this simple story in a simple case is typical. There are numerous loci for 
error and numerous facts known only approximately. This suggests that this 
weighted verisimilitude is not a legitimate basis for comparison unless the 
competing theories are closely alike in appropriate respects. It is not obvious that 
as a general rule there is a proper methodology for determining the superiority of 
one theory over another210. Indeed, it is not self evident that, in general, of two 
false theories, the one with greater weighted verisimilitude is the better theory. 
After all, it is a given that we do not know the Truth, and hence we cannot know 
the verisimilitude, even if our weighting was in some sense correct. In other 
words, if our weighting can be seen with the wisdom of hindsight to have led over 
time to a choice of theories each of which was superior to its predecessors in all 
measurable respects, we could nevertheless be slowly spiraling towards the 
Truth rather than marching directly towards it. More seriously, in these same 
                                            
210 Zamora Bonilla has emphasized this methodological point (Bonilla, J.P.Z. 2000 ‘Truthlikeness, 
Rationality and the Scientific Method’ Synthese, 122, 321-335). The theory with the greatest 











circumstances, we could also be traveling away from the truth. As was discussed 
in Chapter 3 via the example of fluid dynamics, theories which give results that 
accord closely with experiment may be far from the truth211. 
 
The foregoing simply emphasizes a point made earlier, namely that verisimilitude 
in general tells us at best only about empirical adequacy as determined in 
relation to the competing theories. The relative merits of those scientific theories 
which are claimed by Scientific Realists to accurately represent the structure of 
the world are commonly judged by other factors such as explanatory power. The 
measure of empirical adequacy used is itself dependent on the details of the 
competing theories and the conclusion to be drawn from an experiment showing 
improved empirical adequacy from theory T1 to T2 is not always straightforward. 
For example the Stern-Gerlach experiment (mentioned in section 1.6) was set up 
to distinguish classical theory and Sommerfeld’s old quantum theory. The 
experiment did indeed, as the experimenters concluded, disconfirm the classical 
theory, but as later correctly interpreted it also discredited Sommerfeld’s old 
quantum theory. In other words, the actual improved empirical adequacy 
(correctly interpreted) disproved the better (false) theory as well as the inferior 
(false) theory. A correct interpretation of the experiment would have said that the 
Stern-Gerlach experiment merely showed that both theories being tested were 
not empirically adequate (in different ways). Historical examples can also readily 
be found where better theories, showed less empirical adequacy, as least 
initially, than their predecessors. 
 
At the heart of the problem in the approximate truth of real theories (as distinct 
from the toy hot rainy windy theories) is the obvious one I have already alluded 
to: you do not know what you do not know. As already mentioned (section 1.5), in 
                                            
211 This is of course not a criticism of fluid dynamics as science – the continuum model is 
appropriate, and this is one of those cases where a useful model is known to represent one 
aspect of a physical system, and consciously chosen, while failing to represent another. The point 
here is simply the truism that empirical adequacy can, unlike this case, unknowingly rather than 











the nineteenth century Lord Kelvin gave a proof that the Earth could not be more 
than 100 million years old, since on the most conservative estimates the sun 
would have used up all its possible energy in that length of time (the sun must be 
at least as old as the Earth)212. Of course, nothing was known about nuclear 
fusion. He erroneously believed in the approximate truth of the theories that led 
to his result. Lord Kelvin’s calculation of the possible energy output from the sun 
could perhaps be compared with other calculations of the time, but there was no 
way they could usefully be compared with distance from the unknown truth, since 
the theories were incomplete in an essential way.  
 
Barrett213 writes: 
Exactly how much closer to the truth is a theory that predicts neutrons decay 
with a half-life of about 12 minutes from one that predicts neutrons are 
stable? And is this second theory closer or further from the truth than a theory 
that correctly predicts neutron decay but falsely predicts that protons decay 
with a half-life of 1,000,000 years?214 
Thus it may be of great theoretical significance whether a particle is truly stable 
or has a half-life of 1010 years, so that judgments about what constitutes 
empirical adequacy may be intimately related to theory. 
 
Verisimilitude has the merit of taking into account how much is informative in a 
theory. It does not now seem very useful to say that gases consist of atoms or 
molecules. A more informative theory which says gases consist of atoms or 
molecules that are randomly distributed and whose mean kinetic energy depends 
on the temperature is less likely to be true, while having greater verisimilitude. 
                                            
212 Kelvin made an independent calculation using the time for the cooling of the Earth and the 
establishment of the present temperature gradient, and found reasonable agreement. 
Unfortunately, this was also incorrect, since nothing was known of radioactivity. 
213 Barrett, J.A. 2003 ‘Are Our Best Physical Theories Probably and/or Approximately True?’ 
Philosophy of Science 70, 1206-1218 p. 1216 (see also Brink’s remark cited earlier about the 
asymmetrical spider) 
214 At the time of writing, if the proton decays, experiments suggest that it must have has a half 
life greater than 1035 years; proton decay (into a positron and a neutral pion) has not been 












Nevertheless, verisimilitude is little less problematic than approximate truth, 
because the intractable weighting problem remains, as does the problem of 
defining the distance metric. 
 
Verisimilitude does however ingeniously get around the problems I described for 
approximate truth with regard to existential statements and universal 
generalizations. In the case of quantified statements the difficulty lies in the 
problem of looking for instances of approximate truth. There is a difference 
between being an approximation and being approximately true. Small 
adjustments can sometimes turn something that is not a square into a square 
and vice versa. On the other hand, in the case of verisimilitude one is simply 
seeking a world where the statements of the theory are true, and then 
determining the distance of this world from the actual world. 
 
Thus while it is not actually possible to determine the relative verisimilitude of 
competing theories, the Scientific Realist claims that successor theories do in 
fact have greater verisimilitude, and this explains their comparative success. She 
cannot establish this, because the truth is unknown according to the Scientific 
Realist. She must rely on an abductive inference which is not wholly negated but 
made doubtful by the difficulties around the metric and the around the theory 
dependent weighting problem posed by the open ended nature of scientific 
theories in contrast with the closed narratives describing idealized models. 
4.5 Conclusion 
It seems from the foregoing that there is not a convincing account of scientific 
progress in the sense demanded by the Scientific Realist. None of what has 
been said demands that Scientific Realism is false. Moreover, the majority of 
successive theories in a given area put forward by scientists may have greater 
values of verisimilitude, on some not unreasonable definition of the concept, than 











chapters suggest that the McMullin’s Scientific Realist argument is not convincing 
because we need a more satisfactory notion of the approximate truth of scientific 
theories, or of their verisimilitude than is attainable. 
 
It is clear that we cannot obtain something that might be called absolute 
verisimilitude. Imagine Scientific Realism is correct and imagine we know the 
truth in some domain. What is this supposed to mean? We can return to the 
example of the plastic deformation at low temperature of copper single crystals – 
a comparatively simple problem in plasticity. The dislocation density rises during 
deformation from about 104 to 1010 cm-3 and each dislocation interacts with all 
the other dislocations. The orientation of the Burgers vector of each dislocation in 
relation to the dislocation line is specifiable at each short segment along its 
length. There are about 1011 impurity atoms per cm3 in the purest metals 
available and the position of each aggregate of each type of impurity is a 
‘knowable’ fact. The actual distribution of the lattice defects at each stage of 
plastic deformation does determine the behaviour, but obviously a huge range of 
hypothesized dislocation and impurity distributions215 would result in the same 
outcome within any possible level of experimental accuracy. (It should be noted 
that this ‘huge range’ is a minuscule subset of the possible arrangements.) It is 
not a defect of Scientific Realism that the project of finding an absolute (not 
interest based) comparison of the actual to the succeeding hypothesized 
situations in progressively better theories, is an utterly unattainable notion216. 
 
The whole truth is not merely unknown but generally it cannot be known. There 
will be many aspects of the truth which cannot be conceived of at any given time, 
                                            
215 The account could readily be complicated further by considering other lattice defects, but this 
is superfluous in making the present point. 
216 This point about the interest dependence of both verisimilitude and approximate truth has 
already been mentioned. A detailed account of the need to relate approximate truth to the 
specifics of a theory is given by Weston. He argues at the same time with regard to verisimilitude, 
that even when it is considered relative to a chosen target, it remains arbitrary and cannot be 
used to justify Scientific Realism (Weston, T. 1992 ‘Approximate Truth and Scientific Realism’ 











since new concepts will be required217. The arguments of section 3.6.2 in relation 
to the difficulties in assessing approximate truth of open ended scientific theories, 
with their unknown future developments, apply equally to assessing 
verisimilitude. Indeed in both cases, if one were dealing with theories that were 
far from the Scientific Realist’s truth, irrespective of possible future 
developments, there would be no justification for a relative ranking. 
 
It is common sense to claim that the postulation of about ninety stable elements, 
explicable on the atomic theory, is an advance on the notion of the four elements 
earth, fire, air and water. Science does not claim to have the whole truth but 
rather to give an explanatory account in a particular domain. The Scientific 
Realist claim is that in general this account is true in the sense that the 
postulated entities, like atoms and electrons and bacteria, exist in the same 
sense as medium sized dry goods exist, and that most of the well established 
long standing theories describing such unobservable entities are approximately 
true. The inability to satisfactorily define approximate truth of theories or to 
measure verisimilitude does not necessarily undermine this claim, although it 
may be that the concept of an approximately true scientific theory is incoherent. 
(The inability to define satisfactorily simplicity, pornography, beauty or the colour 
blue does not mean that the concepts are without meaning.) 
 
Finally, the issue to consider is whether the conjunction of P-fertility and long 
standing success gives the claims of Scientific Realism significant support, and a 
defensible account of a criterion of whether one theory is better than another. 
The context dependence of the concept of the verisimilitude of theories means 
that it suffers from the same disadvantage as the concept of approximate truth of 
theories. The conclusion drawn vis-a-vis approximate truth in Chapter 3, namely 
                                            
217 Aristotle could have asked but not answered why the sky is blue; he could not have asked 
whether all the isotopes of lead are stable, although of course radioactive substances existed 
billions of years before Becquerel. The fact that most of the scientific questions Aristotle could 
have asked are now answered, speaks to the limitations of the science of any particular time, 
including our own. Any question involves presuppositions which change, and commonly grow in 











that approximate truth cannot adequately sustain McMullin’s defense of Scientific 















 hot (h) rainy (r) windy (w) 
    
W1 T T T 
W2 T T F 
W3 T F T 
W4 T F F 
W5 F T T 
W6 F T F 
W7 F F T 





 Holds in world Cardinality q Dt(q) Dt(q)/q 1-Dt(q)/q 
      
h&r&w W1 1 0 0 1 
h&r W1,W2 2 0+1/3 1/6 5/6 
h&~r&w W3 1 1/3 1/3 2/3 
h W1,W2,W3,W4 4 0+1/3+1/3+2/3 1/3 2/3 
~h&r W5,W6 2 1/3+2/3 1/2 1/2 
~h W5,W6,W7,W8 4 1/3+2/3+2/3+3/3 2/3 1/3 
~h&r&~w W5 1 2/3 2/3 1/3 
~h&~r W7,W8 2 2/3+3/3 5/6 1/6 















 hot (h) rainy (r) windy (w) cloudy (c) 
     
W1 T T T T 
W2 T T T F 
W3 T T F T 
W4 T T F F 
W5 T F T T 
W6 T F T F 
W7 T F F T 
W8 T F F F 
W9 F T T T 
W10 F T T F 
W11 F T F T 
W12 F T F F 
W13 F F T T 
W14 F F T F 
W15 F F F T 















 Holds in world Cardinality q Dt(q) Dt(q)/q 1-Dt(q)/q 
      
h W1 to W8 8 0+1/4+1/4+1/2+1/
4+1/2+1/2+3/4 
3/8 5/8 

















CHAPTER 5 APPROXIMATE TRUTH, REALISM 
AND ANTI-REALISM 
5.1 Introduction 
A problem, which has thus far been implicit, is to what extent the concept of the 
approximate truth of theories is essential to Scientific Realism and to Anti-
realism. As was discussed earlier, McMullin himself eschews approximate truth, 
but despite this stance, the concept seems to be an indispensable part of his 
argument for Scientific Realism. His explanation of the conjunction of P-fertility 
and long standing success is that there is a progressively closer approach to the 
‘structure of the real’. What has not been discussed so far is the more general 
question as to whether approximate truth (or verisimilitude) is necessary for 
every form of Scientific Realism. Thus the argument so far has been as follows: 
Given the acceptance of the empirical observation of the McMullin Conjunction 
then: 
(i) McMullin has an argument for Scientific Realism that allegedly does 
not rely on the concept of the approximate truth of theories; 
(ii) In fact it does do so; 
(iii) The concept of the approximate truth of scientific theories is not 
defensible; 
(iv) McMullin’s argument for Scientific Realism fails. 
If (iii) is true this raises the question as to whether all arguments for Scientific 
Realism necessarily invoke the approximate truth of scientific theories and hence 
all are suspect. This in turn raises the question as to whether Anti-realism 
requires the concept of the approximate truth of scientific theories, since if the 
concept is inadmissible, as I have argued, the answers to these two questions 
may give grounds for discriminating between these contending positions in the 












While I have just urged that McMullin’s argument for Scientific Realism relies on 
some concept of approximate truth, it is not obvious that this is more generally 
true of arguments for Scientific Realism. As discussed in section 1.5, the 
strongest case for taking scientific theories to be true (and resisting the 
Pessimistic Meta Induction) lies in mature contemporary science. This is best 
exemplified in contemporary physics as the basic science. Therefore in section 
5.2 I discuss an implication of the ongoing conflict between the two paradigmatic 
theories of twenty-first century physics – quantum mechanics and general 
relativity; namely the general necessity for approximate truth within Scientific 
Realism. In section 5.3 I suggest that this conflict does not have the same 
consequence for the Anti-realist. 
5.2 Approximate Truth and Realism 
It is possible to be a Scientific Realist without an acknowledged commitment to 
the concept of approximate truth of theories or that of verisimilitude. This is the 
usual commonsense position, where there may be an unexamined acceptance in 
this case of something like the approximate truth of theories. However, as soon 
as one seeks a philosophical basis for Scientific Realism the question of 
approximate truth arises. In Chapter 1 I cited an account of the commitments of 
Scientific Realism and the epistemic requirement was there given as:  
(v) Truths about S are knowable and we do in fact know some of them, 
and hence the terms of S successfully refer to things in the world. 
In other words, the Scientific Realist believes that science tells us something true 
about the world. 
 
As has been discussed earlier, the most commonly cited basis for this epistemic 
tenet is the well known No Miracles Argument. The success of science is here 
explained on the basis of the approximate truth of those of its currently accepted 
mature theories which attempt to describe the mind-independent world. (I am 











fluids are treated as a continuum.) It is agreed by Scientific Realists that current 
scientific theories are generally not true. 
 
This scepticism about the truth of current theories is commonly based on the 
historical evidence that even the best theories in the most advanced scientific 
disciplines have always been repeatedly subject to significant modification218. 
These modifications have sometimes arisen from entirely new experimental 
observations, sometimes from increased accuracy in experimental observations, 
and sometimes from new theoretical insights. The latter have sometimes arisen 
in the theory itself, but also have often come from changes in cognate theories 
which have implications for the theory under consideration. The continuing 
change is not surprising given the scale of the contemporary scientific enterprise, 
and, equally importantly, given the autocatalytic nature of the enterprise. A 
development like the invention of the laser has led to a vast proliferation of 
sensitive new experimental techniques in optical spectroscopy for example. 
Another spectacular example has been the application of the extraordinary 
increase in computing power219 to the enhancement of a huge range of 
experimental techniques, ranging from the radio astronomy studies of distant 
galaxies to the electron microscopy of viruses. Whatever the origin of the 
ongoing modification of even the best theories, it is clear that the force of the 
NMA lies in the acceptance of the notion that the successive versions of the 
theory are approximately true or have increasing verisimilitude. 
 
There is however another common sense stance that does not rely on the No 
Miracles Argument for the truth or approximate truth of scientific theories. The 
starting point is Realism about everyday objects rather than Scientific Realism. 
                                            
218 This is in essence a much attenuated version of the Pessimistic Meta Induction (PMI), 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Instead of claiming that current theories are false because of the 
failures of theories in the past, there is the more limited acknowledgement that even the best 
current theories are highly likely to be imperfect because of the observation that they normally 
need to be modified in the light of new evidence.  
219 The so called ‘Moore’s Law’, the doubling of the number of transistors possible on a chip every 
18 months has now persisted for over 50 years. This is a remarkable example of genuine 











Observable entities, like stones and mountains, and the moons of Jupiter, 
obviously exist, and this is the basic notion. Sankey220 proposes: ‘There is no 
need for the scientific realist to argue for the reality of ordinary, everyday material 
objects, since commitment to such entities has already been established at the 
level of common sense.’ 
 
Thus far there is no requirement for an acceptance of approximate truth because 
the commonsense observations are taken to be true simpliciter. The question 
now is whether one can move from Realism to Scientific Realism without any 
further assumptions. On this Realist picture, what allows us to see at sunrise is 
light, and science maintains that the origins of our seeing are electromagnetic 
waves within a certain wavelength range. The Scientific Realist accepts this view 
of the scientists and believes in the existence of photons. These are particles 
without mass that she cannot see. She accepts, because she is a Scientific 
Realist, that she can detect them with suitable apparatus (one at a time if the 
light source is dim enough). Further, being a Scientific Realist she makes no 
distinction between her ability to see with the naked eye, her spectacles, a 
telescope (for the moons of Jupiter) and a photon detector. In accepting the 
photons she accepts an extremely abstruse theory – Quantum Electrodynamics 
(QED). Indeed as Feynman explains221, for her to accept the account she needs 
to ‘lose her common sense’, which has been relied upon in the Realist story 
above. So, if she is both to believe she is seeing stones or mountains or the 
moons of Jupiter, and believe in how she is seeing them, and what they consist 
of, common sense is of no use to her. As Russell put it222 some 70 years ago, 
                                            
220 Sankey, H. 2004 ‘Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defense’ Knowledge and the 
World: Challenges beyond the Science Wars M. Carrier, J. Roggenhofer, G. Küppers and P. 
Blanchard (Eds) Berlin: Springer Verlag p. 65. In resisting my criticism which follows, Sankey 
argues that the corrections to common sense provided by science are to the explanations offered 
for the appearances, and that the common sense account of the appearances themselves 
remains valid. 
221 Feynman, R.P. 1985 QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter Princeton: Princeton 
University Press p. 5. The need to abandon common sense is thoroughly documented in 
Feynman’s account. 











‘Naive realism leads to physics and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is 
false. Therefore naive realism if true is false; therefore it is false.’223 
 
Quantum Electrodynamics is an extremely well established part of physics and it 
may well be true, but the reason scientists and laypersons have for accepting its 
explanations and predictions is that it is believed to be either true or 
approximately true. In any case, even if the naive Realist insisted that Quantum 
Electrodynamics was true, many other of the explanations delivered by science 
that she accepts are unlikely to be true. They are likely to be approximately true 
(as Scientific Realism understands this concept). 
 
Nevertheless such a Realist might say, ‘I believe what the scientists are currently 
saying is true; if it is false, as I acknowledge it may be, when I learn this I will 
cease to believe it’. Theories are either true or false, she might say, and neither 
come in degrees. Indeed, she might abandon the Realist’s ‘compelling doctrine’ 
‘about the ordinary observable physical world’ and as a Scientific Realist simply 
accept current best science as the truth224. Where reputable science is uncertain 
or is in disagreement she will suspend judgment. 
 
Thus this, what we might call Common Sense Realism, rejects the Pessimistic 
Meta Induction and appears not to require the concept of the approximate truth of 
theories. 
 
                                            
223 As Heisenberg said in responding to critics of the Copenhagen interpretation, 
They [some physicists] would prefer to come back to the idea of an objective real world 
whose smallest parts exist objectively in the same sense as stones or trees exist, 
independently of whether or not we observe them. 
This however, is impossible or at least not entirely possible because of the nature of the 
atomic phenomena … 
 (Heisenberg, W, 1958 Physics and Philosophy New York: Harper and Brothers p. 129) Quantum 
mechanics does not provide a secure argument against Scientific Realism but it does so against 
naive realism. 
224 This is not necessary; she can perfectly well continue to accept the everyday objects on the 











However, there is a problem even if the Pessimistic Meta Induction is rejected. 
There remains the problem of accepted mature successful theories that are in 
conflict. 
 
Consider the highly successful theory, quantum mechanics, and the current view 
within theoretical physics that it is incompatible with another highly successful 
theory, namely general relativity. Indeed highly successful is something of an 
understatement. Experiments on the gravitational red shift and time delay have 
confirmed general relativity, and the whole of modern chemistry and much of 
current physics constitute a confirmation of quantum mechanics. To quote 
Penrose225: 
It has been said that quantum field theory is the most accurate physical 
theory ever, being accurate to about one part in about 1011. However, I would 
like to point out that general relativity has, in a certain clear sense, now been 
tested to be correct to one part in 1014 (and this accuracy has apparently 
been limited merely by the accuracy of clocks on earth). 
This incompatibility between the two main planks of contemporary physics has 
been a puzzle since the formulation of quantum mechanics. There are claims 
that a workable quantum theory of gravity for low energies has been proposed 
but the claim that the theory is adequate is strongly contested. There is general 
agreement that the two powerfully explanatory and extremely accurate 
quantitative theories are incompatible at high energies226. 
 
The Scientific Realist is unable to accept that both of these theories are true, and 
her explanation of their success is that both must be approximately true227 (There 
is the usual fallibilist proviso that one or both may be false and not approximately 
true – a problem for the Scientific Realist given two such well attested and pivotal 
theories for which no contrary experimental evidence has been found in nearly a 
                                            
225 Hawking, S. and Penrose, R. 2000 The Nature of Space and Time Princeton: Princeton 
University Press p. 61. 
226 For a recent account see for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity. 











century228.) She is compelled to take this stance because the Scientific Realist 
believes that the mind-independent world, which is being represented either 
accurately or approximately by science, cannot allow two true incompatible 
theories. Smolin, the distinguished theoretical physicist and committed Scientific 
Realist, writes as follows229. 
There cannot be two different theories of principle, applying to different 
domains. Because the world is a unity, everything interacts ultimately with 
everything else, and there can only be one language used to describe these 
interactions. Quantum theory and general relativity are both theories of 
principle. As such, logic requires their unification. 
 
It might be argued that the Scientific Realist can use my notion (in the context of 
explaining the McMullin Conjunction in Section 2.4) of the true parts of each of 
these false theories (and not approximately true theories) as explaining the 
success of each of the highly successful incompatible theories. However, these 
theories are successful in such detail and with such accuracy that the Scientific 
Realist undermines her primary case for Scientific Realism by merely claiming 
partial truth (and not approximate truth) for what are the two most successful 
theories in the history of physics. Given this, the incompatibility of the two 
theories makes the simultaneous approximate truth of both theories an untenable 
stance from a Scientific Realist perspective. 
                                            
228 Einstein says of the general theory, ‘The chief attraction of the theory lies in its completeness. 
If a single one of the conclusions drawn from it proves wrong it must be given up; to modify it 
without destroying the whole structure seems to be impossible.’ (Einstein, A. 1956 Out of My 
Later Years New Jersey: Citadel Press p. 58a); Sklar says of relativistic quantum field theory 
(which is consistent with special relativity), in what I believe would be a typical view, ‘our best 
available foundational scientific theory’ (Sklar, L. 2003 ‘Dappled Theories in a Uniform World’ 
Philosophy of Science 70, 424-441 p. 425). Note that being consistent with special relativity is a 
very minor problem by comparison with being compatible with general relativity – in special 
relativity we are not dealing with forces at all. 
229 Smolin, L. 2007 The Trouble with Physics London: Penguin Books p. 10. Cartwright would 
deny this, not because of the claim that ‘the world is a unity’, which can be variously interpreted, 












5.3 Approximate Truth and Anti-realism 
Given the situation just described, where the two theories cannot be combined 
since this leads to a contradiction, an Anti-realist could believe that both theories 
are true because each is defining a different conceptual scheme. For example, 
she may believe that both of the incompatible theories are, or are what would be, 
the result of an Ideal Epistemic Inquiry, and all the evidence supports them both. 
It is important to recognize that Ideal Epistemic Inquiry does not imply230 ‘… 
conditions which are simultaneously ideal for the ascertaining of any truth 
whatsoever, or simultaneously ideal for answering any question whatsoever.’ 
 
An ideal epistemic situation need mean no more than a situation where I might 
declare ‘this is a chair’ in circumstances of good lighting and where my eyesight 
was good and I was not confused by drugs and so on231. As will be discussed 
further, there is no reason for the Internal Realist232 or Cartwright’s Entity Realist 
to demand that there is, or that we can find, a single conceptual scheme that will 
encompass all theories. (It is almost universal among theoretical physicists to 
assume that such a scheme can be found, and for more than 80 years they have 
been actively seeking a theory which will consistently combine quantum theory 
and general relativity233.) Van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricist would accept 
                                            
230 Putnam, H. 1990 Realism with a Human Face Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press p. viii. 
This is of course different from Peirce’s hypothetical ultimate limit of inquiry. 
231 Putnam, H. 1990 ibid; Putnam at various times in talking about truth uses the terms idealized 
epistemic justification, idealized rational acceptability, or idealized warranted assertability, always 
viewing truth as ‘not radically non-epistemic’, but never allowing for perfection or omniscience in 
any verification procedure. More recently Putnam has retreated somewhat and currently resists 
explicit definitions of truth; he still rejects both the deflationary and correspondence notions. 
232 An account of the Internal Realist position and the notion within it of distinct conceptual 
schemes is taken up in Chapter 6. 
233 For some thirty years theorists have intensively explored String Theory as a possible means to 
this end. For theoretical physicists this assumption of a single universal conceptual scheme need 
be no more than a methodological maxim, warranted by the history of physics, rather than a 
belief; a stance advocated by Giere (Giere, R.N. 2006 ‘Perspectival Pluralism’ in Scientific 
Pluralism S. H. Kellert, H. E. Longino, and C. K. Waters (Eds) Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science Volume 19 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). This form of 
Scientific Pluralism, wherein the assumption of a single universal conceptual scheme is treated 
merely as a methodological maxim, while maintaining agnosticism about a more profound 
Scientific Pluralism is, Giere maintains, less obviously plausible in the biological sciences. 











that there is no need to claim any more than that each of the theories is 
empirically adequate in its domain, although he would be troubled by their 
inferential isolation. An Anti-realist is on good grounds if she can assert that both 
theories are true, since they underpin an enormous part of modern science. It is 
hard to find any commonplace fact that is more secure than the claim that it is 
curved space-time that accounts for gravity or any postulates more secure than 
those of quantum theory. 
 
It might be argued that it is contrary to the notion of truth that two incompatible 
theories are both declared to be true. Since coherence is evidently an epistemic 
virtue, the conflict certainly does mean for the Scientific Realist that physics 
overall does not constitute an epistemicaly ideal theory. However, the Internal 
Realist does not claim human omniscience; and it may be that any single 
conceptual scheme fails and will continue to fail to construct a seemingly 
consistent universe. For the Internal Realist quantum mechanics and general 
relativity constitute two distinct conceptual schemes. As Putnam writes234: ‘… two 
statements which are incompatible at face value can sometimes both be true 
(and the incompatibility cannot be explained away by saying that the statements 
have ‘a different meaning’ in the schemes to which they respectively belong).’ 
 
There is no reason to suppose that as a result of an Ideal Epistemic Inquiry we 
can know all the truths. Putnam’s position is that there is no fact of the matter as 
to which of the two incompatible positions arising from different conceptual 
schemes is correct. Putnam does not believe that there is any reason to suppose 
that science will converge to a single definite picture with a unique ontology. He 
asserts, ‘to say… that convergence to one big picture is required by the very 
concept of knowledge is sheer dogmatism.’235 
 
                                            
234 Putnam, H. 1990 ibid p. x. He defends this statement, made in the introduction, in Chapter 6 of 
the same book. 











Putnam commonly illustrates what he means by saying that ‘two statements 
which are incompatible can sometimes both be true’ by using the contrast 
between the consideration of three geometric points allowing mereological sums 
as objects, and using the ordinary Carnapian scheme236. In the former case it is 
true to say that there are seven objects and in the latter case it is true to say that 
there are three objects. Each statement is true within a conceptual scheme237 
and each describes the same state of affairs. So for Putnam, truth is relative to a 
conceptual scheme and nothing in nature privileges a particular scheme in the 
case of scientific theories. He says238: ‘it is an illusion that there could be just one 
sort of language game which could be sufficient for the description of all reality’. 
He is here concerned with rebutting the notion that a conceptual scheme 
appropriate for science can tell the whole story of human knowledge. There is 
nothing to compel the Internal Realist to believe that even the whole of science 
can be incorporated within a single conceptual scheme239. Such a view does 
follow from Scientific Realism but not from Internal Realism. 
 
Scientific Realists complain that an epistemic notion of truth leaves us without an 
explanation of the success of science. In their view it is the correspondence of 
the truths with an independent reality which provides the explanation of the 
general success of science. Putnam regards this position as incoherent240. He 
                                            
236 Putnam, H. 1990 ibid p. 97. (This is discussed further briefly in section 6.2.3 footnote 300.) 
237 This claim is not universally accepted. Arguments have been put forward to say that it is false 
to say that if x and y are distinct material objects, neither of which is a proper part of the other, 
that there exists a third material object z, not identical to either x or y, whose matter is exhausted 
by that of x and y (see Gross, S. 2004 ’Putnam, Context, and Ontology’ Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 34, 507-554). Scientific Realists like Boghossian commonly have a different objection. 
Boghossian says that Putnam is mistaken in drawing his conclusion from the options of saying 
truly there are three or seven objects. All that can be concluded (which obviously every Realist 
would concede) is that different descriptions of one set of circumstances are possible. Putnam’s 
point however is that no specifiable description is determined other than via a conceptual 
scheme. This, Putnam claims, does not lead to the relativism that disturbs Scientific Realists 
(Boghossian, P. 2006 Fear of Knowledge Oxford: Clarendon Press) because, while more than 
one true description is possible, false descriptions are not (with the usual fallibilist caveat). I return 
to this issue in section 6.2.  
238 Putnam, H. 2004 Ethics without Ontology Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press p. 22. 
239 Putnam’s picture of truth being embedded within a conceptual scheme is taken up in section 
6.2.2. 
240 More specifically, Putnam gives an account of the only version of the Scientific Realist’s views 











takes each of the theories of physics to be explanatory insofar as it meets the 
usual scientific criteria like empirical adequacy, unifying power and predictive 
power. Despite being an early champion of the NMA he would certainly not now 
explain the ‘success of science’ on the basis of correspondence with a mind-
independent reality. 
 
In any case, as Blackburn points out, Internal Realism can use the argument for 
the success of science here being used by the Scientific Realist but without her 
mind-independence clause. Blackburn puts the Realist argument as follows241: ‘It 
is because opinion is caused, perhaps indirectly, by the fact that p, that it 
converges upon p.’ This argument is available to the Internal Realist since it is 
the way the world is according to the chosen conceptual scheme that determines 
that we accept the conceptual scheme. The experimental and theoretical 
                                                                                                                                  
correspondence theory of truth and a world consisting of a unique fixed totality of mind-
independent objects. He argues that this is incoherent. Numerous philosophers regard Putnam’s 
account as an inadequate or improper description of the Scientific Realist position; see for 
example Khlentzos, D. 2004 Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press; Sankey, H. 2004 ‘Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defense’ Knowledge and 
the World: Challenges beyond the Science Wars M. Carrier, J. Roggenhofer, G. Küppers and P. 
Blanchard (Eds) Berlin: Springer Verlag; Sankey, H. 2004 ‘Scientific Realism and the God’s Eye 
Point of View’ Epistemologia 27, 211-226; Haack, S. 1998 Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Grayling, A.C. 1997 An Introduction to Philosophical Logic 
Oxford: Blackwell. A common objection to Putnam’s characterization is to the ‘fixed totality’ 
clause. For example, Khlentzos (op. cit. p. 195) says: 
Why couldn’t a metaphysical realist allow the possibility that the world is simply too rich in 
structure and complexity for any one language or theory to countenance? Perhaps the 
world is infinitely complex, even at the microphysical level? If so it may just be our lot to 
aspire in our theories to a number of true partial descriptions of ‘the way the world is’ with 
no genuine prospect of ever integrating them into a single ‘final theory’. 
Other critics object to Putnam’s alleged assertion of the incompatibility of mind-independence and 
different descriptive ontologies, ‘we must see that there is no difficulty in admitting a mind-
independent world while at the same time admitting that our cognitive powers extend only to a 
“textualized” world’ (Margolis, J. 1986 Pragmatism without Foundations Oxford: Blackwell p. 283). 
Putnam’s position rests on his contention that any plausible form of Scientific Realism involves 
the necessary conjunction of all the claims he ascribes to the Metaphysical Realist (Clark, P. and 
Hale, R (Eds) 1994 Reading Putnam Oxford: Blackwell p. 253; Putnam, H. 1983 Philosophical 
Papers Volume 3 Realism and Reason Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). One or more of 
Putnam’s claims that the Metaphysical Realist is committed to correspondence, uniqueness, and 
bivalence are contested by all of the authors cited above. Khlentzos believes that Putnam’s 
argument (which Khlentzos does not accept) does not require the Scientific Realist to be 
committed to a correspondence theory of truth but only to evidence-transcendent truth 
(Khlentzos, D. 2004 Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge Cambridge MA: MIT Press 
p. 33). 











constraints upon any 21st century theory of the electron, for example, are such 
that the conceptual scheme (Quantum Electrodynamics) physicists place such 
confidence in is currently forced upon them. 
 
The Anti-realist can dispense with approximate truth, unlike the Scientific Realist; 
she does not need the concept in the context of defending two inferentially 
isolated well established scientific theories. That is, two well established theories 
which if combined would lead to a contradiction. 
 
Of course the foregoing does not entail that the Internal Realist makes the 
unscientific claim that say quantum mechanics and general relativity theories are 
exactly true in the sense of completely and precisely accounting for all the 
phenomena that may ultimately come to light. The claim is only that everything 
said in the theories may be true, that approximate truth is not a concept that is 
required and that ‘truth does not come in degrees’ with regard to scientific 
theories. Thus it seems reasonable to say, for example, that the theory that 
gases consist of molecules which repel at short range is true simpliciter. This is 
not to claim that this is the whole truth about the behaviour of gases or indeed 
that we will ever know the whole truth in this or any other area of science. 
 
Thus all that is needed by the Internal Realist is the notion that theories contain 
significant truths, and theories are to be judged on some or all of the usual 
criteria of comprehensiveness, simplicity, explanatory force and empirical 
adequacy. The concept of approximate truth need not be invoked. However, it 
might be supposed that there exist examples of theories that contain no truths 
and where the McMullin Conjunction is found and the theories give an account 
that plausibly describes the Scientific Realist’s mind-independent world. Such a 
hypothetical long standing successful P-fertile theory would be best accounted 
for by a Scientific Realist invoking approximate truth. The existence of a theory of 
this sort which unequivocally contains no significant truths is implausible. 











such a theory. Of course, even if no historical examples exist, it cannot be 
completely ruled out that such a counter example to the case against postulating 
the approximate truth of scientific theories will be found in the future. But even 
so, the most that would be generated is a realism restricted to such a theory – no 
general case for realism is in the offing. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have suggested that a central problem of Scientific Realism is 
that the use of the concept of the approximate truth of scientific theories is 
inescapable. This is so quite apart from any account of P-fertility. Anti-realism 
does not essentially require the concept of the approximate truth of theories, can 
accommodate inferentially isolated well established scientific theories, and can 
otherwise rival the account given by Scientific Realism. 
 
Putnam’s Internal Realism is considered in the following chapter to investigate 
whether it can give a better account of the scientific enterprise than that offered 
by McMullin. In particular, the issue is whether it can give an account of co-
existing inferentially isolated well established theories without invoking their 













CHAPTER 6 PUTNAM’S INTERNAL REALISM 
I believe that the first step in the setting up of a ‘real external world’ is the 
formation of the concept of bodily objects… Out of the multitude of our sense 
experiences we take, mentally and arbitrarily, certain repeatedly recurring 
complexes of sense impression…and we attribute to them a meaning – the 
meaning of bodily object. Considered logically this concept is not identical with 
the totality of sense impressions referred to; but is an arbitrary creation of the 
human (or animal) mind. On the other hand, the concept owes its meaning and 
its justification exclusively to the totality of the sense impressions we associate 
with it. 
 
The second step is to be found in the fact that, in our thinking (which determines 
our expectation) we attribute to this concept of bodily object a significance, which 
is to a high degree independent of the sense impression which originally gave 
rise to it. This is what we mean when we attribute to the bodily object ‘a real 
existence’. The justification of such a setting rests exclusively on the fact that, by 
means of such concepts and mental relations between them, we are able to 
orient ourselves in the labyrinth of sense impressions. 
Albert Einstein242 
6.1 Introduction 
The argument in Chapter 5 relies heavily on Putnam’s statement already quoted 
 … two statements which are incompatible at face value can sometimes both 
be true (and the incompatibility cannot be explained away by saying that the 
statements have ‘a different meaning’ in the schemes to which they 
respectively belong).243 
                                            
242 Einstein, A. 1956 Out of My Later Years New Jersey: Citadel Press p. 60. 











This is a consequence of Putnam’s Internal Realism244 whose central element is 
as follows. 
The suggestion which constitutes the essence of "internal realism" is that 
truth does not transcend use. Different statements – in some cases, even 
statements that are "incompatible" from the standpoint of classical logic and 
classical semantics – can be true in the same situation because the words – 
in some cases, the logical words themselves – are used differently. But this is 
not to say that talking of "use" instead of "meaning" is going to provide 
another sort of reductive account of or substitute for "intentionality". 
Describing the use of words involves describing many things – when 
sentences containing those words are acceptable, what typically causes an 
expert/ordinary speaker to use those words in particular ways, what interests 
the ways of speaking in question subserve, what the phenomenology of the 
particular way of speaking is, and so on. These things are no more reducible 
to physical-cum-computational language than is meaning talk or reference 
talk245. 
Internal Realism’s conceptual relativism246 is trying to steer a course between 
Scientific Realism and various other forms of Anti-realism, without falling prey to 
                                            
244 Putnam’s exposition of Internal Realism is to be found in various sources. Some major 
references are Putnam, H. 1983 Philosophical Papers Volume 3 Realism and Reason 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (the Introduction and chapters 11 and 12) and the last 
chapter of Putnam, H. 1988 Representation and Reality Cambridge MA: MIT Press. A more 
recent defense is in his responses to the articles in Reading Putnam 1994 P. Clark and R. Hale 
(Eds) Oxford: Blackwell. It seems from Putnam’s writings that he regards the labels Realist and 
Anti-realist as too imprecise to characterize his Internal Realism as falling into one or other of 
these categories. He sometimes refers to his views as Scientific Realism, and says, ‘scientific 
realism in this sense does not presuppose either metaphysical realism or metaphysical 
antirealism, although it is incompatible with all forms of operationalism and phenomenalism’ 
(Putnam, H. 2005 ‘A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again)’ British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 56, 615-634 p. 617). However, it seems proper to characterize Internal 
Realism as Anti-realist, vide his aphorism ‘the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and 
the world’ (Putnam, H. 1981 Reason, Truth and History Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
p. xi). He gives a later explantion of the metaphor, which he still likes, where he says, ‘The rich 
and ever-growing collection of truths about the world is the joint product of the world and 
language users.’ (Clark, P. and Hale, R (Eds) 1994 Reading Putnam Oxford: Blackwell p. 265); 
this last statement is somewhat ambiguous and a literal reading makes it wholly acceptable to a 
Scientific Realist. 
245 Putnam, H. 1988 Representation and Reality Cambridge MA: MIT Press p. 115. 
246 I have introduced conceptual relativism where inferential isolation is demanded because two 











relativism or scepticism. Putnam writes that he wants to put an alternative to, ‘… 
metaphysical realist views …on the one hand, and to cultural relativist ones, on 
the other’247. 
 
Section 6.2 gives an account of Internal Realism and Putnam’s defense of the 
‘incompatible statements’ quotation above against various objections. Section 6.3 
examines Internal Realism’s credentials for dealing with the McMullin 
Conjunction, which has been accepted throughout, and hence must be 
accounted for by an acceptable theory. In section 6.4 I briefly consider the import 
of the many historical examples of successful false theories for Scientific Realism 
and for Internal Realism. 
6.2 Internal Realism 
6.2.1 Putnam’s Thesis 
Internal Realism is characterized by three postulates, as follows248. 
IR1 What objects does the world consist of is a question that it only makes 
 sense to ask within a theory or a description. 
IR2 There is more than one 'true' description of the world. 
                                                                                                                                  
and include cases where the two schemes simply use different modes of explanation. It seems 
that he might, for example, regard the scheme involving a neural account of mental events and 
the account given by folk psychology as constituting different conceptual schemes, although no 
contradiction may result from combining them. It is of course also possible that one of these 
accounts is sufficiently underdeveloped so that inevitable contradictions have not become 
apparent, or indeed that both are. 
247 Putnam, H. 1987 The Many Faces of Realism La Salle IL: Open Court p. 1. 
248 Putnam, H. 1987 ibid; the essentials of Putnam’s Internal Realism in what follows are not 
negated by his shift to what he calls natural realism about perception, in opposition to 
representational theories (Putnam, H. 1994 ‘Sense, Nonsense, and the Senses: An Inquiry into 
the Powers of the Human Mind’ Journal of Philosophy 91, 445-517). As Wright comments, 
there is encouragement for the view that, whatever his own impression of the matter, 
many features of Putnam’s recent reviews represent not a rejection of the middle-period 
internalism, but a further working out of out of the implications and possibilities of the 
(somewhat relaxed) form of evidential constraint on truth which that outlook is most 
usefully seen as involving. 
(Wright, C. 2003 Saving the Differences Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press p. 208) For a 
detailed discussion of the continued viability of what Wright calls moderate internal realism see 
Wright, C. ibid Chapter 11. Putnam himself remarks, ‘So whether I am still, to some extent, an 
'internal realist' is, I guess, as unclear as how much I was including under that unhappy label.’ 











IR3 Truth is some sort of idealized rational acceptability249. 
 
For the Internal Realist the world still plays its part in determining the results of 
our experiments and will exclude many interpretations. Internal Realism rejects 
the forms of relativism which hold that the truth is constituted by what is believed, 
for example, about elementary particles by the international community of 
theoretical physicists. That is, the Internal Realist, like the Scientific Realist, 
allows that the whole community might be mistaken. 
 
The fact that one cannot have a ‘God’s eye view’ of the world but must have a 
system of concepts does not mean that our observations are illusions. The 
Internal Realist can give the same unequivocal ontological status to electrons 
and neutrinos as to moderate sized dry goods or rainbows or shadows. She does 
not share with the Scientific Realist the thesis that the entities to which 
ontological commitment is made can coherently be said to exist independently of 
any conceptual scheme. She asserts that any talk of quarks is necessarily 
embedded in a conceptual scheme, and that there may be a legitimate 
inferentially isolated conceptual scheme that makes no use of quarks. Moreover, 
neither of these conceptual schemes can inevitably be given a privileged status 
as describing the Scientific Realist’s mind-independent world. 
 
A useful metaphor is that of a grid. We need a grid (a conceptual framework) to 
describe the world, and many grids may serve, but that does not mean we can 
describe the world in any way we like. For example, it is no longer possible to 
use the weltanschauung of nineteenth century physics to discuss the trajectory of 
elementary particles. 
 
                                            
249 Putnam no longer believes this is an adequate account of truth but does still hold that truth is a 
substantial property. Truth and ideal warrant are interdependent notions but truth is not defined 
as ideal warrant. Internal Realism requires an epistemic notion of truth but it is not essential that it 
be given by IR3, although Putnam continues to believe IR3 is adequate in relation to most 











A passenger in a uniformly moving train is quite right to assert that she is at rest, 
and a fellow passenger is quite right to assert that she is moving at 150 km per 
hour. They are using different frames of reference and these are simply different 
descriptions of the same event. Alternatively they could be described as each 
using a different grid. However, nobody can correctly use a conceptual scheme 
which allows movement faster than the velocity of light – a conceptual scheme 
that was implicitly used for millennia prior to 1905. For Putnam this is not 
because there is a definite Scientific Realist’s world that the ‘Newtonian grid’ 
does not fit, rather the proposed grid fails satisfactorily to confront the data. 
 
These last remarks say no more than would be acceptable to many Scientific 
Realists or within various other philosophical stances. As Ayer writes: 
the very notion of there being a world of such and such a character only 
makes sense within some system of concepts which language embodies. 
This is not to say that the world does not exist independently of our talking 
about it, or that any one system of concepts is as good as any other. We can 
and do bring different systems to the judgment of experience, and our 
observations lead us to believe that the world has existed, and probably will 
continue to exist, without containing any human beings to be conscious of it. 
Even so, our experience is articulated in language, and the world we 
envisage as existing at times when we do not is still a world which is 
structured by our method of describing it. As I said before, we cannot detach 
ourselves from every point of view. If we abandon one then we have to 
occupy another. The idea that we could prise the world off our concepts is 
incoherent; for with what conception of the world would we then be left?250 
Putnam’s point is that there is no way the world can dictate our conceptual 
scheme to us although it does constrain adoption of a scheme. Hence Internal 
Realism is a form of conceptual relativism – truth is relative to a conceptual 
                                            











scheme251. ‘To grant that there is more than one true version of reality is not to 
deny that some versions are false’252. 
 
Putnam’s view is in stark contrast to the views of the Scientific Realist who 
commonly claims that ‘the world has a definite and mind-independent natural-
kind structure’253. Lewis goes so far as to say that Putnam’s thesis is 
incredible254. He goes on to write255: 
Among all the countless things and classes that there are, most are 
miscellaneous, gerrymandered, ill-demarcated. Only an elite minority are 
carved at the joints, so that their boundaries are established by objective 
sameness and difference in nature. Only these elite things and classes are 
eligible to serve as referents. 
Lewis is asserting that there is an objective inegalitarianism of classifications, 
and that contemporary physics comes close to providing a correct list. For Lewis, 
sticks and stones are elite but less so than electrons and quarks. Sticks and 
stones would in turn be more elite than an object like a complex of a grue 
gemstone and Putnam’s arteries; this last being not elite at all. Putnam has 
responded by calling Lewis’s talk of elite classes ‘spooky’ and ‘medieval 
sounding’256. 
 
                                            
251 Note this is different from the extreme position seemingly sometimes taken by Kuhn (and 
taken by some of his successors) that reality is relativized to paradigms. These philosophers 
have argued that theory influences perception to such an extent that holders of pre and post 
revolutionary theories in science literally see the world differently (‘Pendulums were brought into 
existence by something very like a paradigm-induced gestalt switch.’ Kuhn, T.S. 1970 The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions Chicago: University of Chicago Press p. 120). Putnam would 
deny that the Newtonian scheme and general relativity are incommensurable. Putnam is not 
saying that we can go from the fact of introducing a concept for a kind of thing permits 
individuation of things of the kind, to a conclusion that the introduction of such concepts has a 
role in creating the things in its extension. Some writers have attributed to Wittgenstein the 
conceptual relativism embodied in Putnam’s Internal Realism citing, for example, ‘Here we see 
that the idea of “agreement with reality” does not have any clear application.’ (Wittgenstein, L 
1969 On Certainty Oxford: Basil Blackwell § 215) 
252 Putnam, H. 1980 ‘Models and Reality’ Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 464-482, p. 477. 
253 Psillos, S. 1999 Scientific realism: how science tracks truth New York: Routledge p. xix. 
254 Lewis, D. 1984 ‘Putnam’s Paradox’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62, 221-236 p. 221. 
255 Lewis, D. ibid p. 227. 











Putnam’s Internal Realism says there is ‘more than one true version of reality’. It 
is not merely that there are different perspectives on the world and that some 
perspective is inescapable. We must reject the appealing visual metaphor that 
we can have different perceptions of a mind-independent world. The metaphor is 
appealing because we readily and correctly think of different views of the world. 
We can make an image on a photographic plate of the night sky with an optical 
telescope. The photographic plate is manufactured so as to be sensitive in the 
human visual range, so we will get a picture which is like that of the unaided eye, 
but more detailed. Likewise, we can use a ground or satellite based telescope 
with sensors in the infrared region of the electromagnetic spectrum and we will 
get a different picture, also informative, but very different and inaccessible to 
unaided human vision. It is natural to think of these as different perspectives on a 
‘unique world out there’.  
 
This visual metaphor, says Putnam, is a fundamental error257. There is no such 
mind-independent world and it is meaningless to talk as if there were. It must be 
remembered that the perspectival stance leads readily to the metaphorical 
parallel with different visual perspectives on a given scene, and this slide leads to 
the erroneous concept of a unique correct description of reality. 
 
It is worth noting here the contrast with McMullin’s position. Mc Mullin writes258: 
The Dirac electron is completely specified by Dirac’s theory. But the real 
electron, the entity whose nature has gradually become clearer, thanks to a 
confluence of theories and a strong intervention-type argument is not 
                                            
257 Sankey argues that Putnam’s rejection of a God’s eye point of view, which inter alia makes 
Putnam reject the perspectival stance, is mistakenly applied to Scientific Realism. We can, 
Sankey argues, view the world from a perspective and ‘propose an epistemological model of the 
relation between human thought and our surrounding environment’. Sankey describes how we 
can consider, from our perspective, the supposed mental life of animals without being able to 
comprehend their thought processes. Likewise he says we can do so for our own species 
(Sankey, H. 2004 ‘Scientific Realism and the God’s Eye Point of View’ Epistemologia 27, 211-
226). (While he defends the propriety of the God’s eye point of view, Sankey also maintains that 
the view is in any case not necessary for Scientific Realism.)  
258 McMullin, E. 1987 ‘Explanatory Success and the Truth of Theory’ in N. Rescher (Ed) Scientific 











exhausted by any theory we now have or for that matter ever may have. 
(Author’s italics) 
For the Internal Realist the real electron of McMullin’s Scientific Realist is not a 
tenable postulated entity. (Putnam would not deny that we may never have a 
completely satisfactory theory in any terms, on any conceptual scheme, that 
accounts for all the phenomena that the electron of current Quantum 
Electrodynamics claims to account for.) 
 
The following passage259, already quoted in section 5.3, is important for 
Putnam’s argument, because otherwise IR3 would be in conflict with IR2. 
Idealized rational acceptability does not imply, ‘… conditions which are 
simultaneously ideal for the ascertaining of any truth whatsoever, or 
simultaneously ideal for answering any question whatsoever.’260 Putnam261 
makes an analogy between idealized rational acceptability and the physicist’s 
frictionless plane, an idealization we can approach as nearly as we please but 
not attain. Idealized is short of perfect262. Early in the nineteenth century an 
Internal Realist would have asserted that space was Euclidean. This would have 
been a strongly held framework truth. On Putnam’s continuum263 from the 
analytic to the synthetic, this ‘truth’ would have been near the analytic end. 
6.2.2 Conceptual Schemes 
Given Putnam’s stance that there is a continuum between the analytic and the 
synthetic, it might be thought that he must follow Davidson in the conclusions he 
draws from rejecting the scheme-content dichotomy. Thus, there might appear to 
be concerns about the postulation of conceptual relativism, that is, the proposed 
                                            
259 Putnam, H. 1990 Realism with a Human Face Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press p. viii. 
260 Wright remarks more generally, ‘There seems no good reason … why all questions which are 
empirical in content should become decidable under ideal conditions.’ (Wright, C. 1992 Truth and 
Objectivity Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press p. 39) 
261 Putnam, H. 1981 Reason, Truth and History Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p 55. 
262 Putnam acknowledges that there is no universal method for specifying these satisfactory 
conditions for making true empirical assertions since they are relative to the type of discourse 
(Putnam, H. 1983 Philosophical Papers Volume 3 Realism and Reason Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. xvii, p. 231). 











existence of distinct conceptual schemes. Davidson famously rejects conceptual 
relativism264 – according to him the notion of alternate schemes is not 
comprehensible. But if one cannot say that entities exist either mind-
independently or mind-dependently because mind-independence is an 
unacceptable notion, then this is an argument for Anti-realism. As Khlentzos 
says265: ‘Once we reject the illusion of a distinction between a conceptual 
scheme or a system of practices and a reality to which the conceptual scheme or 
system of practices is answerable, the realist’s credo is revealed as simply 
incoherent.’ However, Davidson thinks that the Realism, Anti-realism debate is 
misconceived266. 
 
The important question for present purposes is whether one has to accept 
Davidson’s rejection of the possibility of different conceptual schemes. I argue 
that the answer to this question is in fact no. 
 
I have earlier accepted Grover Maxwell’s (and other) arguments against a sharp 
observable-unobservable distinction (sections 1.1 and 2.5.3) and will argue that 
this is compatible with conceptual relativism. 
 
The conclusions that Davidson draws from his holism are not universally 
accepted, and there are significant arguments against them in the literature267. 
For example, Williamson states268, 
                                            
264 Davidson, D. 1984 Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
265 Khlentzos, D. 2004 Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge Cambridge MA: MIT 
Press p. 43. 
266 Davidson’s position in the Realism Anti-realism debate is subject to controversy, ranging from 
his own view that on his terms the debate is misconceived, to the view that the Principle of 
Charity is an Anti-realist stance to, at the other extreme, a Realist construal (see for example 
Calvert-Minor, C. 2009 ‘Commonsense Realism and Triangulation’ Philosophia 37, 67-86). 
267 See for example Soames, S. 2003 Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century Princeton: 
Princeton University Press Volume 2 Chapter 13; Williamson, T. 2007 The Philosophy of 
Philosophy Oxford: Blackwell Chapter 8; Goldberg, N. and Rellihan, M. 2008 ‘Incommensurability, 
Relativism, Scepticism: Reflections on Acquiring a Concept’ Ratio 21,147-167. 
268 Williamson, T. ibid p. 260 (the reference to Davidson (1974) is to ‘On the very idea of a 
conceptual scheme’ which is reprinted in Davidson, D, 1984 Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 











Davidson’s principle of charity evokes massive disagreement. However, it 
is not wholly to blame for the contentious conclusions that Davidson 
wishes to draw. It figures in his notorious argument against the very idea 
of mutually incommensurable conceptual schemes, alien ways of thought 
or untranslatable languages (1974). Besides that argument also makes 
the verificationist assumption that other creatures have beliefs only if we 
have good evidence that they have beliefs and the constructivist 
assumption that we can have good evidence that they have beliefs only if 
we can have good evidence as to which beliefs they have. Neither 
assumption follows from the principle that beliefs tend to be true. Neither 
assumption is warranted as we are far from omniscient interpreters … 
 
Kuhn269, in defending his incommensurability position against Davidson, 
developed a local version of incommensurability, restricting translation failure to 
clusters of inter-defined terms from the different theories. He proposed that in a 
scientific revolution that there was a shift from one taxonomy of natural kinds to 
another, untranslatable into the first. Restricting inability to translate to clusters of 
terms, or even to the entire vocabulary of the theories, may eliminate the 
necessity of making sense of either the scheme-content dualism or an 
untranslatable language. 
 
Davidson explicitly denies this270: 
We must conclude, I think, that the attempt to give a solid meaning to the 
idea of conceptual relativism, and hence to the idea of a conceptual 
scheme, fares no better when based on partial failure of translation than 
when based on total failure. Given the underlying methodology of 
interpretation, we could not be in a position to judge that others had 
concepts or beliefs radically different from our own. 
 
                                            
269 Kuhn, T.S. 2000 The Road Since Structure J. Conant and J. Haugeland (Eds) Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press pp. 93-94. 











The argument he gives for his stance is essentially the same as that which he 
gives for the case of total failure. In the partial failure case critics have argued 
that it is problematic a priori to rule out the possibility that Putnam postulates. 
Swoyer271 remarks, 
the possibility that certain aspects of human cognition result from the 
contingent, often highly accidental, evolutionary history of our species, and 
if the similarities among human beings stem from contingent features of 
our brain and our sensory apparatus, creatures with quite different 
biological makeups might perceive and think in quite different ways. 
 
Aliens might understand one another while we cannot understand them. 
Moreover, we might even be able to learn their language and still be unable to 
translate it into ours. ’If a lion could talk, we could not understand him’272 may not 
be right. Perhaps we could understand, having learned the language, but still be 
unable to translate into English. Of course, the fact that we can coherently 
imagine beliefs that differ in modest ways from ours does not provide a firm 
assurance that we can coherently imagine ones that differ massively. We cannot 
envisage alternatives that involve jettisoning the means that enable us to 
envisage them. What is clear is that for the physicist there are two conceptual 
schemes – that of general relativity and that of quantum mechanics – and these 
schemes are inferentially isolated. That is, any combining of the two schemes 
would result in a contradiction. 
 
If the denials of the most radical aspects of Davidson’s stance are accepted, we 
can allow that the Internal Realist can propose conceptual relativity – the 
existence of distinct inferentially isolated conceptual schemes. That is conceptual 
schemes which if combined would lead to a contradiction. Hence the Internal 
Realist can believe both the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, 
despite the fact that they are inferentially isolated, and, as an Internal Realist, 
                                            
271 Swoyer, C. ‘Relativism’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism. 











one can accept this and the possibility that they may continue indefinitely with 
precision to account for every observation in each of their domains. Putnam does 
not accept the assumption that physics is ever going to give us a Grand Unified 
Theory; indeed, as I cited him earlier (section 5.3) he rejects this claim as ‘sheer 
dogmatism’. 
 
This acceptance of these two scientific theories, on the grounds of the distinct 
conceptual schemes they embody, raises the question of precisely what is meant 
by Putnam by the term ‘conceptual scheme’. Clearly scientists do not accept that 
‘p’ and ‘not p’ can arise from one acceptable theory. Nor do scientists normally 
accept that two theories they regard as incompatible are both true. In the 
example mentioned earlier, the (erroneous) caloric theory that heat is a material 
substance was favoured for a long time over the contemporaneous kinetic theory 
of molecular motion. Scientists at the time will have used each for particular 
purposes, but would either suspend judgment as to which was correct, or believe 
one but not the other, taking it to have merely instrumental value. In the quantum 
mechanics general relativity case the situation is the same. However, the Internal 
Realist can believe both, which perhaps few practicing scientists would do, 
though they do certainly use both. Now the Internal Realist is not claiming that 
whenever there are conflicting meritorious scientific theories, there are legitimate 
distinct conceptual schemes, and hence both theories should be believed. What 
then is meant in the quantum mechanics general relativity case in claiming that 
we do indeed have two conceptual schemes? 
 
Soames, in the different context of discussing Davidson’s work, asserts that 
‘conceptual scheme’ is a vague notion, but offers the following example273. 
Consider the beliefs of speakers whose natural and unreflective way of 
looking at the world does not involve the recognition of objects that persist 
through time, but does involve the recognition of temporal stages of objects 
                                            
273 Soames, S. 2003 Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century Princeton: Princeton 











that bear proximity relations to one another. Do such speakers have a 
conceptual scheme different from ours? Is it conceivable that we could 
interpret them? So long as the speakers in the alien culture are willing to 
grant that there are certain kinds of sums of temporal stages over time that 
could be regarded as enduring objects – as strange and unnatural as these 
objects seem to them (“Of course such objects exist but why would anyone 
be interested in them?”) – and so long as, given our enduring objects as 
starting points, together with moments of time, we are willing to grant the 
existence of temporal stages – as strange and unnatural as they seem to us – 
there may be no fundamental disagreement between the two cultures as to 
what objects exist. Neither culture need view the claims made by the other as 
false. Rather each may view the entities that the other takes as most worthy 
of attention as strange, unusual and derivative; and because of this, each 
might find it difficult to explain or understand how the other could take such 
unnatural entities as basic. But speakers of the two cultures need not 
disagree over the kinds of objects that exist, or even over their properties. 
Thus, the need to ensure agreement in order to construct a Davidsonian 
theory of interpretation does not have any significant bearing on the possibility 
that such an alien culture might exist, or even that we could interpret them. 
 
These schemes are incompatible in that one does not recognize objects that 
persist through time and the other does so. The situation can be compared with 
the incompatibility of the Newtonian scheme with that of special relativity. If the 
velocity of light were infinite these two schemes would be compatible. Long 
before Einstein’s realization that the velocity of light was constant it was known 
that the velocity of light was finite274. If some earlier genius had proposed the 
                                            
274 A reasonably accurate measurement of the speed of light was made in 1676, by Romer who 
studied Io, a moon of Jupiter, which was eclipsed by Jupiter at regular intervals. Romer found that 
during the course of a year the eclipses lagged more and more behind the expected time, but 
then began to pick up again. As the Earth and Jupiter move in their orbits, the distance between 
them changes. The light from Io takes a finite time to reach the Earth, and takes longest when the 
Earth is furthest from Jupiter. Indeed Newton wrote in the Principia (Book I, section XIV), 











special theory in the eighteenth century, a Newtonian would, in principle275, have 
been forced to acknowledge that her scheme was untenable. 
 
It must be acknowledged that to accept the argument that we do have two viable 
conceptual schemes in operation, we have to accept the scheme independence 
of at least part of our evaluative principles. In other words, judgments are made 
that in some respects transcend the internal judgments within the two schemes. 
The Newtonian has to accept that within her conceptual scheme the 
experimental evidence of the constant finite velocity of light cannot be 
accommodated. This is merely to reiterate Putnam’s point that the existence of 
more than one conceptual scheme does not lead to an empty relativism. 
However, prior to Einstein’s thought experiment, the Newtonian scheme had 
every appearance of internal consistency276. 
 
The grounds for making a claim for differing legitimate conceptual schemes in the 
quantum mechanics general relativity case are twofold. As outlined earlier they 
are, first, the predictive power, coherence and profound insight provided by each 
scientific theory, and the spectacular agreement of each theory with all the data 
relevant to it; second, the long term failure, despite a huge concentration of effort, 
to find a theory that reconciles the two schemes. 
 
In accepting both the quantum mechanical and the general relativistic schemes 
the Internal Realist is relying on the belief that in part her evaluative principles 
are applicable to both schemes; otherwise the judgment could not be made. This 
is not inconsistent with the two schemes being inferentially isolated; it is only to 
say that the two schemes are correct judged by criteria internal to each of them, 
                                                                                                                                  
the observations of different astronomers, that light is propagated in succession and requires 
about seven or eight minutes to travel from the sun to the earth’ (cited in ‘Relativity resources’ 
www.relativitybook.com). 
275 Many physicists persisted in scepticism about the special theory long after 1905. 
276 As was noted in footnote 274 above, the finite velocity of light was known in Newton’s time, so 











and neither is successfully invalidated by any criterion that can be applied to 
each. 
 
In discussing this, Caruana277 suggests that having the same doxastic attitude 
towards some basic propositions leads to the requirement that Putnam 
acknowledge the mind-independence of something – namely this common 
ground. This Caruana argues does not undermine Putnam’s Internal Realism 
because all that is required is a shared human nature and thus a common 
cognitive faculty. 
 
Returning to the incompatibility of quantum theory and general relativity, the 
schemes are incompatible in the same sense as the Soames example. A 
quantum theory of gravity requires gravitons278 for which quantum mechanics 
cannot give a credible account. Einstein’s general theory of relativity makes no 
place for the existence of gravitons, that is, it is not a quantum theory. 
Consequently the conjunction of the two theories is not an acceptable theory279.  
 
The Scientific Realist on the quantum theoretical view could envisage the 
gravitational attraction between two bodies as being due to the exchange of 
virtual ‘gravitons’ – the quanta of the gravitational field. However, gravity differs 
from electromagnetism in that the gravitational field is nonlinear. This nonlinearity 
arises because the gravitational field possesses energy; this implies that 
gravitons will interact with other gravitons, unlike photons, which interact only 
with electric charges and currents and not with other photons. In quantum 
                                            
277 Caruana, L. 1996 ‘Beyond the Internal Realist’s Conceptual Scheme’ Metaphilosophy 27, 296-
301. 
278 The particle that mediates the gravitational force; there is currently no direct experimental 
evidence for its existence. 
279 For many applications general relativity and quantum mechanics have disjoint experimental 
domains. General relativity is observable with massive objects. Quantum effects are primarily 
observable with minute particles, although macroscopic phenomena like superconductivity 
require quantum mechanics for their explanation. Nevertheless, for many applications these 
incompatible theories can coexist in a temporary truce. Unfortunately any calculation that 
simultaneously uses both of these theories gives nonsense. Theorists argue that the origin of this 
lies in equations which become badly behaved when particles interact with each other across 











electrodynamics the resulting infinities are removed by renormalization and 
sensible answers are obtained. Thus quantum electrodynamics is a 
renormalizable theory because all such infinities can be removed by a systematic 
procedure; in effect, a single set of mathematical operations is sufficient to 
remove the infinities. This cannot be done for quantum theories of gravity. 
 
There remains the vexing problem of giving a clearer and more detailed account 
of what constitutes a conceptual scheme. The Newtonian scheme was accepted 
as accurately encompassing many physical phenomena and it coloured the 
views of scholars well beyond the arena of its direct applicability280. 
Nevertheless, it left uninfluenced large areas of conceptual thought even among 
those contemporaries and successors who were well versed in Newton’s work. 
Indeed even among these scholars it had no impact within many fields of 
science. It seems one can say little more than that a conceptual scheme provides 
an intellectual framework (a set of background assumptions) applicable within a 
certain domain. It does not appear possible to define precisely that domain even 
within a given conceptual scheme. Where the Internal Realist differs from the 
Metaphysical Realist is however clear. Putnam’s Metaphysical Realist believes 
that a mind-independent world specifies a unique true way of describing the 
world. 
 
The physicists’ current stance that they can use quantum mechanics and they 
can use general relativity in circumstances where one or other is appropriate, but 
cannot allow inferences from one of these schemes to the other is in stark 
contrast to the stance of the Metaphysical Realist. We have an instance of two 
conceptual schemes as the Internal Realist might characterize them. As I have 
mentioned previously, many theoretical physicists are dissatisfied with this 
situation, which they see as indicating that something is seriously wrong with one 
or both theories. 
                                            
280 It is sometimes argued that it was Newton’s conception of the universe based upon natural 











6.2.3 Putnam’s Pragmatism 
Putnam explains his use of ‘use’ in the important second quotation (in section 6.1 
above) beginning ‘The suggestion which constitutes the essence of "internal 
realism" is that truth does not transcend use’, as follows281. Putnam draws on an 
interpretation of Wittgenstein asserting that those inside a language game have 
learned not only rules or a technique, but ‘correct judgments’ Putnam gives an 
account of how a competent electrician might describe measuring current, 
including an account of the workings of a voltmeter and adds282, 
… knowing the ‘use’ of 'current is flowing through a wire' is knowing things 
like this. Of course, much else is presupposed; in fact, acculturation in a 
technical society, with all that this entails. Understanding a language game is 
understanding a form of life. And forms of life cannot be described in a fixed 
positivistic meta-language, whether they be scientific, religious, or of a kind 
we do not have in Western societies today. 
This key insistence on the primacy of practice seems at first sight to make far too 
much of a concession to relativism and the authority of the communal norms than 
Putnam intends; but Putnam emphatically does not believe that whether a 
statement is true or not is a matter of community acceptance, ‘… it is a property 
of truth that whether a sentence is true is logically independent of whether the 
majority of members of a culture believe it to be true.’ 283 
 
His argument in the remark about current flow in the wire is that the competent 
electrician or electrical engineer in this example will confront reality, because 
various things are part of a day to day system that works, resulting in a world 
somehow incorporated in the ‘form of life’ (the intertwined social and linguistic 
practices) of the competent electrician or electrical engineer. Putnam is claiming 
that truth and assertibility are inextricably related, and the form of life of the 
                                            
281 Putnam, H. 1995 Pragmatism: An Open Question Oxford: Blackwell pp. 45-52. 
282 Putnam 1995 op. cit. p. 48. 
283 Putnam, H. 1988 Representation and Reality Cambridge MA: MIT Press p. 109. Various 
philosophers argue that Putnam’s own Internal Realism undermines this robust rejection of this 
form of relativism (see for example Norris, C. 1997 New idols of the cave Manchester: 











competent electrician enables her to warrantably assert there is ’current flowing 
in the wire’, assuming she is at home in the form of life and in an ideal epistemic 
situation (where ideal is humanly possible, and is not some hypothetical perfect 
limit of inquiry)284. Inquiry is inductive and open-ended. Thus practice can be 
assumed to provide the cues for truth. Moreover, our epistemic standards evolve 
in the trial-and-error process of inquiry itself. 
 
A difficulty with this pragmatist stance is that highly competent experienced 
practitioners in various areas have throughout history agreed on, and regarded 
as obviously true, important falsehoods. Thus there seems to be a danger of an 
unacceptable relativism. However the Internal Realist accepts that some 
conceptual schemes are inadequate. Internal Realism is fallibilist, so false beliefs 
(common in science) would draw the response that no one doubts that mistakes 
have been made in the past, and past and present knowledge are limited. 
Further, Putnam would say, despite the obvious truth that errors have been made 
in the past and surely are being made currently, we should not doubt any 
propositions we have no specific reason to doubt. 
… we don’t need a ‘rule’ to take care of a ‘doubt’ that is wholly without 
justification!285 
Pragmatism … is characterized by being fallibilist and anti-skeptical 286 
The heart of pragmatism is the idea that notions that are indispensable to our 
best practice are justified by that very fact …287 
 
Putnam is anxious to maintain simultaneously the truth of our common sense 
view of a table and the physicist’s view of the same table in terms of elementary 
                                            
284 Putnam does not take the true to coincide with the warrantably assertible – they must come 
apart because something that was warrantably assertible at some time in the past may now be 
known not to be true. 
285 Putnam, H. 2001 Enlightenment and Pragmatism Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press 
p. 40. 
286 Putnam, H. 2004 Ethics without Ontology Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press p. 99. 











particles. This he calls conceptual pluralism.288 He cites the rainbow, which we 
see as showing bands of red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet, 
while in fact there is a continuous spectrum (the physicist’s rainbow)289. Vision 
does not show us a ‘ready-made world’; our perceptions are already structured290 
by our conceptual scheme. As Putnam points out, this ‘human’ rainbow is in part 
determined by our visual system including the way our brain processes its input. 
This last may include cultural factors. The ‘human’ vision of the rainbow is not 
defective because of the fact that it includes bands of colour not present in the 
physicist’s rainbow – it ‘fits the objects for us, not metaphysical things in 
themselves’.291 The two pictures are not incompatible and as I said earlier this is 
an example of Putnam’s conceptual pluralism. 
 
Putnam argues that Scientific Realism292 entails that our concepts and categories 
refer because they match up in some mysterious manner with the pre-structured 
                                            
288 In Representation and Reality he called this ‘conceptual relativity’. Later he acknowledges this 
as a mistake and refers to the chairs versus assemblage-of-molecules dichotomy as ‘conceptual 
pluralism’. By conceptual pluralism Putnam means that we can use both the common sense view 
and the physicist’s view ‘without being required to reduce one or both of them to some single 
fundamental and universal ontology’ (Putnam, H. 2004 Ethics without Ontology Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press p. 49) Thus, for example, it is simply a matter of convention whether a 
chair is identical with the region it occupies in space-time or with the sum of the time slices of the 
molecules it contains. Conceptual relativity implies conceptual pluralism but the reverse is not the 
case (Putnam, H. 2004 ibid pp. 48-49). It seems reasonable that someone might refer to metal 
window frames and someone else to aluminium window frames and a third person to precipitation 
hardened aluminium alloy window frames. The first two are correct ways of speaking; the last is 
more precise and could be called the solid state physicist’s window frame. A theoretical 
physicist’s window frame might consist of quarks and leptons. It is unclear what significance 
Putnam attaches to conceptual pluralism; it seems perfectly acceptable to the Scientific Realist 
and unlike conceptual relativity it does nothing to undermine the notion of a unique ontology. Of 
course, the Scientific Realist denies the meaningful existence of Putnam’s conceptual relativity 
and argues that there is only the acceptable conceptual pluralism. In her view there is always a 
unique truth of the matter, even if we do not or cannot know it. (Putnam‘s common example of 
conceptual relativity is the three objects, seven objects dichotomy in the Carnapian versus 
mereological account described in section 5.3 above and discussed further in footnote 300.) 
289 Putnam, H. 1981 Reason, Truth and History Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p. 146. 
290 Putnam himself points out that that this can lead to falsehood. We may see someone as a 
witch, as was done with complete conviction in Europe for hundreds of years (Putnam, H. 1995 
Pragmatism: An Open Question Oxford: Blackwell p. 67). 
291 Putnam 1981 op cit. p. 146. 
292 Putnam refers to the position he defines and criticizes as Metaphysical Realism. Insofar as 












categories, kinds and individuals that are inherent in the external world293. He 
rejects this, saying294: ‘It is we who divide up “the world” – that is the events, 
states of affairs, and physical, social, etc., systems that we talk about – into 
“object”, “properties”, and “relations”, and we do this in a variety of ways.’ The 
world does not come pre-structured but structure is imposed on it by the human 
mind and its conceptual schemes. The conceptual pluralism is acceptable to the 
Scientific Realist, who would not deny the rainbow story just given295. However, 
for Putnam the imposition of conceptual schemes by the human mind also leads 
to conceptual relativism, an essential element of Internal Realism, where different 
conceptual schemes may be incompatible. 
 
This position is of course not uncontroversial. Brown writes296 
One can grant that it is false that the world has one true classification or 
division into objects and kinds of objects without granting that it has no 
organization of its own. A modest realist might well say that the world has 
infinitely many classifications, that it contains infinitely many different kinds of 
objects. Such a moderate realist could say that when we develop a language 
we are not imposing an organization on the world, but selecting one of the 
world's organizations for our own use. On this view the world "in itself" has 
more objects than we usually talk about, not fewer. 
The Internal Realist would regard this statement as incoherent; ‘the world’ does 
not have any organizations from which to choose. There are no self identifying 
objects in the world. There can be many human descriptions but no one of them 
is of some ‘real’ mind-independent world. Putnam asserts297: 
                                            
293 ‘The metaphysical realist insists that a mysterious relation of correspondence is what makes 
reference and truth possible.’ (Putnam, H. 1990 Realism with a Human Face Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press p. 114) 
294 Putman, H. 1994 ‘Replies’ in Clarke and Hale (Eds), Reading Putnam Oxford: Blackwell p 243. 
295 For the Scientific Realist these are simply different observations leading to different description 
of (or perspectives on) a mind-independent world. 
296 Brown, C. 1988 ‘Internal Realism: Transcendental Idealism?’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
12, 145-55. 











There are ways of describing a physical object other than describing its 
appearance from a visual perspective; referring to alternative schemes as 
‘perspectives’, of course, makes it sound as if there must be ways of 
describing the world apart from the descriptions. This is just the disastrous 
Kantian error we need to avoid. 
Brown in turn would presumably respond to this response by saying that to deny 
that the world has a determinate unique structure is not to deny that it has 
structure. Putnam however maintains that the only plausible form of Scientific 
Realism is the form that he has characterized as Metaphysical Realism and this 
incorporates physicalism, a Correspondence Theory of truth and hence a unique 
structure. 
 
McMullin believes that the rejection of Metaphysical Realism does not 
immediately undermine Scientific Realism, and maintains contra Putnam that 
there is an acceptable form of metaphysical realism, which he does not specify, 
although he rejects aspects of Putnam’s account of Metaphysical Realism. It is 
worth quoting his slightly ambiguous remarks at length298. 
My own inclination is to defend a form of metaphysical realism, though not 
necessarily under all the diverse specifications Putnam offers of it. But that is 
not the point here. What is to the point is that scientific realism is not 
immediately undermined by the rejection of metaphysical realism, though the 
character of the claim scientific realism makes obviously depends on whether 
or not it is joined to a concept of truth in which the embattled notion of 
"correspondence" plays a part. Further, the type of argument most often 
alleged in its support does use the language of correspondence: it is the 
approximate correspondence between the physical structure of the world and 
postulated theoretical entities that is held to explain why a theory succeeds as 
well as it does. 
                                            
298 McMullin, E. 1984 ‘A Case for Scientific Realism’ in Scientific Realism J. Leplin (Ed) Berkeley: 











McMullin here uses a form of words that seems to commit the unnamed 
philosophers to approximate truth and to a correspondence theory of truth. 
 
The essence of Putnam’s defense against the charge that his claim, ‘truth does 
not transcend use’, leads to an unacceptable form of relativism is that science is 
a shared practice. The different equally correct descriptions (including quite 
possibly a different ontology) in a given domain are each the result of a common 
shared practice of inquiry involving cooperation and communication299. Each is 
fallible and they can be incompatible, and each can be true. There is no one true 
description in the sense that any different description is therefore false. This does 
not allow two true descriptions to be contradictory but it does allow them to be 
incompatible300. Thus it is not possible to express the general theory of relativity 
in a manner consistent with quantum mechanics. It is of course also possible that 
revision is required in any or all of the descriptions. 
 
Thus the Internal Realist takes the present successful mature scientific theories 
to be ideally rationally acceptable or ideally warrantably assertible, since there is 
                                            
299 This might appear to be inconsistent in that the shared environment must be identified with the 
rejected mind-independent reality. However, this is not so; the sharing comes through ‘common 
inductive practices involving communication and cooperation’ (Mueller, A. and Fine, A. 2005 
‘Realism, Beyond Miracles’ in Hilary Putnam Y. Ben-Menahem (Ed) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 114). This has already been discussed in section 6.2.2 where Caruana’s 
earlier paper is cited. 
300 To say ‘There is a fire in the room and I do not believe there is a fire in the room’ is to make 
incompatible assertions. The assertions are not however contradictory. Wittgenstein referred to 
this as ‘Moore’s Paradox’. Putnam’s usual example is somewhat different; it is the three objects 
seven objects dichotomy in the Carnapian versus mereological account described is section 5.3. 
In this case both the Carnapian and the mereological counter will recognize that the other gives 
the same answer as she gave previously for all the cases where they themselves gave the same 
answer. That is, counting is taking place and there are no grounds for believing that either is in 
error or, as Putnam would add, there is any truth of the matter. The schemes are inferentially 
isolated in my analysis because if they were not we would have a contradiction. Provided they are 
isolated there is no instance of asserting p and not p (such as there are 3 objects and there are 
not 3 objects because there are 7). Scientific Realists resist in various ways this conceptual 
relativity thesis that leads to the concept of incompatible but not contradictory theories. Scientific 
Realists who reject Putnam’s view that their stance commits them to a direct correspondence 
theory of truth can argue that the three objects seven objects dichotomy does not deny a unique 
ontology. See for example Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. 2002 ‘Conceptual Relativity and 











no reason to suppose that they do not coincide with the outcome of an 
Epistemicaly Ideal Inquiry. 
 
From the point of view of the concerns of this thesis, the most important point, as 
already mentioned, is that the Internal Realist can avoid approximate truth301, 
and can take the less solidly accepted current scientific theories to be false until 
such time as it is reasonable to suppose they can be justifiably presumed to 
coincide with the outcome of an Epistemicaly Ideal Inquiry. Whereas the 
Scientific Realist must draw on the approximate truth of theories, because her 
claim for success rests on nearness to a supposed mind-independent reality, the 
Internal Realist explains success either on the basis of truth or on the basis of the 
significant claims that are true in the theories. Her stance does not allow of 
nearness to a mind-independent reality because there is no such thing. 
6.3 Internal Realism and the McMullin Conjunction 
My argument has been that the Internal Realist need not say that the current 
theory of the electron is approximately true. As truth is properly understood the 
theory, which is explanatory and in excellent agreement with experiment, is 
believed to be true. In saying that the theory is believed to be true, one is not, as 
an Internal Realist, saying that it will necessarily be believed in its entirety twenty 
years from now. If it is believed to be true now by the Internal Realist’s lights it 
may be thought or known to be false then by the same standards, by virtue of 
new data. The dilemma presented by inferentially isolated, long standing, highly 
successful, mature theories like quantum mechanics and general relativity should 
persuade an Internal Realist to abandon the concept of approximate truth 
because she, unlike the Scientific Realist, does not need it (as discussed in 
                                            
301 Putnam himself is untroubled by the notion of approximate truth, which he refers to at various 
times and treats as unproblematic (see for example Putnam, H. 1984 ‘What is Realism’ in 
Scientific Realism J. Leplin (Ed) Berkeley: University of California Press; Putnam, H. 1975 in 
‘Philosophy and Our Mental Life’ Philosophical Papers Volume 2 Mind, Language and Reality 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p. 301). He does acknowledge its ill defined nature but 
regards it as usable nevertheless (Putnam, H. 1994 Words and Life Cambridge MA: Harvard 











section 5.3). Thus the Internal Realist can avoid an argument that undermines 
McMullin’s case for Scientific Realism. 
 
Turning to nearness to some putative final answer, an Internal Realist would 
respond, if asked of various figures which one is closest to being a square that it 
depends on one’s explanatory interest. Without that clarification, it is a pseudo 
question. In other words, an Internal Realist would affirm that a rectangle of edge 
lengths a, b with b≠a, and a<1.01b<1.01a, resembles a square, provided one is 
not interested in four-fold symmetry. A similar response would be given to a 
question involving an equiangular figure whose four edges of equal length were 
arcs of circles of large and equal radius. The proviso in this case would be that it 
was unimportant that the curvature of the edges should always be zero. 
 
The Internal Realist is not suggesting that all conceptual schemes are equally 
acceptable. The conceptual scheme Mendeleyev proposed for the ordering of the 
elements was hugely successful in predicting the existence and properties of 
new elements. Obviously, alternative schemes were possible as would be 
acknowledged by Realists and Anti-realists alike. The point is that Internal 
Realism fully accepts that the world determines the outcome of experiments. 
Once an experiment has been set up, the opinions of the scientists, while they 
unquestionably may play a major role in the interpretation of the results, 
obviously play absolutely no role in such things as the meter readings or particle 
tracks302. These results can lead anyone with a theory which explains past 
results to a new theory which explains the apparently conflicting results of new 
experiments. The simplest explanation for the Internal Realist (just as for other 
Anti-realists, as suggested in Chapter 2) of the successive generation of theories 
from their predecessors is that the theories contain significant claims which are 
true. Of course, as stated there, this explanation is available to the Scientific 
Realist. Like McMullin, most Scientific Realists would however prefer to attribute 
                                            












the P-fertility to the approximate truth of the successive theories because this is 
consonant with the Scientific Realist picture. 
 
Dalton’s atomic theory was wrong about the behaviour of nuclei (of which nothing 
was known at the time), but it contained significant true claims about the extra-
nuclear behaviour of atoms. Similarly, the caloric theory of heat in assuming that 
the material substance, caloric, was conserved did incorporate (in a restricted 
form) the true claims about the conservation of energy. It thus allowed 
developments in the understanding of the distinction between heat capacity and 
temperature and in the understanding of specific heat. 
 
For the Internal Realist a long standing successful theory based on a given 
conceptual scheme can be viewed as a succession of theories, each modified 
just as McMullin suggests. As discussed earlier in relation to the other Anti-realist 
positions, it is not approximate truth that is invoked to account for this, but the 
significant claims which are true – truths in this case within the chosen 
conceptual scheme. These true claims persist as the theory demonstrates its P-
fertility over time. Thus to take the two examples previously discussed at some 
length, given the conceptual scheme, it is true simpliciter that dislocations 
account for the plastic deformation of metals and that the energy levels in the 
Bohr atom and its successors are quantized. 
 
The Scientific Realist might respond to this by saying that her account is 
explanatory in a way that the Internal Realist’s is not. This argument has little 
force for someone who believes the Scientific Realist view is incoherent. 
Nevertheless, because of the underdetermination of theory by experiment, it may 
seem too easy to propose a theory and maintain that it is true by the Internal 
Realist’s lights. However, the constraints in the mature sciences provided by the 
extremely rich and precise data and extensive theorizing in related areas make it 
difficult to find even one satisfactory theory. Hence the underdetermination 











inferential isolation of the conceptual schemes of quantum theory and general 
relativity. 
6.4 False Successful Theories 
Scientific Realists account for the success of false theories by claiming that they 
are approximately true. This clearly does not work for theories like the phlogiston 
theory which is not approximately true, so that this remains a problem. 
Nevertheless, the success of long standing successful current theories, which the 
Scientific Realist would say were unlikely to be true, is dealt with by claiming they 
are approximately true. 
 
The Internal Realist explains that the success of theories that are false is 
primarily a result of the true significant claims in the false theories303. (These of 
course include the theories that the Scientific Realist is claiming are 
approximately true). The choice between competing theories is made by the 
Internal Realist on the same basis as the Scientific Realist. The chosen theory 
simply has more explanatory power, or gives results more closely in accord with 
the most well established experimental observations, or it is least in conflict with 
related theories, or some combination of these and other relevant factors304. That 
is, for the Internal Realist it is more rationally acceptable. The notion of 
approximate truth need not be invoked. 
 
In the case of successful theories that are entirely devoid of truth, the Scientific 
Realist and the Internal Realist are equally at a loss. The theory that projectiles 
return to the Earth because that is their natural resting place certainly made 
innumerable correct predictions. A Scientific Realist contemporary of Aristotle 
                                            
303 There may be a contribution from false elements also (see footnote 124). 
304 Such considerations of course do not ensure a correct conclusion. The caloric theory that heat 
is a material substance was favoured for a long time over the contemporaneous kinetic theory of 
molecular motion. One reason for this was the very low specific heat of mercury compared with 
water. In comparing the two liquids it seemed inexplicable on the kinetic theory that the very 
much heavier mercury atoms could require less energy to raise their temperature than the water 
molecules. Twentieth century theories of specific heat would not now allow this simple 











would have taken the theory to be approximately true and an Internal Realist 
would have taken it to be true305. The present argument is that the latter claim is 
clear and false, and that it is not possible to attach a meaning to the former claim. 
What might it mean to say that this teleological theory was approximately true? 
                                            
305 As was remarked in section 1.5, McMullin’s claim of the conjunction of P-fertility and long 











CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
It has been argued that the interesting and novel argument for Scientific Realism 
that McMullin advances (on the basis of the conjunction of long standing success 
and P-fertility) requires a satisfactory notion of the approximate truth of scientific 
theories or of the relative verisimilitude of different theories to the truth. It has 
been claimed here that inter alia the context dependence of these concepts 
undermines the McMullin’s argument. Given this, even based on the acceptance 
of the correctness of the supposed observed McMullin Conjunction, Internal 
Realism, without any concession to the notion of approximate truth, and taking 
truth to be epistemicaly constrained, is an attractive alternative ‘best explanation’, 
based on the truths in the successive versions of the theory. 
 
I have accepted throughout, for the purpose of considering McMullin’s thesis, the 
reality of the McMullin Conjunction. However, rather than drawing on the 
progressive nearness to the truth of the successor modified theories, the 
McMullin Conjunction can be explained (by the Internal Realist and the Scientific 
Realist) by the fact that it results from the true claims in the theories, and the 
resulting metaphorical suggestiveness of the theories or the productive 
experiments they suggest. Each of the sequence of theories may lead to a 
further theory also containing true claims. Sometimes true theories are arrived at, 
and the Internal Realist would say that, for example, Quantum Electrodynamics 
is true. 
 
The Scientific Realist picture has an intuitive appeal if the notion of approximate 
truth of scientific theories is accepted. If the idea of ideal elastic ‘billiard ball’ point 
molecules is accepted as approximately true of a mind-independent world, then 
the modifications of it that lead to the van der Waals theory arise naturally and 
seem more closely to describe that world. On the other hand, quantum 











fiction, albeit a most useful and fruitful guide to a better understanding of the 
behaviour of gases. 
 
The Internal Realist does not lack resources for explaining P-fertility. She has a 
stable account of truth to legitimate the claim of persisting significant true 
theoretical claims within successor versions of long standing successful theories. 
She has a conceptual scheme which draws on all the scientific evidence and her 
changing picture of recalcitrant reality changes precisely because the evidence 
suggests the changes. As already remarked the constraints of the data and 
related theories severely limit possible conceptual schemes. The notion of our 
epistemic situation given by Internal Realism offers an account of the success of 
science without drawing on approximate truth or verisimilitude. 
 
A founding pragmatist, Peirce, wrote306: 
There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our 
opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, 
and, though our sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, 
yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain how 
things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and 
he reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion. 
 
The Scientific Realist and the Internal Realist would both broadly agree with the 
above proposition. The former would say that the ‘Real things’ have a knowable 
character independently of any account we might give of them, and that science 
gradually enables us more precisely to establish that unique character. To the 
extent that it is successful, the theory that expresses this is true or approximately 
true. 
 
                                            
306 Peirce, C.S. 1935 The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce C. Hartshorne and P. 











Putnam’s Internal Realism would have the Internal Realist conclude that there is 
nothing to be said about the ‘Real things’ until we propose a conceptual scheme; 
having done so we would claim that our account (within one or other of our 
conceptual schemes) of the ‘Real things’ is either true or false, or we must 
suspend judgment. (Putnam would however not accept the ‘one True conclusion’ 
Peirce sees as the ultimate outcome of scientific inquiry since this is akin to the 
Metaphysical Realism Putnam rejects.) 
 
In asserting earlier that that the McMullin Conjunction as a valid historical 
account can be explained on the basis of Internal Realism; it is not being claimed 
that it provides unequivocal support for Internal Realism. If we accept that the 
McMullin Conjunction is a valid generalization over a broad spectrum of scientific 
theories, and we also assume that the approximate truth and the verisimilitude of 
theories are concepts that we cannot justify, then Instrumentalism must also be 
considered. 
 
In this context one can consider Cartwright’s Entity Realism together with van 
Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. Neither writer believes in the truth of 
universal theories; Cartwright because the world is a messy place, and van 
Fraassen because acceptance is all one should have as an attitude towards 
scientific theories. Neither philosopher denies there may be a mind-independent 
world in a sense that Putnam does deny. Cartwright believes in the existence of 
electrons and quarks, while van Fraassen does not, and asserts that the proper 
way to pursue knowledge is to accept rather than to believe the scientific theories 
that postulate such entities. Cartwright would take exception to the assumption 
Peirce makes in the statement quoted above that there are universal laws. Van 
Fraassen would take exception to the implication that science seeks and can find 
the truth. He would be troubled by incompatible theories but not be concerned 
with problems in giving an account of the approximate truth of theories. 
Cartwright on the other hand would be sceptical of claims that either quantum 












We know that innumerable false theories are successful both currently and 
historically. In different ways fluid dynamics and Newtonian mechanics are 
hugely successful false theories307. Physicists commonly believe that one or both 
of the theories of quantum mechanics and general relativity are false, while 
believing that they contain truths, and are seeking a quantum theory at all 
energies which accounts for gravitation. To believe that these theories are false 
is not to deny that they contain important contributions to our knowledge. 
 
The No Miracles Argument based on the success of science is readily 
accommodated by internal Realism, Entity Realism, and Constructive 
Empiricism. It can simply be argued that science as a self-correcting enterprise 
unearths facts about the world (in relation to some conceptual scheme in the 
case of the first of these three). As a result, later scientific theories generally 
contain more significant truths and/or fewer significant falsehoods than earlier 
theories. The fact that a theory contains significant true claims will commonly 
lead to experiments that will provide information on the merits of the conceptual 
scheme and/or the theory, and suggest modifications. This does not make the 
theory more nearly approximately true, since such a notion is unclear. 
 
If the McMullin Conjunction is accepted, Internal Realism, Entity Realism, and 
Constructive Empiricism remain plausible accounts of the scientific enterprise. 
(Of course aspects, other than the rejection of approximate truth and 
verisimilitude and the acceptance of the McMullin Conjunction, which might 
support or cast doubt on these theories have generally not been explored in this 
thesis.) The latter two views suggest that there is a given mind-independent 
                                            
307 I have claimed earlier that the Scientific Realist must argue that one or both of these theories 
is approximately true. This was in the context of the common premise (shared by McMullin) that 
success is an indicator of truth. While a common assumption, it is by no means obviously 
reasonable. As Lyons remarks, ‘The truth of one of the many competitors that would share our 
theory’s success would also explain our theory’s success.’ (Lyons, T.D. 2006 Review of Peter 
Lipton ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57, 255-
258). These competitors would of course include theories that have not yet been propounded 











world on which we have (perhaps significantly incorrect) perspectival views. The 
Internal Realist rejects this ‘visual perspective’ metaphor, and believes there is 
nothing other than our various conceptual schemes which enables us to partially 
know the world that circumscribes our conceptual schemes. 
 
While the McMullin Conjunction might be explained on the basis of some clear 
context independent notion of the approximate truth or the verisimilitude of 
scientific theories, in the absence of such a notion the novel case made by 
McMullin does not succeed in providing a convincing abductive justification for 
Scientific Realism. First, because both the Internal Realist and the Scientific 
Realist can give a satisfactory account of the conjunction on the basis of the 
significant true claims in the successful theories; second, because of the reliance 
of the latter position on the questionable notion of the approximate truth of 
scientific theories. Thus the claim that Scientific Realism is the best explanation 
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